Canberra, 12 July 1971
Secret Personal
There have been several reasons for the unusually long delay in replying to your letter of 7 June. 1 In the first place it arrived just after I had gone on two weeks’ sick leave (for a minor nasal operation); secondly, it raised, particularly in the last paragraph, some basic questions which I find it extremely difficult to answer to my own satisfaction, let alone yours; and, thirdly, I was conscious that you would be meeting very shortly with Mick Shann and David Anderson in Singapore and that they would be able to convey to you orally, much better than I could in writing, the present trends and the future possibilities in our policy. I trust that what I write below does not in any way conflict with what they will have told you.
In my understanding, following what we are calling ‘the virtual suspension’ of the dialogue, the emphasis now does revert to the United Nations aspect. There seems, however, to be an increasing realization at higher levels that the preservation of any sort of diplomatic relationship with Taiwan is irreconcilable with making progress with Peking. Mick Shann told me just before he left of his belief that by the end of the year the Prime Minister will have decided in favour of recognizing Peking—presumably accepting the concurrent need to sever relations with Taiwan. This may or may not, in my view, entail our getting out of line with the United States and Japan, but I do not regard it as inevitable that our relations with those two countries should be seriously prejudiced by a major divergence: this would be a difficult but not insuperable exercise in diplomatic presentation. I find it harder to judge whether a move in this direction by Australia would contribute to an excessive loss of confidence in Taipei.
My delay in replying to your letter has given me the opportunity of commenting at the same time on the paper you have prepared for the Heads of Mission Conference,2 copies of which you sent to Mick Shann. Most of my comments relate to the points enumerated in paragraph 12, but I might first say that I am rather impressed by the point you make in paragraph 6 (which I imagine has a reflection in the fourth last sentence of paragraph 8) about the likelihood that America would be unhappy if it were isolated in its support of the ROC. This provides some counter to the view that the adverse effects of a change in policy on our relations with the United States may in the past have been exaggerated.
As you know, I have always personally had some difficulty with the first of the four points you enumerated in paragraph 11 as being influenced by the result of the voting on Chinese representation in the United Nations. I can, of course, see a situation of some embarrassment to the United States if under the Security Treaty it were acting in defence of Taiwan when the principal organs of the United Nations had by their vote explicitly or implicitly accepted that Taiwan was part of the PRC’s territory; nevertheless I think that, provided the Americans had not themselves voted for this formula, they would be able to get themselves out of the problem.
As to the points in paragraph 12, I might make the following comments:
(a) It would be interesting to know what ‘practical reasons’ you have in mind in sub–paragraph (a).
(b) Following from the personal views reiterated above, I question whether in sub–paragraph (b) the reference to justifying internationally the continuing American defence commitment is necessary.
(c) Your sub–paragraph (g) is of course correct in the abstract but the basic question is whether it is so in a situation where the PRC has given us a straight choice, as it seems clearly to have done.
(d) As to sub–paragraph (h), I suggested that all its aspects have in practice already been floated through our approach of ‘progressive normalization’, and rejected.
(e) I agree that a study should be made in the circumstances described of ways in which your Embassy might be converted to some other form of representation. Again personally, I doubt whether that form can carry an official label.
(f) In connection with your sub–paragraph (o), I suggest that the validity of the third sentence depends on how conspicuous we had been in the manoeuvring whereby the ROC comfortably retained a seat; if we had taken a leading role I very much doubt whether the PRC would want to talk to us at all.
Geoff Brady3 has brought to my attention that replies are also outstanding to your memorandum 392 of 8 June and cable 494 of 30 June.4 In as fluid a situation as confronts us, with our policy still aiming to maintain some degree of flexibility, it is not really possible to give you any more precise answers than the foregoing to the cogent questions you have raised. In addition, of course, to this letter you have received through the PIRs and in other ways all the policy guidance that is available to us, as well as some more specific material relating to the UN side of the problem through the copies we have been sending you of telegrams to Washington. We shall of course make every endeavour to keep you as well informed as we can of developments in the Government’s approach.
I have left over only one major point, the Residence alterations. On this, you will also have had Mick Shann’s views which, at last reading and consistent with his assessment of the way the Prime Minister will jump, were not encouraging.
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38/18, xv]
1 Document 194.
2 Document 204.
3 G.V. Brady, Head, China-Korea Section, Department of Foreign Affairs.
4 Not published.