206

CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA

Paris, 12 July 1971

3285. Secret Priority

Dialogue No. 12

You will be considering what should be recommended to Ministers to say when Mr Whitlam returns from China.

2. In this connection, I would like to ‘flag’ two points. Firstly, there is the obvious point that it might be argued the dialogue has stalled because of the Opposition’s policy.

3. Secondly, there is the point that according to the French, Huang Chen, the Chinese Ambassador here, is a very important figure within China and is much more than ‘official’ in our terms means. While the French may have a vested interest in ‘cracking up’ Chen, his background (a veteran of the Long March, etc.) supports their contention.

4. Looking back over the second talk with Chen in the light of what has since come out publicly in China, the emphasis of his rejoinders about trade discussions was upon his ignorance of the subject and hence his incapacity to talk about it and not so much that trade exchanges had to follow not precede the establishment of diplomatic relations. Hence, it could follow from Chen’s attitude here that trade relations might be discussed between others. If Ministers wish to leave no stone unturned in this field, perhaps therefore an attempt should be made to have these exchanges done by the proposed visit by Bareham or between commercial counsellors here or elsewhere (preferably elsewhere as Chen was quite glacial when we last parted).

5. I suggest that in your studies of this complicated subject, you should bear in mind the following if you have not done so already. This is that despite Belgium’s past public declarations that she recognizes Peking as the Government of mainland China, the Formosa authorities have maintained their embassy in Brussels. As we do not accept the claim of these authorities to represent the whole of China, adoption of the attitude which Belgium has so far taken could be worth considering as a move which would be consistent, which might cost us nothing (possible effects on trade with Formosa would need to be examined) and yet show movement in policy. I realize that such a move would amount to a declaration of the one China–one Formosa solution to which the P.R.C. objects so strongly. However, the same attitude has not prevented the Belgian–P.R.C. dialogue.

6. I am seeing Rothschild later this week to see where matters between Peking and Brussels now stand.

Renouf.

[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xv]