Washington, 15 July 1971
3777. Emergency
For Prime Minister
Minister and Secretary of Foreign Affairs
From Plimsoll
Secretary of State, has just telephoned me from San Clemente to say that Kissinger was in Peking from July 9th to 11th and had talks with Chow En Lai. President Nixon will visit China to have talks with leaders next year at time to be decided. President will announce this at 10.30 p.m. tonight and say it means no change in relations with America’s allies.1
[NAA: A6364, WH1971/07-0l]
KISSINGER‘S FIRST VISIT TO PEKING, 9-11 JULY 1971
Kissinger’s secret visit to China was the product of a determined campaign by himself and Nixon to establish a direct dialogue with the Chinese leadership. Attempts had been made to use various channels—including the Dutch, the Romanians, and the PRC Embassy in Paris—but it was Pakistani contacts who proved most expeditious. In a message of April 1971, which augmented one of December 1970 of a similarly concessionary nature, Chou En-lai affirmed Peking’s willingness to have high-level discussions, possibly with the President, with a view to the fundamental restoration of bilateral relations.
The exchanges of the following months, which were to remain a matter for speculation for Australia and other US allies, involved some intriguing manoeuvring over contentious matters. Nixon replied positively to Chou on 10 May, noting that at such talks ‘each side would be free to raise the issue of principal concern to it’, and proposing that Kissinger meet Chou for a preparatory meeting. Chou, for his part, welcomed a visit from Kissinger, yet used Nixon’s allusion to the agenda to stress that it ‘goes without saying that the first question to be settled is the crucial issue … which is the question of the concrete way of the withdrawal of all the US Armed Forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits Area’. The Chinese had thus signalled clearly that substantive progress depended on US concessions over Taiwan.
Kissinger discussed Taiwan in detail with Chou when in July he arrived in Peking via Pakistan. In response to tough rhetoric from the Premier, Kissinger said the US would remove two-thirds of its military presence from Taiwan when hostilities in Vietnam ceased, with the remaining third being reduced ‘as our relations improve’. In this way, military questions would not be a ‘principal obstacle’. On the political front, Chou was assured that the US was ‘not advocating a “twoChinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” solution’. Rather, Kissinger’s ‘prediction’ was that Taiwan’s ‘political evolution’ would be in the direction of restoration to the PRC, but the US and China had to ‘recognize each other’s necessities … We should not be forced into formal declarations in a brief period of time which by themselves would have no practical effect’. Chou, evidently pleased with the disavowal of support for a permanent separation of Taiwan, remarked that the prospects for a solution to the problem and the establishment of diplomatic relations was ‘hopeful’. Later, in the context of an interchange on diplomatic relations, Kissinger articulated his ‘personal estimate’ that the ‘political question’ could be settled early in Nixon’s second term. It is clear from further comment that he believed this involved not only mutual recognition, but also satisfaction of the PRC’s demand that it be declared the sole legal government of China. In other words, Kissinger accepted de-recognition of the ROC and the principle of movement toward reunification as a quid pro quo for the normalisation of Sino–American relations.1
1 Plimsoll cabled again shortly afterwards: ‘Rogers telephoned me three quarters of an hour before President appeared on television. He said he was telephoning at Nixon’s request and asked also that regret be expressed to Mr. McMahon at shortness of notice. He said it had been kept a complete secret’.
1 Kissinger also promised Chou that the US would not support a Taiwanese independence movement, and it would oppose the establishment of a Japanese military presence on Taiwan.