Canberra, 21 October 1950
535. Top Secret Immediate
For Spender only from Menzies.
Further to my telegram 500.1
China
I agree with your view that the stage of bargaining for the entry to the United Nations of Communist China by offers to stop the Korean war is now over. I agree also that the time may soon come when a new approach to the problem of Chinese representation on the United Nations may be required. I had rather assumed that the most appropriate time for reconsideration of this matter would be shortly after the American Congressional elections.2
2. I have doubts, however, regarding your suggestion that this problem can be dealt with in two separate stages, namely:—
(a) ‘Unloading’ of the Nationalist Government; and, subsequently,
(b) Admission of the Communist Government.
While I have not attempted to look into the position from the point of view of international law, my off–hand view would have been that recognition of a new government de jure instantly connoted de–recognition of the old government and vice versa, the acts of recognition and de–recognition being therefore contemporaneous. There is, of course, the possibility that the ordinary rules of recognition are not necessarily the same as the rules laid down by some international body, such as the United Nations Assembly, which presumably is master of its own procedure. Nevertheless, it would seem unwise for such rules to differ substantially from the ordinary rule of international law.
3. Apart from the legal position, however, there is the point raised in your paragraph 43 as to public opinion in the United States. I can understand that American public opinion may not be ready to accept Communist Chinese representation in the United Nations. If this is so, however, I should have doubted whether it would have been prepared to accept an ‘unloading’ of the Nationalist Government, even though this unloading were temporarily divorced from the question of accepting the representatives of Communist China. Would unloading be a wise step some two or three weeks before the Congressional elections?
4. In any event, it seems to me that this is not a matter on which it is desirable that Australia should take the lead. After all, the United Kingdom and many other governments have already recognised Communist China. It seems more appropriate for such governments to take the lead either in ‘unloading’ the Government of Nationalist China or in seeking acceptance of the representative of Communist China in the United Nations. If and when these Governments take either or both steps and a decision is called for, we can reconsider our position.
5. There is no information available here as to the reasons for President Truman’s flight to meet General MacArthur4 or as to the nature of their conversation. It is possible that these talks have some bearing upon the problem we are considering. I should be glad to have any information that you can obtain in New York or Washington on this subject.
[NAA: A11537, i]
1 13 October. Menzies thanked Spender for Cablegram 646 (Document 20), noted that he had been thinking about the ‘difficult problem’ of China, and stated that he hoped to telegraph his comments shortly. He suggested, in the meantime, that Spender desist from taking public action along the lines that he had suggested in Cablegram 646.
2 Mid–term Congressional elections were held in the United States on 7 November.
3 Paragraph 4 of Document 20.
4 Truman issued a communique about his meeting with MacArthur on Wake Island on 15 October.