Washington, 19 July 1971
3849. Top Secret Immediate
For Prime Minister from Plimsoll
After the Secretary of State had talked to New Zealand Ambassador and me as I have reported in Telegram No. 38481 I remained behind to talk with him privately. He had read your letter to President Nixon.2
2. I told him that there were two sorts of problems for the Australian Government.
(a) It was important that the Australian public should see that there was genuine consultation between our two Governments and that consultation did not consist simply in the Australian Government being informed a few hours or even less ahead.
(b) The Australian Government needed to know in advance how United States policies were developing on China and Vietnam and other Far Eastern questions because that affected the presentation (underline one) of our policy publicly as well as some of our decisions on substance. I developed those points with reference to the situation in Australia along lines which I need not repeat here.
3. Rogers accepted all this. He said that there was indeed a close association between our two countries and we had worked together for a long while and that in fact in some places such as Indonesia in Soekamo’s latter days and in Cambodia, Australia had sometimes been taking a lead and the United States giving support rather than the other way around. The question of the President’s visit was an exceptional one on which it had just not been possible to let many know.3 Inside the United States Government itself it had been a closely guarded secret known to very very few. Indeed it was so closely guarded that in order to cope with pressures from inside the State Department he had had to write memoranda to the President pressing him on the urgency of a decision on the line to be taken in the United Nations on Chinese representation though he personally had known why the President was hanging back while being unable to tell his officers in the Department.
4. I spoke to Rogers about keeping Australia informed well in advance on the question of further United States troop withdrawals from Vietnam. He said that the President did not at present have any idea of speeding up withdrawals or advancing the date of the next announcement but of course this would depend on any developments from now on. He said we would be kept in the picture as it shaped up.
5. Rogers told me (and Comer) in great confidence and asked that it not be bruted about that the origin of the move lay with Peking and not with the United States. He said this to emphasise that we should not give the impression that we were the ones who wanted to get something and that we were courting China. Both sides had something to gain and we should avoid public positions developing which endangered our negotiating strength.
6. Rogers promised to keep very much in his mind what you had said in your message. He told me that President Nixon had asked that his personal regards be passed to you.
7. In the light of my talk with Rogers I think that the following are points which you might think of including in your own public statements.
(a) The Australian and United States Governments have been in continuous contact over many years on the Chinese question as well as on other questions relating to Asia and the Pacific. The policies of the two countries though not identical have been formed in the knowledge of one another’s interest and views.
(b) The possibilities in United States policy were first signaled publicly to Peking by Mr Rogers in his address to the National Press Club in Canberra on 8 August 1969.4 Mr Rogers had been having talks in Canberra with the Australian Government as well as attending SEATO and ANZUS Councils. (When he addressed congressional leaders privately this morning President Nixon mentioned this Canberra address. Kissinger also mentioned it in the White House press briefing reported in Telegram 3829).5
(c) The practice of using the term ‘People’s Republic of China’ to cover mainland China began with the ANZUS Council communiqué in Washington on 26 September 1970.
(d) In the past year the United States has been following many Australian [leads]6 (in relaxing trade, allowing visits etc.)
(e) The United States and Australia are in different positions because to put it bluntly one is a great power and the other is a smaller power. One of the strengths of the Australian position is that its neighbours cannot see it as a threat, and Australia does not have all the complications that go with being a great power. On the other hand the United States has a strength that comes from its sheer power and other countries take this into account in its dealings with it.7 Australia and the United States have different hands to play and each should play from its own strength and not in exactly the same way. An Australian government should not be expected to do or have done exactly what a United States government does. But our basic objectives are the same (as you have stated them already).
Plimsoll.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xix]
1 19 July. Rogers had reiterated points made in the President’s announcement and had indicated that the United States had asked the ROC to acquiesce in the accession of the PRC to a seat in the Security Council. On Vietnam, Rogers told Plimsoll and Comer that ‘nothing specific’ had come from Kissinger’s visit.
2 See Document 213.
3 Beneath this, McMahon wrote: ‘But they trusted the Pakistanis!! Not us!! Or Japan!!’
4 The text of the statement by Rogers is given in Current Notes , vol. 40, 1969, pp. 440–43.
5 Not published.
6 Text handwritten in the original.
7 Presumably, ‘it’ should read ‘them’.