Canberra, 21 July 1971
QP 11/71. Secret Eclipse
Developments in Sino–American Relations: Implications for Australia
The announcement by President Nixon on 15 July, 1971, of the Kissinger–Chou En-lai meeting in Peking and of his own acceptance of an invitation to visit Peking before May, 1972, served as dramatic confirmation of the speed with which the United States is prepared to move in the pursuit of its own interests, without consulting even its closest allies. Dr. Kissinger’s background briefing for the press the next day,1 and the non-committal and reserved comments that have characterised American briefings to Australian officials in Washington, have served notice that other interested parties cannot expect to be taken into American confidence any more than they were before President Nixon’s announcement. Nonetheless, the evolution of United States policy towards China and in Asia generally over the last two and a half years, together with hints and implications contained in Dr. Kissinger’s backgrounder of 16 July, have provided clear pointers to the areas of policy on which some agreement was probably reached at the Kissinger-Chou En–lai meeting.
Likely General Areas of Agreement
2. We can expect that agreement was achieved on a conceptual framework for the Sino–American dialogue in order for the Kissinger–Chou En-lai talks to have proceeded in the precise, business-like manner to which Kissinger referred in his backgrounder, and without which the invitation to President Nixon could have been neither offered nor accepted. In its most general terms, this framework seems likely to consist of broad agreement that both powers have legitimate interests in Asia, that neither seeks the military encirclement of the other, and that both genuinely seek an improved bilateral relationship. Some time ago high level Chinese officials remarked that when the time came to improve relations with the United States, the improvement would come about ‘all at once’. At the time, the Americans interpreted this to mean that a gradual improvement would have harmful consequences for the maintenance of domestic revolutionary fervour in China. It now seems more likely, however, that what the Chinese meant was that China would wait until it was convinced that American policy towards China, and in Asia generally, had changed to such an extent that an improvement in relations and the achievement of broad areas of agreement between Peking and Washington would not only be possible but certain. The United States has been working steadily for two and a half years for such an improvement, and although a breakthrough has until now appeared unlikely, largely because of the lack of any significant Chinese response to the various American initiatives, it now seems that a breakthrough has been achieved and that a basis for the improvement of bilateral relations has been laid.
3. To have achieved any agreement on fundamentals, we would expect the United States to have convinced the Chinese that the United States has no designs on China, that it will not seek to prevent China from pursuing its legitimate national interests in Asia, that the policy of containment, particularly as expressed in United States alliances in Asia, is being dismantled, and that neither United States efforts for detente with the USSR nor the United States relationship with Japan represents a threat to China. For their part, the Chinese could be expected to have convinced the United States Administration that China will not use force to further its interests, and that it seeks a normal relationship with the rest of the world. (The impressions gained by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister during his recent visit to Peking—see Belgrade telegram 8882—represent a summation of the kind of signals the Chinese have been putting out recently).
4. While it is difficult to speculate in detail, it seems clear that within the agreed conceptual framework substantive agreement may have been reached on at least the broad outlines of how both sides are to approach the major issues of contention in Sino–American bilateral relations. Indications from both sides suggest that the status of Taiwan (of principal domestic importance to China) constitutes the core of agreement reached between Kissinger and Chou En-lai. This would mean, in the first place, that the United States position on China’s representation in the United Nations has been fixed and communicated to the Chinese, and that it is broadly acceptable to Peking. The United States is most likely to have made concessions over Taiwan without a quid pro quo. We would expect, therefore, the United States to be satisfied that China will be prepared to play a constructive role in a settlement of the Indo–China war (of principal domestic importance to the United States). We doubt whether both sides have gone very far on the establishment of diplomatic relations. This subject was no doubt touched on during Kissinger’s intensive talks, but clearly both sides will need time for the present leap forward to be absorbed, not only domestically but among their respective friends and allies. The essential thing about the meeting, however, is that the Americans have clearly taken a bold approach, based on the view that peace in South East Asia is ‘a foremost, immediate objective’ and that the technical details of achieving detente are secondary. To this end it is clear that fundamental changes have been made in United States foreign policy during the last several months, changes which, to quote Kissinger, ‘it took so long to prepare’ and ’such painful decision to reach’.
Chinese Representation in the United Nations
5. Chronologically the most immediate issue in Sino–American relations, the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations must have figured prominently in the Kissinger/Chou talks. We would expect the United States to have given the Chinese firm assurances that:
(a) the United States will not oppose the entry of PRC into the United Nations this year;
(b) the United States will work for the acceptance of the PRC as a permanent member of the Security Council;
(c) the United States, for domestic and international political reasons, will associate itself with a move to retain a United Nations seat for Taiwan, but will avoid any formula that may give added legal effect to the division of China.
It is difficult to see President Nixon’s visit to China going ahead under any other circumstances.
6. The Chinese are clearly aware of the political need for the United States to make some gesture in favour of a seat for Taiwan. However, they can also be expected to be only too aware of the implications of such an American undertaking in present circumstances: the fact of broad United States/PRC agreement alone will operate in favour of Peking in voting at the United Nations, thus eroding support for Taiwan’s right to a seat even in the General Assembly. On top of that, American willingness to accept Peking into the Security Council can be expected to have serious repercussions on ROC/United States relations, possibly resulting in a walk-out by Chiang Kai-shek rather than humiliation. Nonetheless, there remains, for Peking, a slight risk that United States endeavours to preserve a place for Taiwan will succeed: the implications of such an eventuality for China’s taking its seat and for the projected Nixon visit to Peking cannot be assessed at this time.
7. In terms of procedure there are many ways in which the United States could achieve the desired result of admitting Peking to the Security Council while attempting what the United States has previously called a ‘One China solution which does not exclude Taiwan’ (Washington telegram 2445 and Policy Planning Paper QP9171).3 Among these, and excluding a walk-out by Taiwan, the most likely course appears to be United States abstention on the Albanian Resolution and a positive vote for a ‘non-expulsion’ resolution (i.e. and amended IQ resolution). Approaches based on dual representation and reversion to the traditional IQ resolution would appear to sail close to a ‘Two Chinas’ concept on the one hand and opposition to Peking’s entry on the other. They are therefore somewhat less likely, but should not be excluded altogether, particularly if the Chinese have remained adamant in insisting on the expulsion of Taiwan. In that event Kissinger and Chou may well have agreed that the Americans should simply fall back on the traditional IQ resolution in the almost certain knowledge that it will fail, a possibility that was referred to by Winthrop Brown during the talks on Chinese representation at the time of the ANZUS officials’ meeting in Canberra earlier this year.
Indo–China
8. It also seems clear that the domestic political pressures created by the Vietnam war, linked with Russia’s growing strategic mobility on a global scale, have been great enough to encourage the United States Administration to move towards an accommodation with China, involving a compromise over Taiwan in return for Chinese willingness to assist in a settlement of the Indo–China war which will permit the United States to extricate itself from the military and political morass in that area. There is enough evidence to suggest that, for their part, the Chinese are satisfied that the United States presence in Indo–China poses no threat to China’s security or territorial integrity, and that it is in any event being substantially reduced with the intention of its eventual total withdrawal. The focus of Peking’s interest appears to have shifted in recent years from Indo–China to East Asia where the growth of Japanese power seems to have brought home to Peking the unpleasant fact that China is faced by two traditionally hostile powers in Russia and Japan, while at the same time the full weight of the most powerful political force in Asia—the United States–Japan alliance—impinges directly on China’s primary strategic interests. In the light of apparent Chinese eagerness to mend relations with the United States there is now very little doubt that since her emergence from the Cultural Revolution and the border clashes of 1969 with the USSR, Peking has been concerned rather less with the achievement of super power status, than with a hasty scramble to break out of political isolation which she may have seen as being increasingly imposed upon her by the three big powers. Some support for this view comes from Peking’s continual denials that China wished to be a super power and also from the degree of hostility directed at Japan in particular. In short, detente with the United States will serve both to increase Peking’s leverage against the USSR and Japan, at the same time that it can be expected to create strains in the Japanese/American relationship.
9. In comparison with these objectives, the political situation in Indo–China no longer appears to occupy a principal place in Peking’s foreign policy priorities and we would expect the Chinese to have shown general willingness to assist the United States in moving towards a settlement of the war. However, reactions from Hanoi in particular, together with Kissinger’s comments on negotiations, suggest that few details have so far been worked out between the two sides. It is almost certain, however, that a broad agreement has been reached for both sides to exercise restraint and at the same time to work towards serious negotiations over the corning months, with the possibility of an Indo–China conference some time after President Nixon’s projected visit. This will be a complex exercise, however, as preliminary reactions from Saigon and Hanoi have shown; both Vietnamese parties must clearly have cause for concern about the possibility that the two big powers may attempt to reach a ‘deal’ on Vietnam over their heads. Soviet reactions to the Chinese–American discussions and Russia’s likely interest in taking part in a settlement can also be expected to complicated the prospects for serious negotiations. We would expect Kissinger’s emphasis on the preparatory work which needs to be done in advance of President Nixon’s visit, to apply in particular to a settlement in Indo–China.
The Status of Taiwan
9. The United States is now clearly prepared to sacrifice the ROC as a member of the United Nations. Whatever gestures it is still prepared to make in support of a United Nations seat for the ROC, the most likely outcome, given the effect on world opinion of the Sino–American discussions, is that one way or another the representatives of the ROC will leave the United Nations this year. In that event the issue of Taiwan can be expected to become a much more simple bilateral issue between the United States and China. We would expect agreement to have been reached between Kissinger and Chou that the United States will withdraw its military forces from Taiwan in return for the crucial concession sought by the United States of China, an assurance that force will not be used against the Nationalist regime; pending a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem, the United States has also clearly stated its intention to the PRC to maintain in being its defence treaty with the ROC. This has been announced publicly in the last day or so.
Recognition and Diplomatic Relations
10. It seems inconceivable that Kissinger and Chou would not have spent some part of their meeting discussing recognition and the exchange of diplomatic missions. However, Kissinger has given nothing away on this subject in his backgrounder. He has stated firmly that recognition and the exchange of diplomatic missions cannot be expected before President Nixon visits Peking, and has relegated these matters to the status of technical issues that cannot be resolved until there is ’some conceptual understanding of where we are trying to go’. He has not, however, ruled out the possibility that recognition and the exchange of diplomatic missions might emerge from the Nixon–Chou meeting, although at this stage neither country has ‘even the beginning of an agreement’ on this subject.
11. The United States diplomatic and military commitment to Taiwan is the major obstacle in the way of establishment of diplomatic relations. However on the basis of the apparent strong desire on the part of the United States to get out of Indo–China in return for a detente with the PRC, it seems unlikely that the United States will let Taiwan stand in the way. It is difficult to speculate with any accuracy on the way in which the diplomatic problem can be overcome, but it is quite possible that the solution may be a unique one, perhaps permitting the continued independent existence of Taiwan with its own contacts to the outside world for as long as it takes for the achievement of a peaceful settlement between Peking and Taipei.
12. In short, therefore, although we have little hard information to work on, it appears reasonable to assume that, subject to agreement if only on approach between China and the United States on major issues of dispute between them, the question of recognition and the exchange of diplomatic missions is likely to be resolved either during President Nixon’s visit to China or shortly thereafter.
Implications
13. The two most significant implications of this apparent sudden shift in great power relationships are, on the one hand, the evident American need to be able to extricate itself from Indo–China, and, on the other, an apparent premiss behind American actions that China is a ‘problem’ that can be solved, and that its solution will allow the United States greater freedom to deal with its chief adversary, the Soviet Union. The boldness of the American approach is at once as commanding as it may be dangerous and ill-conceived. There is no doubt that a Sino–American detente could go a long way towards removing military and political tensions in Asia, but should the Americans move too quickly and should they misinterpret Chinese intentions, the resultant difficulties for smaller countries in the area as well as for the United States could well be increased.
14. The Sino–American dialogue, conducted as it has been in secret, has already begun to produce domestic pressures within Japan that could lead ultimately to a shift in Japan’s policies and attitudes towards the United States. Should the Japanese come to lose faith in the United States Alliance, we could expect a trend to gather force within Japan in favour of greater defence expenditures, removal of constitutional impediments on the possession of standing armed forces and, in the longer term, perhaps even on acquisition of nuclear weapons. Such defence policies could be expected to create greater tensions in Sino–Japanese relations, which in turn could afford the Russians with more room for exploiting Japan’s relations with both China and the United States. They would tend also to increase fear of Japanese economic and military domination among the smaller Asian states. In simple terms, a too sudden Sino–American rapprochement could precipitate a break-up of the Japan/American alliance, leaving the Japanese far more exposed and, therefore, potentially dangerous.
15. Enhanced prospects for a Sino–American rapprochement can be expected to cause concern in Moscow, which has gained much in the past from the continuing Sino–American hostility, and may impede the expansion of soviet influence in Asia, except perhaps in India, North Vietnam and possibly North Korea. The Soviet Union can be expected to reassess its policies, particularly in areas where there is a chance of achieving agreement with the United States, e.g. in the Middle East and in the limitation of strategic armaments. The Russians may also feel the need to work harder in mending their fences with China and in establishing more constructive relations with Japan. In both cases, however, the Soviet Union faces formidable obstacles.
16. For less powerful Asian countries there arises an immediate and continuing need to review their policies towards China, especially in the light of the strong likelihood that neither the United States nor China will be over-concerned with the sensitivities of third parties in reaching the detente they both seem to want. They are likely to assess that any Sino–American rapprochement must facilitate the exercise of Chinese influence in Asia, and they may be expected, therefore, to hasten their various moves to normalise relations with China. The concept of neutralisation could well gain greater support from countries of South East Asia than hitherto.
For Australia
17. Like a number of other countries, Australia now finds itself, despite careful review of its policies and assiduous consultation with the United States and other like-minded countries, considerably embarrassed by the apparent breakthrough in United States/PRC relations. It was suggested in the major Cabinet submission on China policy4 (9 February, 1971, paragraph 72) that ‘in the final analysis we must remember that the United States, as a super power, will tend to move at its own pace, and that pace will largely be dictated by the desire on the part of Washington and Peking to achieve some accommodation of interests . . . We cannot expect the Americans to keep us fully briefed on every detail of change in their position’. This assessment has now been dramatically confirmed and we can no doubt take it for granted that it will continue to apply in the future.
18. What has happened does not mean that the United States will sell out throughout the whole of Asia, regardless of the interests of its friends and allies, nor that the United States cannot in most cases be trusted as an ally. What it does mean is that on really crucial issues of Asian security, we shall not necessarily be consulted or even briefed: we shall have to conduct aspects of our foreign policy as much in the dark in the future as it appears we have done during the last three months. American apparent readiness to ride roughshod, not only over Australia and other Asian sensitivities, but most importantly over those of Japan, demonstrates final acceptance by the United States that the containment of China will not work and that neither Taiwan nor Japan will be allowed to stand in the way of the achievement of an American accommodation with China.
19. The point to which the Sino–American dialogue has developed in recent months, together with other indications we have had, leaves us in no doubt that, on the one hand, the Chinese may be ready to normalise relations with Australia, but that, on the other, they see no need to enter into negotiations with Australia that avoid the central substantive issue in the exchange of diplomatic recognition, i.e. Taiwan. We should, therefore, reassess our policy towards China on the basis of our national interest and taking into account the quite clear fact that there now appears to be no point in seeking a ‘dialogue’ which does not ultimately tackle the central issues of recognition.
20. Where we do need to await a United States lead is in the United Nations, where the nature and extent of Western efforts on Taiwan’s behalf are entirely dependent on decisions to be made in Taipei and Washington. Countries like Japan and Australia will have little choice but to fall in with these.
21. The beginnings of movement towards Sino–American detente hold important implications also for our policy in Indo–China. We will not necessarily know in advance the nature or extent of agreement likely to emerge from Sino–American discussion of Indo–Chinese questions. We should, therefore, be careful, without going back on our commitments, not to get ahead of the Americans in strength of commitment to the Indo–Chinese states. We should withdraw our combat troops from Vietnam, redirecting our military support for that country along lines similar to our assistance to the Khmer Republic, while continuing our economic assistance to and diplomatic support for all three. At the same time, we should hold ourselves ready to play an appropriate constructive role in any Indo–China negotiations which might emerge from Sino–American discussions. Action on these lines would have the effect of loosening our Indo–China policy and freeing us to adjust it quickly and effectively, in terms of our own interests, in response to Sino–American agreements on Indo–China.
22. American total disregard of Japan’s position in particular illustrates the risks which the United States is prepared to run in gambling on a favourable Chinese response. The potential for damage to the interests of smaller South East Asian countries is appreciable and must give us cause for concern whether our alliance with the United States can protect us at every step from political disadvantage resulting from the manner in which the United States conducts its global policies. We have argued elsewhere that the American alliance, in a changing power balance, will mean less to us than it has in the past. If anything, this argument has been strengthened by the recent United States actions and by America’s failure to consult us on issue5 of primary importance to Australia. Accordingly, we shall need now more than ever to formulate independent policies, based on Australian national interests and those of our nearer neighbours, that will enable us to react quickly to developments in United States policy towards China and Indo–China.
[NAA: A1838, 625114/23, i]
1 Not published. A copy may be found in NAA: A1838, 3107/40/161, xxviii.
2 17 July. Fernandez was told that the Chinese had spoken at length to the Acting Yugoslav Foreign Secretary, Mirko Tepavac, of their desire to improve relations with the United States. They indicated that they would welcome a visit by Nixon. On Southeast Asia, the PRC authorities had ’seemed anxious’ to give assurances that the countries of the region would not be threatened after the US withdrew from Vietnam; China would not interfere in the internal affairs of these countries. With regard to Australia and New Zealand it had been remarked that there was no reason why China’s relations with these countries could not be normalised.
3 Not published.
4 Document 157.
5 This should presumably read ‘on an issue’.