Canberra, 21 July 1971
Secret
Foreign Policy Initiatives on China
These can be of two kinds:
(a) Secret
(b) those which can be publicly announced.
Your letters to Sato and Nixon1 are in the secret category but are nonetheless important for that. I believe that contact with Japan is particularly important as showing a wish by two Pacific powers to work together (as happened during the Djakarta conference).2
2. Public initiatives are more difficult. You suggested three for consideration:
(1) Talking to Moscow
(2) Free world leaders accompanying Nixon
(3) Discussions with Nixon before he goes to China.
3. A dialogue with Moscow is difficult because we would reveal our doubts and uncertainties about American policies. These doubts may be strong but it is not in our interest to share them with the Russians.
4. Nixon conceivably might agree to Free World leaders accompanying him. But I doubt whether the Chinese would agree to accept them.
5. I think discussions with Nixon before he goes to China would be invaluable. Nixori talks frankly when he is alone. He does not trust the State Department (as he told me himself).
6. I should like to see us take an initiative in urging a new international conference on Indo–China, with a strong Asian flavour like Djakarta. However, I cannot see how to do this without appearing to be following Whitlam’s lead.3
7. Since drafting the above, the possibility of a Trade Mission to Peking has arisen. I think this opens up a better possibility than the others discussed above. It would give you the opportunity of showing that what you have done, quietly and through proper channels, has produced results.
[NAA: A1838, 3107138/18, xix]
1 Documents 183, 181, 213 and 214.
2 A reference to the Djakarta Conference on Cambodia, 16–17 May 1970.
3 McMahon wrote alongside this, ‘What does this matter? How do we go about it[?]’