Canberra, 29 July 1971
1832. Secret Priority
For Ambassador
China Policy
Please deliver following message from Prime Minister to Mr Sato and also give Mr Sato text of Prime Minister’s July speech.1
Begins:–
Dear Prime Minister Sato,
Thank you for your message of 20 July,2 which Ambassador Saito conveyed to me on your behalf in reply to my letter of 18 July on China Policy.3
I am glad that our two countries have kept in close touch with one another about this problem. In particular, we have received very useful information from Ambassador Saito on the discussions between your officials and United States representatives.4
I hope that we have been able to reciprocate to the full.
The Australia–Japan official level discussions, which opened in Canberra on 26 July, have given me the opportunity to compare notes with Deputy Vice–Minister Hogen, and there has been a discussion in depth between officials from our respective Foreign Ministries concerning China policy, and in particular the question of Chinese representation at the United Nations.
Unfortunately, these discussions could not in the circumstances lead to any firm conclusions on the course of action that we should follow, especially with regard to the maintenance of a position in the United Nations for the Republic of China if it wishes to remain there.
Further examination of possible courses of action would depend upon the nature of the R.O.C.’s reply to the United States proposal that the People’s Republic of China be seated in the General Assembly and the Security Council, on the understanding that efforts are made to retain a place for the R.O.C. in the General Assembly.
We still need to know the course of action that the United States will pursue on the Chinese representation issue, and how vigorously it will pursue such a policy, before the Governments of Japan and Australia commit themselves publicly to a declared course.
As I see it, the attitude of the United States is critical if a determined effort is to be made to keep a place in the United Nations for the R.O.C. Only the United States has sufficient influence and weight in the U.N. to have any hope of directing such an initiative. Early knowledge of United States intentions thus remains essential.
We have also had some preliminary discussions with your officials concerning the reported proposal by President Marcos5 for a summit meeting in Manila of several Asian and Pacific heads of government to discuss the implications of President Nixon’s recent announcement about his proposed visit to the P.R.C.
For our part, we felt that there would be no advantages and some dangers in discussing the implications of President Nixon’s China policy in the kind of forum proposed by President Marcos. Such a discussion could hardly be kept confidential and the probable result would be the unedifying spectacle of an inconclusive public debate among the Asian and Pacific countries about the objectives and intentions of the United States.
So far, however, the Philippines has made no official approach to us with regard to any such summit meeting.
It is our wish that the close co–operation between our two countries will continue on the China representation issue, as well as on those other issues that so closely affect the future of the Asian/Pacific region.
Yours sincerely,
William McMahon.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xvii]
1 Presumably, a reference to a speech given by McMahon in mid–July to the Young Liberals. A further speech, of 28 July, may be found in Current Notes, vol. 42, 1971, pp. 385–7.
2 Document 216.
3 Document 214.
4 On 20 July, Saito passed to Shann a record of conversation between Secretary of State Rogers and the Japanese Ambassador to the United Nations. Shann later commented to Bury that ‘this reveals an even firmer determination on the part of the United States that Peking should have the Security Council seat and that the United States is not really interested in working out a DR Resolution which would prevent the ROC from being expelled’.
5 Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines.