Canberra, 3 August 1971
Secret
Chinese Representation in the United Nations
In his message to you of 2nd August, 1971,1 the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, raised, inter alia, the possibility of ‘a meeting of like-minded Nations at our UN Mission in New York to seek agreement upon common texts for an Important Question resolution and a resolution to provide representation for both the ROC and PRC as well as upon tactics to be followed’. In your reply (conveyed in our 3740 to Washington the same day), you said that you welcomed the proposal, and that you would be happy for officers of the Australian Permanent Mission to take part.
2. Mcintyre has now reported (UNNY 567)2 that the US Representative to the United Nations is convening in New York a meeting of eighteen countries for the afternoon of Wednesday, 3rd August, 1971:
(a) to have a first look at the texts of two resolutions which the Americans have circulated, and
(b) to discuss possible tactics.
3. As you know, Mcintyre will be in Washington on 3rd August to have discussions with the State Department. We have sent a message to New York requesting that the Minister (Ashwin)3 attend the wider meeting. We have instructed Mcintyre and Ashwin in terms [which you already know.]4
US Draft Resolutions
4. So far as the two draft American resolutions are concerned, the following are our initial comments:
(i) DRAFT DR (DUAL REPRESENTATION) RESOLUTION
(a) Our own preference has been for an implicit or indirect DR (Dual Representation) approach with the two issues—the PRC’s entry and the ROC’s continuing membership—being covered in separate resolutions. It is unnecessarily provocative to both parties to include them in a single resolution.
(b) No DR or other substantive resolution has any chance of success unless it specifically allocates the Security Council seat to the PRC.
(c) We agree with Mcintyre’s comment that the draft is cluttered with clauses of doubtful utility or clarity (UN567 para. 4 (iii)).
(ii) DRAFT IMPORTANT QUESTION (NON–EXPULSION) RESOLUTION
(a) The draft does not provide any argument in support of the operative paragraph except for the single preambular: ‘Recalling the provisions of the Charter’.
(b) We are convinced that there could be misunderstanding about the purpose of an amended IQ as it is now called. Although it seeks only to protect the ROC from expulsion by a simple majority, and places no procedural hurdle whatever in the way of the PRC’s entry, it could be identified with the traditional IQ (which required a two-thirds majority for admission of the PRC) and thus be regarded by many as no more than another procedural device to impede the PRC’s entry. To help overcome this damaging impression, we see merit in employing a new expression such as ‘Non-Expulsion’ resolution.
Possible Tactics
5. At this stage, tactics may be of as much or even greater importance than the wording of individual resolutions. The Albanian resolution (AR), having been submitted first will have priority in voting unless the President of the Assembly and/or the Assembly decides otherwise. Our assessment is that only a procedural resolution (such as a Non-Expulsion resolution) has any chance of being accorded priority over the AR. It follows that at this point we cannot see any prospect of a substantive resolution other than the AR even being brought to the vote.
6. Our basic objective should be to seek the simplest possible procedures that will ensure that support for the ROC is not dissipated. Countries should be asked to vote on two separate issues—the entry of the PRC and the expulsion of the ROC—and it is in our interest that these issues should be placed before the voters in a direct manner, uncomplicated by verbiage or by procedural confusion.
7. The tactics which appear to have the best chance of succeeding are as follows:
(a) Introduce a Non-Expulsion (NE) resolution. (It would be desirable if we could avoid co-sponsorship but we might have to consider co-sponsoring it, especially if the group of co-sponsors were sufficiently large and representative.)
(b) Seek priority of voting for the NE (either through the President’s ruling or by vote). If priority of voting is obtained, vote in favour of the NE resolution.
(c) In accordance with Rule 915 of the Rules of Procedure, request separate votes on the two main parts of the Albanian resolution (AR), that is, on the part calling for admission of the PRC and on the part calling for expulsion of the ROC. (We would do this even if the attempt in (b) did not succeed.)
(d) We would vote against the ‘expulsion’ portion of the AR, and in favour of the first part (PRC entry to UN and Security Council).
(e) If we were successful in having the NE given priority, and if it were then adopted, the vote on the expulsion portion of the AR would require for its adoption a two-thirds majority. But if the NE were not voted on first (or defeated) the question of the majority necessary to secure the adoption of the ‘expulsion’ portion could be raised on a point of order, either before the vote was taken or before the decision was announced, or even if necessary afterwards by way of challenge to the correctness of a ruling by the President that the text had been adopted (Rule 73).6
8. Notwithstanding our preference for the foregoing approach, if others wanted it, we should probably be prepared to go along with the combined approach of the Non-Expulsion and DR resolutions (the latter being regarded as an alternative to the Albanian resolution). But we cannot see how the DR could obtain priority over the Albanian resolution. Against the disadvantages which have been outlined earlier, perhaps the only or principal advantage in submitting a substantive DR resolution—even if we knew it could not obtain priority-is that it would serve to demonstrate once again our positive support for the PRC’s entry to the United Nations and the allocation to it of the SC seat. However, if such a DR resolution were submitted, we would want it to be along the lines of our draft and not that of the Americans.
Recommendations
9. It is therefore recommended:
(i) That we should support entry of the PRC to the United Nations and allocation to it of the Security Council seat;
(ii) That we should seek to retain membership of the United Nations for the ROC and thus oppose any proposals for its expulsion;
(iii) That our tactics should be to follow the most simple means of achieving (i) and (ii) above;
(iv)That, therefore, we should seek to have the United Nations General Assembly vote on the two simple propositions of:
(v) entry of the PRC; and
(vi) non–expulsion of the ROC;
(vii) That, to achieve this, the best and simplest approach would be to have a Non-Expulsion resolution introduced which we hope would, as a procedural motion calling for a two-thirds majority for expulsion of the ROC, take precedence over substantive resolutions and then have separate votes taken on the two parts of the Albanian resolution (which has already been tabled);
(viii) That we should express (at this stage, to our friends only) our preference for this approach rather than the introduction of a substantive DR resolution (which would almost certainly not win precedence over the Albanian resolution) but that we would go along with the DR approach if our American, Japanese and other friends firmly favoured it;
That we should avoid, at least for the time being, getting into a position of sponsorship of particular drafts or, generally, of being an activist—in public—on the Chinese representation issue;
That we should make our views on tactics and drafts known to the Americans, the Japanese and the New Zealanders and discuss with them ways in which these tactics and drafts might be put into effect; but that we should not adopt public positions on these tactics and drafts at this stage;
That, when we know the outcome of the 3rd August meeting, we should review the position again and determine our further action.
I believe that the PRC would be totally opposed to any plebiscite in Taiwan. There is no prospect of change on its part, least of all with the tide running so strongly in Peking’s favour.
The ROC would likewise be expected to oppose any plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of Taiwan-unless it was quite sure that the result would be what it wanted.
Incidentally, UN observation etc. is a total farce. It would require literally hundreds of Chinese-speaking observers to give any valid opinion as to whether any plebiscite was fair. Observers would have to be impartial. How would they be recruited? They would be suspected of holding the view of country of origin.
So long as we have diplomatic relations with the ROC and recognise it, it would be a very unfriendly act to endorse a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the people it controls.
I agree with the Secretary that a UN plebiscite is conceivable if the ROC dropped its all-China claim; but any such plebiscite would be a fresh rationalisation for the status quo and would not advance the prospect of a settlement that would satisfy the PRC.7
G.V. Brady
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xix]
1 Document 225.
2 Document 228.
3 C.R. Ash win, Minister, Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York.
4 Text was a handwritten correction on the original.
5 Rule 91 states that: ‘A representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment shall be voted on separately. If objection is made to the request for division, the motion for division shall be voted upon. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favour or two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are subsequently approved shall be put to the vote as a whole. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole’.
6 Rule 73 states that: ‘During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, and the point of order shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with the rules of procedure. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote and the President’s ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the Members present and voting. A representative rising to a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion’.
7 On 4 August, Cumes recorded a telephone conversation with Bowen. In a lengthy discussion Bowen indicated that he was disposed to be favourable towards the recommendations in paragraph 9, and that he did not think that Australia should be an activist in the matter of Chinese representation. It should only co-sponsor resolutions if accompanied by a large and representative number of co-sponsors. He speculated whether the United States was ‘fighting very hard’ for continuing ROC membership of the United Nations, and indicated that he was aware of the pros and cons of Australia’s voting for the Albanian resolution.