Canberra, 6 August 1971
781. Secret
Chinese Representation
We should be glad of any elucidation you can give us on American thinking on the following:
(i) What is basis for their belief that they can defeat Albanian resolution and carry their DR? Have they done any recent arithmetic on voting prospects?
(ii) How firmly do they believe priority could be obtained for a Non–Expulsion resolution?
(iii) Since Americans acknowledge that their DR cannot get priority over Albanian resolution would they not consider it dangerous to forego opportunity to have Albanian resolution voted on in two parts along lines we ourselves have been suggesting? If it is voted on only as a whole, some key voters (that is, those who favour the PRC’s entry and oppose the ROC’s expulsion), having been denied the chance to express their views separately on the two issues, might feel compelled to vote in favour of the resolution as a whole (or abstain) in order to avoid voting against the PRC’s entry.
(iv) Could we have some elaboration of United States thinking on ‘Article 30 of Charter1 and relevant ICJ opinion’ (UNNY’s 576)2 in relation to Security Council seat? Reference seems rather thin to us. We assume that Article 27(2)3 would apply to voting in the Security Council on credentials of China.
2. We should also like your views (and any views available to you of other (including United States) delegations) on:
(i) Whether a change in the usual order of resolutions would be determined by a presidential ruling or whether it would more likely be put to a vote,
(ii) Whether a Non–Expulsion resolution could be applied retrospectively to the Albanian resolution if the NE did not receive priority,
(iii) Whether the second part of the Albanian resolution could be voted on first, if the Assembly agreed to vote on the resolution in two parts,
(iv) Whether a favourable vote on the first part of the Albanian resolution, if it were taken first, could lead to a challenge to the credentials of the ROC (the PRC having thus been declared ‘the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations’) and thus to the abandonment or deferment (for consideration by the Credentials Committee) of the vote on the expulsion portion.
3. You will of course continue to bear in mind in any discussion with Americans (or others) precautions expressed in paragraph 3 of our 767 (3760 to Washington)5 about no commitment, and the need [not]6 to identify Australia with any particular drafts or tactics.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/19, ii]
1 Article 30 of the UN Charter .reads: ‘The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President’.
2 3 August. At the US–organised meeting in New York on Chinese representation (see paragraph 3, Document 228), which was attended by 23 countries, the Americans mentioned Article 30 and ICJ opinion in connection with the idea that the Security Council had itself to decide who should sit in the Council.
3 Article 27(2) of the UN Charter states that: ‘Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members’.
5 Document 231.
6 Editorial insertion.