New York, 11 August 1971
UN 592. Confidential
China—Representation
United States Ambassador called informal meeting this morning in his office. Present were Australia, Belgium, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand. Purpose of meeting was to have informal no–commitment exchange of ideas and information. It emerged at the end of meeting that other specific United States purpose was to sound out those present about desirability of holding further meeting early next week of those present at meeting on 3 August.1
2. At outset Bush referred to suggestions in press and in UN lobbies that United States attitude was half–hearted, that it did not care whether resolutions were won or not. Bush said he had himself talked to Nixon, Rogers and Kissinger within the past six days. He could assure all present that at the highest level the United States wanted the objectives expressed in the resolutions to be achieved, regarded these objectives most seriously, and would do everything in its power through lobbying and through press briefings and statements to make it clear to everyone that it did so regard them.
3. Bush then went on to say that since the meeting on 3 August, United States Mission staff had consulted with some 60 or so other missions in addition to those present at the earlier meeting, that is a total of over 80 members. Most had no firm instructions so far but the United States Mission had gained the impression that the reaction to the idea of approaching the question on the basis of actual political realities was generally favourable, and that, although things would be close, there was a reasonable chance that the United States approach would win. He said he was now more optimistic than he was on 3 August.
4. New Zealand and Belgium raised the question of the Security Council seat. New Zealand said an explicit reference in the resolution package to the disposition of the seat would seem likely to make the package more attractive, particularly to the floating voters. New Zealand also pointed out that as the Albanian now covered the Security Council aspect, this by comparison left an obvious gap in the United States resolution. Belgium agreed with New Zealand, thought it essential resolution refer to Security Council aspect, and suggested press and other scepticism about United States half–heartedness reinforced need to put this in. We said we agreed with New Zealand and Belgian viewpoints and suggested that, as basis of approach was being described as one of recognising political realities, this too meant there should be explicit mention of Security Council seat. With regard to United States position, expressed at earlier meeting, that question of seating would be one for Security Council itself, we noted that in various organs of the UN Australia had normally taken the attitude that questions of representation should be decided on the basis of decisions taken by the General Assembly. The Philippines and Thailand supported inclusion of a reference to the seat. Ogiso (Japan) said his Government had not yet taken a decision but he personally favoured inclusion of the Security Council aspect in the resolution and thought this might be important, having regard to the voting on priorities. Delegations would only give the Non–Expulsion resolution precedence if they considered the whole approach was a sincere one. The Security Council question was integral to an assessment of this.
5. Belgium asked whether ROC could use veto when question came before Security Council. United States legal adviser said that, while attempt could be made to use veto, he doubted whether it could be sustained given procedural nature of question, relevance of any opinion expressed by Assembly and political circumstances. Japan asked whether Rogers’ statement about ‘decision of the members of the United Nations’ could make it difficult for the United States to agree to put something in the resolution about the Security Council seat (see Washington telegram 4319, para 1).2 Bush said no. He said that Rogers had been seeking to indicate United States flexibility on Security Council question. He added that he clearly understood from comments at this meeting that those present felt the resolution would be more realistic and attractive if it covered the question. He said that about one–third of the missions consulted by the United States had raised this issue.
6. Belgium and others made the point that most vulnerable aspect of United States resolutions arose from question of legality. We noted that some delegations had commented to us that while political solution was attractive it would result in effect in admission of new member without going through correct procedures and this worried them. United States suggested that, although there were weaknesses from point of view of legality, we should not be too defensive on this aspect. Was Albanian invulnerable in regard to legality? Furthermore, there had been anomalies in regard to admissions in the past, e.g. pre–independence India and the Russian States. The Charter nowhere defined what a member should be, and it should now be seen, as it was in 1945, as flexible enough to permit accommodations in regard to membership.
7. Japan said some delegations had raised the query what would happen next year, if United States won this year. Most believed United States resolutions would not win next year or that United States would not push them then. Consequently they were hesitating to support them this year. Japan said it was answering such comment by saying that if Albanian won there could be no compromises in future but United States–type resolutions could be the basis for future compromises. Bush thought this an excellent answer.
8. Belgium asked whether the sixth preambular paragraph of the DR3 implied support for the universality approach and whether this might cause problems. New Zealand considered sixth preambular would be attractive to those countries which at present had relations with neither China. They looked to the UN to provide guidelines for the approach to China issues.
9. Question of inscription (our telegram 575)4 was raised. If item is to be inscribed, this must be handed in by 20 August. United States hopes to have draft of memorandum available by late tomorrow. Those who spoke on this question (we did not) felt inscription was desirable and that subject could then be handled through bracketing together of both items. United States said they would like a good number of co–sponsors for inscription. New Zealand asked whether co–sponsors for inscription need feel obligated to co–sponsor resolutions. United States replied this would perhaps be logical by not necessary consequence.
10. United States then suggested holding meeting of larger group at United States Mission on 17 August to consider inscription, memorandum and who would co–sponsor. United States agreed to try to go ahead rapidly with re–examination of draft resolution with object of indicating to that meeting what changes, if any, it would be prepared to make.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xix]
1 That is, the meeting of 23 countries on Chinese representation (see footnote 2, Document 233).
2 10 August. Feldman had said, in conversation with the Australians, that ‘there had surfaced a considerable reluctance on the part of a surprising number [of countries] to commit themselves one way or other on the issue of reference to the Security Council, apparently on the ground that some new American “manoeuvre” must be involved’. He continued that it was highly desirable to include such a reference but that the wording used by Rogers in his statement of 2 August—we … are prepared to have this question resolved on the basis of a decision by members of the United Nations’—would ‘pose problems unless they did speak up’.
3 See Document 227.
4 3 August. It contained the draft text of a letter to the UN Secretary–General requesting inclusion on the agenda of the Dual Representation resolution. The cablegram also mentioned that an explanatory memorandum had to be submitted with the letter.