Canberra, 13 August 1971
Secret
Chinese Representation in the United Nations
In our submission of 3rd August, 1971,2 we made recommendations on possible tactics on Chinese representation that we might explore in the immediate future with the United States, Japan, and New Zealand. At that time, we awaited reports from our Washington and New York Missions on meetings that were to be held with the Americans on the 3rd and 4th August, and it seemed necessary to have these before making any decisions about the way we should proceed.
2. We have now received the reports of those meetings. We have also received replies to a number of procedural and tactical questions which we have put to the Americans during the past few days.
3. Three broad conclusions can be drawn from recent reports:
(a) while the Americans are not quite as inflexible in their approach on tactics as they had appeared initially, they may still tend to be too sanguine on some key issues, such as the question of the Security Council seat, and the advantages and prospects of their own DR approach;
(b) they seem to take an over–simplified, broad–brush approach in estimating prospects of various resolutions and tactics; and
(c) it is unclear whether the US will make a real all–out effort on behalf of the ROC at the UN. So far, it has not done so. Likewise, the ROC has not yet indicated whether it will remain in the UN if the PRC is seated. It is possible that the US is merely going through the motions, especially as vote estimates are not reassuring and as recent reports indicate that the question of Taiwan figured prominently in the recent meeting between Chou and Kissinger and is likely to be the key item for discussion during President Nixon’s visit.
Implications for Australian Policy of US Approach
4. The major implication of the American approach for Australian policy is that we could become caught up in tactics which will not best promote our objectives, either with regard to the ROC or in connection with our long–term interest in normalising relations with the PRC.
5. These dual Australian objectives (preservation of ROC membership of the UN and normalisation of our relations with the PRC) have been options that we have sought to keep in a fluid situation. But when the chips are down, we cannot expect to normalise our relations with the PRC while we are acting to preserve a place for the ROC. Peking in particular (but also the ROC) will not permit a ‘two–China policy’. Peking may perhaps be prepared to make a minor concession on presentation (although not on substance) on this issue to a great power such as the US, but it will not do so with Australia. If we move towards relations with Peking, we damage our relations with the ROC. To some extent, this is already happening. If on the other hand we act to preserve the ROC’s membership of the UN, especially if we take an active and conspicuous role, the PRC will hold it against us. We must bear in mind, in seeking to preserve a place for the ROC at the UN, that conspicuous activity in support of ROC interests will harm our prospects of renewing the dialogue with the PRC.
Protection of the ROC
6. With regard to the protection of the ROC’s membership, we were possibly the first country to submit to the Americans that the old tactics would fail, and that a non–expulsion resolution (NE), requiring a two–thirds majority for the ROC’s expulsion, would be a better tactic. The NE now forms part of the approach favoured by the Americans. We continue to believe that, if a decision were taken to go all–out to attempt to preserve ROC membership, the NE would hold out the best prospect of protecting the ROC for the present in so far as its membership can be retained.
7. However, the American approach also provides for a DR resolution which would affirm the ‘right of representation of the PRC’ and the ‘continued right of representation of the ROC’. There are two basic weaknesses in their DR. In the first place, it has little chance of being accorded priority in voting over the Albanian resolution (although the Americans claim to be confident that it can) and secondly, it makes no reference to the Security Council seat. With regard to the first consideration, the Americans appear to believe that their DR might get priority over the Albanian resolution so long as a simple majority of members oppose the expulsion of the ROC. This reasoning, referred to in paragraph 3 above, is applied by the Americans to all possible situations (for example, not only with regard to priority of voting on resolutions but on the possible outcome of voting on the substance of those resolutions). We could foresee, however, a situation in which countries supporting the PRC’s entry and opposing the ROC’s expulsion, would vote in favour of priority for the non–expulsion resolution (and for the resolution itself), but against a move to give priority to the American DR over the Albanian resolution—on the ground that the NE would protect the ROC anyway, and that the Albanian resolution, having been submitted first, had every right to precedence over another substantive resolution. (The waverers might also be reluctant to take an open stand against the Albanian resolution—although some would be prepared to vote against the expulsion part if they were given the opportunity to do so).
8. If our objective is to be to go all–out to keep ROC membership, it could be argued that the US approach of concentrating tactics on the DR might serve only to confuse the many smaller, ill–prepared delegations. This would be to the ROC’s disadvantage. It would therefore seem preferable to adopt the simplest possible procedures that would ensure that support for the ROC was not dissipated. In these circumstances, the best approach would seem to be to
(a) interfere as little as possible with the Albanian resolution, and
(b) submit the simplest and most direct non–expulsion resolution for which priority might be sought in voting over the AR.
9. With regard to the need to obtain priority for the NE, our New York Mission has reported that if precedence is sought for the NE, the PRC supporters might introduce a motion which could either declare the NE itself an important question requiring a two–thirds majority, or declare a motion seeking precedence for the NE to be an important question. Apart from the fact that either move would be little more than a procedural gimmick (and would hold up Article 18 to ridicule), it is likely that those countries which are not willing to see the ROC expelled would also not be prepared to vote in favour of either motion. Thus the same majority of countries (which the Algerians think might vote in favour of the NE) are also likely to defeat any such procedural moves.
10. While the tactics we have outlined seem to offer the best chance of success it still might be prudent to have at least one alternative approach, especially if the Americans remain unwilling to seek separate votes on the Albanian resolution, and if prospects for their DR remain poor. The best arrangement would then be to move an amendment to the Albanian resolution. A major advantage of this approach is that an amendment would gain automatic priority in voting (Rule 92).3 A suitable amendment has not yet been drafted, but a paragraph which would simply call for the representation of the PRC in the United Nations and Security Council could presumably suffice. It would replace the prejudicial parts of the AR and omit reference to the expulsion of the ‘representatives of Chiang Kai–shek’.
11. The other weakness in the American DR is that it makes no reference to the Security Council seat. It is likely that some key waverers would support a DR resolution only if the Security Council seat were allocated to the PRC. Our judgment is, then, that it is in the ROC’s own interest for this to be stated specifically in any substantive resolution. The Americans in fact favour the PRC being allocated the Security Council seat—and have informed the ROC accordingly—but they have decided not to take the initiative themselves (by including such a provision in their DR) because of strong opposition from the ROC. The Americans apparently expect that another country will move an amendment to their DR providing for this. But in the meantime the Americans are employing some arguments (which they describe as ‘constructive ambiguity’) suggesting that only the Security Council is entitled to determine its own composition. In fact, Article 23 of the Charter provides for the composition of the Security Council (five permanent members who are named, together with ten other non–permanent members to be elected by the General Assembly). By persisting with this approach, the United States is risking the support of many key waverers who might suspect that the Americans have in mind using procedural devices within the Security Council which would deny the China seat to the PRC.
Support for the PRC
12. As for our other policy objective—support for the entry of the PRC—a principal aim should be to avoid finding ourselves in a position in which we would be obliged to vote against the PRC’s entry. The American tactics, as presently devised, carry this risk. If the NE resolution failed and the DR resolution did not obtain precedence over the AR (or was defeated), we might then be confronted with an Albanian resolution in its entirety, that is, without separate votes being called for on its two main parts. Under these circumstances, in order to avoid the ROC’s expulsion, an argument might be advanced in support of our voting against the AR since abstentions by the ROC’s supporters would help the AR to come very close to a two–thirds majority—and thus achieve the ROC’s expulsion even if a ruling by the President called for a two–thirds majority for the adoption of the expulsion part of the AR. In other words, under these circumstances, any vote, other than a vote in opposition to the AR, might assist the expulsion of the ROC.
13. But if there were separate votes on the AR, we could vote against the expulsion part and in favour of the first part calling for the PRC’s entry. In the final vote, if the expulsion part had then been deleted, we could vote in favour of the AR. If however the expulsion part remained intact we could either abstain or vote in favour, and in an accompanying explanatory statement say that:
(a) We did not support the ROC’s expulsion and that we had expressed this attitude on two occasions—when we had supported the unsuccessful attempt to give the NE priority ( or when we had voted in favour of the NE) and when we had voted against the second part of the AR;
(b) Our vote in favour of the resolution as a whole was in order to give clear expression to our support for the PRC’s entry, and the allocation to it of the Security Council seat.
14. While the decision on how we should vote in the circumstances described above could be taken at a later date, we need to be aware now of the difficulties we could face so that we can devise tactics to avoid them.
15. We thus consider it important to continue to advise the Americans of the shortcomings of their approach, and to continue to emphasise our strong preference for tactics which include a call for separate votes on the Albanian resolution. The Americans currently tend to dismiss this as ‘a matter of tactics to be decided on during the course of the debate’, thereby suggesting once again a curiously relaxed stance to the whole question of their support for the ROC in the UN.
Need for Flexibility
16. At this stage, we believe that our approach has a better chance than the one submitted by the Americans of achieving an objective of giving the ROC the best of whatever chance it has for remaining in the UN. However, we would certainly not wish our attitude to be intractable. We should be ready to change course if another approach, including that of the Americans, seemed, on available evidence, to be better. Indeed we have in fact already changed our position once: prior to the tabling of the Albanian resolution our preference had been for a two–resolution approach—an NE coupled with a substantive resolution inviting the PRC to take its UN and Security Council seats. But when the Albanian resolution was submitted first, our assessment was that it would obtain priority over any subsequent substantive resolution; it was thus better to concentrate on a simple approach which seemed to have better prospects—an NE followed by separate votes on the main parts of the Albanian resolution.
17. In any event, we must recognise that no approach will succeed unless the Americans are prepared to put their whole weight behind it. Thus, if the Americans persist with their DR and lobby very hard in support of it and if the Security Council seat is specifically allocated to the PRC, their DR will certainly have better prospects of success. We might then wish to fall in behind them. (If we do accept the DR approach we would prefer that it be along the lines of our own DR, which does not mention the ROC.)
Value of Consultations
18. Although at this point we wish to avoid getting into a position of sponsorship of particular drafts or, generally, of being an activist, our interest seems to lie in continuing to express our views firmly and frankly to the Americans (and, where necessary, to the Japanese and New Zealanders) and to influence them in a way which would better serve our own policy objectives. There are of course risks in any such close consultations, for example, if the Americans should interpret our interest in the subject as a willingness, or even commitment, to accept whatever role they should choose ultimately for us (including sponsorship of resolutions). We believe, however, that these risks can—and are—minimised by our frequent and explicit comments to the Americans that views expressed to them on the subject are without commitment and that we would not necessarily be prepared to co–sponsor even our own draft resolutions.
Possible Inscription of a New Item
19. On 11th August, 1971, American Ambassador Bush invited representatives of friendly countries in New York to a meeting ‘to have an informal no–commitment exchange of ideas and information’ on Chinese representation. Australia, Belgium, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand attended. Mcintyre has reported (UN592)4 that, at the outset, Bush referred to suggestions that the United States attitude was half–hearted, and that it did not care whether resolutions were won or not. Bush said he himself had talked to the President, Rogers and Kissinger within the past six days. He assured all present that, at the highest level, the United States wanted the objectives expressed in the resolutions to be achieved, that it regarded those objectives most seriously and that it would do everything in its power through lobbying and through press briefing and statements to make it clear to everyone that it did so regard them.
20. The question of the inscription of a new item on Chinese representation was raised at the meeting. (If such an item is to be inscribed as a matter of routine, it must be handed in to the Secretariat by the 20th August.) The American draft substantive (DR) resolution, in its first preambular paragraph, refers to an item entitled ‘the Representation of China in the United Nations’. 5 (The item already inscribed by the supporter of the Albanian resolution is ‘Restoration of the lawful lights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations’). The Americans envisage that the subject of Chinese representation would be considered through the bracketing together of the two items. There is no tactical advantage for the OC’s supporters in inscribing a new item since the General Assembly would almost certainly not agree to take up separately the new item—and prior to the Albanian group’s item. But for reasons of presentation—and in order to reflect fairly, both in the title of the item and in the explanatory memorandum, the nature of the issues involved—it is felt advantageous to inscribe a new item. Bush told the meeting that the United States would like a ‘good number of co–sponsors for inscription’. When asked whether co–sponsors for inscription need feel obligated to co–sponsor resolutions, Bush replied that this would perhaps be logical but not a necessary consequence.
21. The United States has now suggested holding a meeting of a larger group of friendly countries on 17th August, 1971 to consider the matter of inscription, the explanatory memorandum (which would accompany the request for inscription), and to see which countries would be prepared to co–sponsor the inscription. In the meantime, the Americans would try to proceed with a re–examination of their draft resolutions with the object of indicating to the meeting on 17th August what changes, if any, they would be prepared to make.
22. A decision on Australian co-sponsorship of the inscription of the item should only be made:
(a) after we have seen the text of the explanatory memorandum, and
(b) after we know which countries are prepared to join as co–sponsors.
23. If however, the explanatory memorandum is acceptable, and if a reasonably large and representative group of countries agree to co–sponsor, it would be difficult for Australia not to join them. (We have in mind such countries as the United States, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Brazil). However, if we so decide to co–sponsor we should make it clear to the Americans privately that our co–sponsorship of the new item should not be taken as a commitment to our co–sponsoring the American—or any other—draft resolutions.
24. With regard to the instructions which we shall have to send Mcintyre for the 17th August meeting we would suggest that he be advised not to take an active part in the discussion, that he inform the meeting, if necessary, that he could obtain instructions only when the outcome of the meeting was known and that he be requested to send us an immediate report on the meeting with particular reference to the matters raised in [para 22]6 (a) and (b) above.
Recommendations
25. In the light of current policy objectives:
(a) that we shall seek to normalise our relations with the PRC;
(b) that we should support entry of the PRC to the United Nations and allocation to it of the Security Council seat;
(c) that we should seek to retain membership of the United Nations for the ROC if it so desires, and thus oppose any proposals for its expulsion;
We are making the recommendations set out below. However, we should bear in mind the element of inconsistency between the first and third of these objectives, the fluidity of the general situation, our fundamental long-term interest in normalised relations with the PRC and our consequent desire to avoid either international isolation or conspicuous association with a diplomatic defeat on the Chinese representation issue. As a consequence, our policy should still be regarded as completely open, because we may need to make some rapid lastminute changes if we are to protect and advance our own national interest to the maximum.
It is recommended
(i) That our interim preference should be to follow the most simple means of achieving (a) (b) [and (c)] above (while bearing in mind that no tactics can succeed unless they have the full support of the Americans);
(ii) That, therefore, we should suggest that the US might wish to seek to have the United Nations General Assembly vote on the two simple propositions of:
(a) entry of the PRC; and
(b) non–expulsion of the ROC;
(iii) That, to achieve this, the best and simplest approach would be to have a non–expulsion resolution introduced which we hope would, as a procedural motion calling for a two–thirds majority for expulsion of the ROC, take precedence over substantive resolutions, and then have separate votes taken on the two parts of the Albanian resolution;
(iv) That we should express (at this stage, to our friends only) a preference, but without commitment, for this approach rather than the introduction of a substantive DR resolution (which would almost certainly not win precedence over the Albanian resolution) but that we might go along with the DR approach if our American, Japanese and other friends firmly favoured it, and if its prospects can be shown to be reasonable; but that we should in this event explore the possibility of our own earlier draft DR being used by the US, rather than the present United States draft;
(v) That, especially if the prospects for a separate DR seemed poor (and the Americans were unwilling to support action on the Albanian resolution as in (iii) above), we should explore with the Americans (and our other friends) the possibility of amendments being proposed to the Albanian resolution aimed at wording more closely in accord with our own earlier draft DR;
(vi) That we should avoid getting into a position of sponsorship of particular drafts, or, generally, of being an activist on the Chinese representation issue;
(vii) That we should make our views on tactics and drafts known to the Americans, the Japanese and the New Zealanders and discuss with them ways in which these tactics and drafts might be put into effect; but that we should not adopt public or committed positions on these tactics and drafts at present;
(viii) That at this stage we should keep our approach to this question flexible, and under constant review; in particular, if the prospects of a DR resolution improved to an extent that its acceptance by the General Assembly seemed likely, we should consider joining our friends in supporting it in preference to the NE Albanian approach suggested in (iii) above;
(ix) That, at a later stage, we might give further consideration to joining in sponsorship of an NE or DR resolution, if a sufficiently large and widely representative group of countries were also prepared to co–sponsor and if prospect seemed more favourable.
(x) That, in connection with the meeting in New York to be convened by the Americans on 17th August, 1971, Mcintyre be advised not to take an active role, that he should inform the meeting, if asked about Australia’s attitude to co-sponsorship, that he could obtain instructions from Canberra only when the outcome of the meeting was known, and that he be asked to report immediately on the meeting with particular reference to the discussion on the explanatory memorandum, and to the countries which had agreed to co-sponsor the inscription of the new item.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38118, xix]
1 The submission was sent by Waller as a teletype message to Bowen in Sydney.
2 Document 230.
3 Rule 92 states that: ‘When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the General Assembly shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal and then on the next furthest removed therefrom, and so on, until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter amendment shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted upon. A motion is considered an amendment to a proposal if it merely adds to, deletes from or revises part of that proposal’.
4 Document 235.
5 See Document 227.
6 Text in parentheses was handwritten on the original.