Taipei, 16 August 1971
Secret Eclipse
China Policy
I assume that the dialogue with the PRC has continued in some form, and that we are addressing, or will soon address, ourselves to the problem of ultimate recognition and possible formulas to be used in that connection. The following comments are based on that assumption. I should of course welcome your views.
We seem to have two broad options—to find a formula which would enable us to enter quickly into relations with the PRC while enabling us to say that we have not unceremoniously dumped our friends, or to work steadily at the question over a longer period, without being too much put off by actions by the Turks, Iranians and so on. Such countries are further from the centre of action and do not have even our limited interests in Taiwan, or, more importantly perhaps, need to pay such close attention as we should to the effect of our actions on our relations withJapan in particular by other regional countries in general. (I omit the US from this list, as, after the Kissinger exercise, they would have little reasonable kick–back if we moved faster than they.) It seems quite important to me that the British seem very reluctant to give the PRC all it wants in terms of a formula. (London’s15209 to you.)1 I assume that relations with Japan, apart from principle and legality, carry considerable weight with the UK in this question.
The Question of a Formula
I am sure the following thoughts on formulas will be among those you will have considered. They are put forward for what they are worth and any comment you might wish to make.
The PRC seeks explicit recognition as the ’sole legal’ government of China, including Taiwan, whereas we (like the US, Japan and presumably other Asian countries including Thailand and the Philippines) would prefer the Taiwan aspect left as indeterminate as possible. The British have consistently run into this problem with Peking because of what they have said in the past about the ‘undetermined’ status of Taiwan. Our own public statements about preserving the rights of the people on Taiwan, the question of the U.S. treaty commitment to Taiwan, and our trade and other interests here all suggest that, in working towards normalization of relations, we should try hard to keep this point more open than might be possible under the Canadian or Kuwait formulas.2 No matter how carefully the implications of the phrase ‘take note’ in respect of the PRC’s specific claim to Taiwan might be glossed, that claim is endorsed to some extent by ‘agreement’ that the PRC is the ’sole legal government of China’, unless we specifically deny that Taiwan is a part of China. If we did make such a denial, we would undercut our position on Taiwan’s right to representation in the UN as a part of China.
It would presumably be quite impossible for us to keep our trade agreement with the ‘Republic of China’ in being while remaining completely consistent with the Kuwait formula. Some study of Canadian practice in terminology seems desirable (they appear to have some continuing agreement with the ROC—e.g. on textiles). In general it seems that we can now publicly use the terms PRC and ROC while we are in relations with Peking but could hardly do so after recognizing the PRC under the Kuwait formula without evoking protests from the PRC and domestic criticism for inconsistency. No doubt we could live with all this, but some ingenious and tolerably rational public line would be necessary.
What really is needed is an ‘Asian and Pacific’ formula slightly different from those used to date. (For presentational purposes it would also seem better not to follow, tardily, the Canadian lead some time later.) While it may be unlikely that Peking would accept any modification with Nixon’s visit in early prospect, it might not be completely out of the question since Peking might assess that such a modification could open the door to recognition by a number of important regional countries. We would need to be careful that anything we proposed would not create excessive difficulties for others. It would seem desirable in principle, but probably impracticable, to consult such countries on wording we might have in mind.
One basis for an ‘Asian’ formula could be for the PRC to ’state’ that it is the sole government of China and so on (preferably without any reference to Taiwan) and for us to ‘take note’ of this statement. Such wording might be rationalized to some degree as conceding much less than if we explicitly ‘agreed’ that the PRC was the sole government of China. Whether or not the PRC would accept this formulation,3 it might be worthwhile to try it out as one step on the road to normalization of relations. It would, of course, be best of all to get something on the lines of the French formula, but it might be too much of a waste of time to make a proposal on these lines as the first step.
Where would use of such a formula leave us with Taiwan? It could enable us to say to the ROC and its other friends that we had not explicitly agreed that the PRC was the ’sole’ government of China and that we had therefore conceded less than the Canadians, Turks and so on. Given the greater sense of realism and fear of isolationism that now prevails here, the ROC would probably clutch at any such straw. It might well decide not to break relations or remove its Embassy from Canberra. Such a decision could cause problems for us if we saw an early need to put a mission in Peking on a reciprocal basis. This consideration would doubtless enter into the ROC’s thinking. Moreover, since the ROC wanted to continue official trade relations with Turkey even after that country used the Kuwait formula, there is [sic] good reasons to believe that in the worst case, some form of satisfactory trade representation could be arranged if we used a better formula from the ROC’s point of view. We should of course expect that any form of recognition of the PRC will affect at least temporarily our exports to Taiwan.
The main question in this regard might be whether the PRC would be willing to close its eyes to some form of official or unofficial Australian representation in Taiwan. At the very least we should aim to be in no worse position in Taiwan than when we opened our Embassy here—i.e. a Trade Correspondent, possibly with supporting staff. There are other better possibilities, ranging down from a full–fledged Trade Commission, through an office of the Export Development Council, or Chambers of Commerce or Manufacturers.
We should also look into the Peruvian precedent whereby it was agreed that a trade office would be opened in Peking before agreement on Peru’s recognition of the PRC was reached.
The Effect of Nixon’s Proposed Visit
It seems quite possible that Nixon’s proposed visit could result in some live and let live formula over Taiwan, with a more or less tacit understanding that the US presence in (and eventually commitment to) Taiwan will wither on the vine offsetting a similar undertaking that the PRC will not use force to take it. For countries like Japan, and to a much less extent Australia, which have some interests here, such an arrangement could open the way for us to retain sufficient presence in Taiwan to protect our interests here. Other regional countries might well wish to profit from whatever unique arrangement might emerge. There are obvious risks that the US might leave us stranded if we attempted this approach, but these risks might be reduced if we and other countries adopted a closely parallel approach. In the light of Japan’s reaction to the Kissinger exercise, the US would presumably think more than twice before leaving a large group of friendly countries high and dry again. The Americans might do so, but as long as we were in reasonable regional company all would still not be lost.
Since we can assume that the US will be unable to remove all its official presence here—let alone its investment etc.—it seems possible that improvement in US/PRC relations could take place while such a presence remains. (If the ROC became too recalcitrant, the US might withdraw its official presence faster. This is a considerable inhibition on ROC reaction, and a cause, no doubt, of much frustration.)
If this assumption is sound, if we do not foresee immediate and concrete benefits from entering into full diplomatic relations with the PRC, and if part of our purpose is to present a case reasonably consistent with past statements on Taiwan and the China question in general to show that we are completely reasonable on the question, there could still be advantage in taking a wait and see attitude up to the time of the Nixon visit. This need not necessarily prevent us from discussing questions of recognition with the PRC (even testing them out on other formulas such as that suggested above.) Such official discussions are in themselves a form of relations. And there are many other points that we could put to Peking in the course of them. For example, we could argue that, unlike other countries which have recently recognized the PRC, we have citizens and property in Taiwan, and a considerable volume of trade. We have some duty to protect such interests, which are largely apolitical. Just as we had dealings with the PRC before recognition, we would like to continue to take such action as is necessary to protect our specific interests in Taiwan, without in any way attempting to prejudge the eventual outcome of the Taiwan/China problem. This line could be developed enough to keep a dialogue going for some time, particularly if our interest in discussing formulas for recognition clearly indicated that we had recognition in mind. Peking’s replies would be very interesting, and the ball would be kept in play for some time if necessary. The main danger could be that the PRC might say that we must end all trade with Taiwan before we could talk further on the subject or recognition. But, on past form, I wouldn’t rate this risk very high.
Glad of your views on the above.4
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xxi]
1 Not published.
2 For discussion of the Canadian formula, see Document 158; for Kuwait, see paragraph 3, Document 186.
3 Anderson underlined this phrase, and wrote in the margin, ‘Not a chance!’
4 In a handwritten note to Brady, Anderson wrote: ‘Most of Mr Dunn’s ideas seem wishful to me and impracticable. But he has put some thought & work into this & it should be acknowledged’.