Washington, 17 August 1971
Secret Eclipse
Policy Planning Paper: Implications for Australia of Kissinger/Chou En–lai Talks
I refer to your memorandum No. 836 of 23 July forwarding a copy of Policy Planning Paper QPll/71 of 21 July, 1971,1 received here on 3 August.
[ matter omitted ]
12. I am in disagreement with a large part of paragraphs 4 to 7 of the Policy Planning Paper. I do not believe that the United States expressed to the Chinese explicitly, or even implicitly, a readiness to ‘dump’ Taiwan in the interests of the PRC, at least in the foreseeable future. To do so would be hopelessly to undercut the credibility of United States undertakings elsewhere. It would run against the President’s past record. (He could not possibly face charges that he was ‘handing over’ fourteen million people to ‘the Communists’. ) It would also constitute a major blow at relations with Japan. The Joint Communique between President Nixon and the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Sato, on 21 November, 1969 is of relevance in this connexion:
‘The President referred to the Treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan.’
Whilst the United States ran into difficulties with Japan in announcing the Kissinger/Chou discussions, it will make special efforts to avoid raising Japanese doubts over Japan’s fundamental security. This is illustrated by the President’s strong reaction to the recent speculation which developed over the views of the Secretary of Defence, Mr Laird,2 on the desirability of permitting Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. The Administration will regard its relations with Japan as more important for the indefinite future than its relations with China, not only because of Japan’s potential military power, but also because of its existing economic power and because of its status as the United States’ second largest trading partner. Indeed, the United States will regard continued close ties with Japan as an essential element in developing better relations with China.
13. In his talk with James Reston, Chou stated that ‘Japan has ambitious designs with regard to Taiwan. Japan wants to control Taiwan in her hands … It’s even conceivable that they are trying to separate Taiwan from China and, under the direction of Japan and also possibly with support from some quarters in the United States, to bring about a so–called independent Taiwan.’ For the PRC, Taiwan is not just a domestic issue, but, perhaps even more importantly, an international problem, because of concern over Japan. It may be significant in this regard, that, in talking to Reston, Chou appeared to give the Taiwan issue a lower immediate priority than Indo–China, Japan, or the USSR.
14. As to future United States policy toward the status of Taiwan (paragraph 9 of the paper), the United States position formally remains that this is an unresolved issue, to be resolved eventually between the PRC and GRC by peaceful means. In the meantime, the United States contractual obligation to defend Taiwan remains in existence. The United States will not withdraw diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China, or close its embassy on Taiwan, or cease its treaty obligations to Taiwan. Those courses of action are not within President Nixon’s present thinking.
15. Paragraph 13 of the Policy Planning Paper contains a further misconception of American thinking when it refers to ‘an apparent premiss behind American actions that China is a “problem” that can be solved, and that its solution will allow the United States greater freedom to deal with its chief adversary the Soviet Union’. It is true that public opinion in the United States, as to a lesser extent in Australia, has been inclined to regard basic international relations as problems that can be solved once and for all. I do not think President Nixon and Dr Kissinger are looking at China that way. They see what they have done so far as only one step forward in a very long journey. I think, too, it is completely wrong to say that the United States wants to ’solve China’ in order to be able to deal with greater freedom with the Soviet Union. The United States does not look at the situation in such simple terms. The Nixon Administration has consistently in the past refused to choose, as a matter of consistent preference, between the two. Quite genuinely, the President sees relationships with China as something important in themselves and not only as an element in dealing with the Soviet Union.
16. The implications for Australia, as stated in Policy Planning Paper from paragraph 17 on, seem to me to be too sweeping. They seem to reflect pique that Australia was not informed in advance of Dr Kissinger’s visit to Peking. This inability of President Nixon to inform us, which had embarrassing consequences inside Australia and Japan in the presentation of those two countries’ governments’ statements of policy, does not justify the following statement in the Policy Planning Paper, with which I very much disagree: ‘American apparent readiness to ride roughshod, not only over Australia and other Asian sensitivities, but most importantly over those of Japan, demonstrates final acceptance by the United States that the containment of China will not work and that neither Taiwan nor Japan will be allowed to stand in the way of an achievement of an American accommodation with China.’ Paragraph 22 is equally extravagant: ‘American total disregard for Japan’s position in particular illustrates the risks which the United States is prepared to run in gambling on a favourable Chinese response.’
17. The Policy Planning Paper has a certain anti–American tone, bolstering a plea for a more independent foreign policy. This concept is emotionally attractive, of course, but it is not so easy to put into practice if one realistically weighs the relative roles and potentialities of great powers and smaller powers. I believe that the American alliance is and will continue to be vital to Australia’s security and prosperity. I believe that we should continue to do what we can to strengthen American associations with Australia. It would be quite wrong and dangerous, for example, to think that we achieve anything by announcing important decisions without first having genuine consultation with the United States. Tit for tat may be emotionally satisfying but it is not an effective way of protecting one’s interests. It is wrong, too, to think that the American alliance is a disadvantage to us in our dealings in Asia. On the contrary, as a prominent Asian neutralist once said to me, Australia carries more weight and influence, even with neutralist countries, because of its basic backing by the United States than it would have if it was simply a country of thirteen million people isolated on the edge of Asia. The United States and Australia have different roles to play, but our basic interests are the same and we should try to work in the greatest intimacy. Australia has a bigger interest in that than the United States has.
18. Nor should the President’s visit to Peking—at least until we know what happens there—lead to basic revision of Australian policy in Asia. It must be remembered that some features of United States policy, such as the establishment of SEATO and the military operations in Viet Nam, were encouraged by the Australian Government. Australia pushed the United States very hard in 1953 and 1954 to enter in a collective security arrangement in South East Asia. This was seen as an essential and positive element in developing sound relations with Communist China. President Nixon and Dr Kissinger would see their and our ability to work out relations with Peking as being affected by the degree to which Allied strength exists in South East Asia. If it fell too low, or if it was almost exclusively American, negotiations would be on a weaker basis, and in addition the Americans would be less ready to undertake obligations in respect of South East Asia.
19. Much of this has had to be written as personal opinion, because of the reticence of United States officials to discuss Dr Kissinger’s visit—a reticence all the greater because they do not know what went on or what was in the President’s mind. But I can say with some confidence that no agreements on substance from that visit should be suspected. I believe that there will be a gradual edging forward, and Australia will be able to express views on substance in one way or the other.
20. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to the other recipients of your memorandum No. 836 to Washington, namely to Belgrade, London, New Delhi, Ottawa, Taipei, Hong Kong, Moscow, the Australian Mission to the United Nations, Paris, Tokyo, and Wellington.
[NAA: A1838, 625114/23, i]
1 Document 219.
2 Melvin R. Laird, US Secretary of Defense.