Taipei, 24 August 1971
Secret
Chinese Representation in the United Nations
From intra–departmental papers sent to me for background, it appears that some thought has been given to the possibility of voting for the Albanian resolution as a whole, after seeking by other means to preserve UN membership for the ROC. I wish to recommend strongly against such a vote.
2. Like somenew fashion, such a course might seem attractive and spuriously interesting and exciting. Particularly in stormy weather, however, it could risk charges of indecency and be of no practical value in protecting our essential interests. And, in my view, it would certainly encourage the PRC to think that we are a country with which it could work its will in negotiations towards normalization of relations.
3. In more pedestrian terms, the disadvantages in such a vote, in my view, include the following:
(a) it would be hard to reconcile with our policy objective (para 2 (c) of your telegram 662)1 of opposing any proposals for the ROC’s expulsion;
(b) it would seem incompatible with the Prime Minister’s statement on 28 July 2 that we will not unceremoniously dump old friends;
(c) the change from our past voting position on the traditional IQ and Albanian resolution would be so rapid and complete that we could not avoid charges of grave inconsistency;
(d) the PRC might well take such a vote as committing us to agreement that it is the sole legal government of China (the wording of the AR). Unless Ministers had agreed beforehand that we might eventually agree to this in negotiations with the PRC, we could most seriously compromise our bargaining position before we started. (The British may have this problem in resisting PRC pressures for such a formula. But there seems little need for us to give too much too soon.)
(e) unless such a vote were cast in company with a large number of other countries (other than the traditional supporters of the AR), it could increase such countries’ difficulties on the China question. I have Japan and other regional countries particularly in mind;
(f) it could well affect our interests in Taiwan, and in particular our trade interests.
4. Nothing in my experience of China and Chinese affairs suggests that we would gain much credit with the PRC by making concessions too easily. Loyalty, even misplaced loyalty, remains a cardinal Chinese virtue (of which they admittedly often fall short). Just as President Nixon’s proposal of a visit to Peking lost him face in many Asian eyes, a complete and abrupt reversal of position by us would lose us face in Peking and elsewhere. The PRC might well assess that we have given in entirely, and that we could be coerced into agreement on other matter on which it chose to apply pressure such as trade with Taiwan. No matter what the final outcome of our bilateral negotiations, we would be more respected if we went through the ritual of hard bargaining before making major concessions.
5. As you know, I have argued a strictly limited thesis from Taipei—that we have some interests here which we should seek to protect as far as possible while working towards our policy objectives. A non–activist role, as far as possible, would seem to serve this limited purpose best. To my mind, a vote in any circumstances for the AR would appear an active shift. It would have repercussions here. We would share the blame for an adverse result in the UN and probably be regarded as having influenced others to vote against the ROC. (Our position on the allocation of the SC seat to Peking has put us in a fairly delicate position up till now.) No matter what explanations of the vote we made, we could not deny the fact that we have voted for the ROC’s expulsion.
6. I am not saying that the ROC would break relations with us over this question. In present circumstances it will probably cling hard to such shreds of international associations as it can. Nor am I suggesting that the Embassy here could not live through the coolness that would result from our casting such a vote. My point is simply that I do not see us making sufficient gains elsewhere to offset the disadvantages outlined above.
7. To my mind, a vote against the AR would as a whole still be perfectly justifiable. In our statements and other actions we could make it clear that we strongly favoured the PRC being in the UN and on the SC. We could point out that a vote against the AR would not be support for any procedural device to exclude the PRC but that, in the terms in which the AR was phrased, we were, unfortunately, unable to vote for it because it meant the expulsion of the ROC.
8. The other possibility would be an abstention. From here such a vote would be much less desirable, particularly since it might positively contribute towards the expulsion of the ROC this year or next. An abstention would, however, be consistent with a non–activist role in the question, and could be rationalized as indicating a balance between our somewhat conflicting policy objectives. While the Embassy here would get some kick–back from the ROC, it would probably be much less acute than in the case of a vote in favour. It might not even be unexpected; the ROC might well accept it without too much demur as part of our inevitable slide towards the PRC. Moreover, in all the circumstances, I believe that PRC itself would see it as a respect–worthy position for us to take.
9. Even if we cannot now decide to vote against the unamended AR, I assume that we will keep other options open until it is clearer what effect our vote would have on the final outcome.
10. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to Washington, UN New York.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38118, xx]
1 Document 239.
2 See Current Notes, vol. 42, 1971, pp. 385–7.