Canberra, 25 August 1971
Secret
Taiwan: Internal Situation
This submission selects salient features of reports (copies attached)1 from our posts in Taipei, Tokyo (from Japanese Foreign Ministry) and Washington (from2 State Department) on the attitudes of Taiwanese and former Mainlanders to the three main long–term options facing the ROC:
(i) maintenance of the ROC on its present basis;
(ii) establishment of an independent Republic of Taiwan;
(iii) reconciliation between the ROC and the PRC.
[ matter omitted ]
Maintenance of the Present ROC
4. The reports received agree that the Government of the ROC is firmly entrenched, and that it will most likely continue to seek to maintain itself as an alternative Chinese government. The Japanese feel that this is so, even though they consider that younger Mainlanders do not want to stay in Taiwan. Mr Dunn (our Ambassador in Taipei) considers that younger Mainlanders see their future in Taiwan or abroad rather than on the Mainland. There is agreement that Mainlanders and educated Taiwanese support the status quo. The State Department and Mr Dunn consider that responsible Taiwanese would prefer a gradual improvement of their lot under the ROC to the other options. All those consulted agreed that the ROC ambition of recovering the Mainland has already been tacitly dropped, and could be abandoned overtly without domestic repercussions.
Establishment of an Independent Republic of Taiwan
5. The Japanese believe that there is no immediate possibility of independence for Taiwan. Mainlander control is too firm. Moreover, the Taiwanese have good economic prospects, have not known independence for a long time, and are prepared to continue passively under the ROC rather than risk a repetition of the 1947 riots.3 The State Department assesses that, while independence would undermine the Mainlanders’ status in Taiwan, Mainlanders believe they would still be better off than under the PRC.
6. There is unanimous agreement that ·formal movements for Taiwanese independence within Taiwan and abroad are small in membership and weak in organization. According to the State Department, there has been some support for the cause of Taiwanese independence by private US citizens, for instance, the Rev. Thornberry who was deported from Taiwan in March.
Reconciliation between the ROC and the PRC
7. The Japanese consider that there is no evidence of a move towards this, but do not discount the eventuality. Mr Dunn considers that reconciliation might be possible, but only after a lapse of time and a change of present leadership.4 The State Department considers that both Mainlanders and Taiwanese would stand to lose from any reconciliation and would oppose it. Some might find the idea of semi–autonomous status attractive, but such a status would be hard to maintain.
[ matter omitted ]
Conclusions
11. The opinions summarized above are not conclusive. It is hard to glean information on these controversial subjects in Taiwan itself, and our Japanese and US informants may well have to put their views in over–generalized terms to avoid alarmism or departure from established positions. Moreover, the present situation could be radically changed by future developments within Taiwan (such as economic recession or the death of President Chiang), within the PRC (such as a struggle for the succession to Mao) and elsewhere (such as changes in Japanese and US attitudes towards the PRC).
12. However, the following short–term conclusions, based on material written before the announcement of President Nixon’s initiative on China, can be made about the existing situation in the ROC:
(i) The ROC Government is well–entrenched. Mainlanders would prefer to see it continue, but, failing this, would prefer an independent Taiwan to a reconciliation with the PRC.
(ii) The Taiwanese would be interested in viable independence, but will continue to acquiesce in a continuation of the ROC. Formally organized movements for independence are small and weak. There is not enough PRC infiltration in Taiwan to influence Taiwanese towards a reconciliation with Peking.
(iii) External developments will crucially affect internal developments in Taiwan. For example, the seating of the PRC in the UN and expulsion of the ROC, if it were to occur, could have serious effects on the attitudes of Mainlanders and Taiwanese on Taiwan. Likewise, any US–PRC detente could have unpredictable effects on Taiwan.5
H.D. Anderson
First Assistant Secretary
Asia Division
[NAA: A1838, 3107/3811811, ii]
1 Not published.
2 Matter expunged.
3 Sentence expunged.
4 Sentence expunged.
5 Bowen ‘noted’ the contents of the submission.