New York, 2 September 1971
UN647. Secret
Chinese Representation
Your 881.1
On 2 September we conveyed to the United States Mission (Thayer)2 your possible amendments to the AR, commenting that they had no status other than to suggest alternative ways in which our policy objectives could be achieved. Thayer passed no comment on the drafting of these tentative alterations, but said he would convey them to Washington for consideration. He went on to reiterate that the Unites States Mission’s principal undertakings at this stage were to obtain adequate co–sponsorship for their two draft resolutions and to lobby for support to have voting priority given their dual proposals. He said that we should work on the assumption that the American DR would be revised to take the Security Council seat into account (though he did not specify by whom or at what stage this change might be made), and that it was the United States’ wish to associate Australia’s name with the text from the very outset. Thayer observed that the Mission was not ‘overwhelmingly confident’ that priority could be obtained for their package proposals, which he said represented their maximum preferred position, but that the United States would continue to bend its efforts to this end.
2. We discussed at some length the order in which the draft resolutions (IQ, AR, DR) might eventually be taken, and particularly the procedural and substantive effect that adoption of the IQ could have on the passage of the AR. Thayer said that the United States was being deliberately vague about the precise consequences which would flow from a favourable vote on their draft IQ, since it could be argued that while procedurally it was aimed specifically at the second part of the AR’s operative paragraph, the phrasing of the rest of the AR could be interpreted to have the same implicit effect as the provision for expelling ROC. In such an eventuality the adoption of the IQ would be intended to apply equally to an attempt to deprive the ROC of its seat on these grounds. It was with these considerations in mind that the United States had formulated its IQ to cover all contingencies, not only a recommendation for the formal expulsion of ROC. Thayer could see our suggested amendments to the AR in this light, as an attempt to remove a potential opening by which ROC could be forced to leave without being explicitly expelled.
Comment
3. We sense that the United States is not irrevocably committed to the tactics it has so far outlined and promoted and would prefer to withdraw3 some of the major countries of the Asian region into association and collaboration with its initiative before taking a final position. It is our impression that the reluctance we have so far displayed about co–sponsoring the American drafts, together with our exploring possible amendments to the AR, will reinforce the United States view that even the traditional supporters of the ROC remain sceptical about the prospects for success in the present circumstances of any DR proposal with or without reference to the Security Council seat. There are in addition indications that the Japanese Mission has also been lobbying certain missions to vote against or at least abstain on the second part of the AR’s operative paragraph, should it come to a vote.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xxi]
1 Document 250.
2 Harry E.T. Thayer, advisor on political affairs, US Mission to the United Nations, New York.
3 The word ‘withdraw’ should presumably read ‘draw’.