Canberra, 21 September 1971
Secret
Your telegram No. 5184 of 18th September1 turned the scale on co–sponsorship of the US resolutions on Chinese representation. The decision to co–sponsor was in fact a modification of the Cabinet decision. As originally drafted, this authorised co–sponsorship if Australia was a member of a ‘large and representative group’. 2 The PM struck out the words ‘large and’ but even so, we felt that the list of co–sponsors as received last week was very far from representative and that the United States, by its failure to make up its mind soon enough, had placed countries like Australia at a disadvantage.3 We still feel that if the Americans had moved quickly, much of the erosion of the PRC4 position would have been avoided. We have of course been saying this for months.
Freeth cabled on Saturday 18th September that the LOP was still undecided.5 Shann and I discussed the situation with the Minister who agreed that we could tell Tokyo that we would immediately agree to co–sponsor if they did. Then on Sunday, 19th September, your message arrived expressing alarm at the possible effects on our relations with the US if we failed to co–sponsor.6 The Minister had a long discussion with the Prime Minister and the Department after which it was decided to drop the requirement for co–sponsorships by a representative group and concentrate on the fact that the attitude we had been urging on the Americans since early in the year had been met. It was therefore logical that we should co–sponsor. I was not happy about this. Throughout, we have urged the Government to follow its three principles viz.: admission of PRC, the Security Council seat and thirdly non–expulsion of Taiwan. But looking down the line, we felt that a low profile was highly desirable. Co–sponsorship with such an unrepresentative group presented no immediate problems but in the long term, we could be seen to have been unnecessarily rigid.
However, what really worried me were passages in your telegram such as the following:
para 2. ‘We are at a point where I think great damage could be done to future Australian–American relations if the United States has to go to the United Nations with a resolution which does not have Australian co–sponsorship’
para 4. ‘If we now back out, it will result in a weakening in our intimate co–operation with the United States’.
I discussed these passages with the Minister who commented that if the alliance was to be jeopardised by our failure to co–sponsor a last minute resolution which in any case we were pledged to support and had been working vigorously to support, then the alliance was not worth much.
In recent weeks, we have seen a series of United States actions which have hardly been designed to strengthen the alliance. The Kissinger visit, the economic and financial measures, the tough stand on South Pacific air traffic and the somewhat intransigent attitude on meat7 do not give one much confidence that the Americans care what we think or do. It is easy to see the reasons leading the Americans to ‘go it alone’. But they cannot do this and expect instant compliance from their allies.
Is there perhaps a danger that we may confuse the frank and friendly relations we enjoy with State …8 the Pentagon etc. with something deeper? Are the Americans really likely to denounce Anzus? For us, Anzus means that we have the benefit of the American nuclear umbrella in a global war situation. In a situation short of global war when Australia was in difficulty, not of her own making, I have always believed we could count on some degree of air and naval support. I do not believe Anzus at present means much more for us than this. For the United States, it gives them a potentially very important base in a global war situation, plus the current very substantial dividends flowing from Woomera, Pine Gap and North West Cape.
Is this situation and this relationship really in jeopardy, because as I said above, we are reluctant to co–sponsor resolutions which through American tardiness, have very largely failed to win respectable international support?
So far as ‘intimate co–operation’ is concerned, the Japanese have been far franker with us about their thinking on United Nations problems than has Washington. I assume that this is because so many decisions are being taken in the White House and not as a result of the usual Departmental processes.
Having said all this, I remain frankly worried about your telegram. I have suggested to the Minister that he discuss the problem with you and I am sending him a copy of this letter.
[DFAT: WALLER PAPERS]
1 Document 258.
2 See Document 237.
3 For McMahon’s discussions with Waller on the question of Australian co–sponsorship of the US resolutions see Document 242.
4 The word ‘PRC’ should presumably read ‘ROC’.
5 Not published.
6 Not found.
7 On 19 September, the Australian Minister for Civil Aviation, Senator Robert Cotton, had released details of an agreement with the United States over difficulties that had arisen in connection with the introduction of a new US carrier and of Boeing 747 flights between Australia and the United States. Waller’s reference to meat presumably relates to negotiations on the terms of an agreement with the US of 7 May 1971 which regulated the importation of meat into that country.
8 Matter expunged.