Canberra, 30 September 1971
Secret
The Kibel Mission1
Although the Chinese have not set precise political conditions for acceptance of the projected Australian trade mission, they have made it clear in their talks with Kibel and Bareham that they would read definite political implications into an Australian decision to send the mission. It seems important that these implications should be drawn to the notice of Ministers before a final decision is taken.
Points Made by the Chinese
2. Following are the main references by the Chinese to political aspects:
(a) On 27 September, the Chinese told Kibel that they would regard the exchange of trade missions as ‘a prelude to mutual recognition by the two Governments’;
(b) they further asked Kibel to inform the Prime Minister that ‘China is resolutely against the Two China policy and doubts very strongly whether they would take a place in the UN if that policy is pursued’;
(c) on 28 September, the Chinese told Bareham they hoped the Australian mission would be successful and would have a continuing benefit, but that ‘the success of this continuing benefit was dependent on the Australian Government’s attitude in the United Nations to China’s legal seat in the UN, that is, whether Australia would follow the United States step to create Two Chinas. Further trade must be based on the recognition of the PRC only’. They saw ‘a paradox’ in the fact that the Australian Government was ‘hostile’ to China yet willing to send an unofficial mission to China for trade purposes. When Bareham pointed out the problems in our position and said he hoped that whatever the UN result this would not interfere with the planning of the unofficial mission, they said they felt sure that the mission would proceed.
Comment
3. The proposition in (a) is consistent in principle with our approach of progressive normalization of relations through trade and cultural exchanges in the first instance. (Having rejected this approach in Paris, it seems likely that the Chinese have since decided to come some way towards it but have chosen to do so in a round–about way in Hong Kong partly to save face and partly to test our intentions.) There are some latent points of difference, however, between the Chinese proposition and our approach. The Prime Minister has stated publicly his belief that ‘in due time it will be possible to reach a point when we are able to recognize the People’s Republic with honour and without deserting old friends’. The Chinese probably envisage swifter progress towards recognition, following the exchange of trade missions, than is implied in the Prime Minister’s statement. Moreover, recognition on their terms would inevitably involve our breaking off with Taiwan. But Bareham could say to the Chinese that we, too, would consider the exchange of trade missions as a first step towards normalization of our relations, and that we see the end point of the process as mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations.
4. As to the message in (b), Bareham might say that although Australia is co–sponsoring the United States resolutions at the UN, we do not advocate a Two China policy but want to see the PRC in the United Nations with the Security Council seat.
5. It seems clear from the Chinese reply to Bareham’s question in (c) above that they are not asking us to withdraw our support from the DR and reverse IQ resolutions at this year’s Assembly as a condition for accepting the Australian trade mission. It is not clear, however, whether they are saying
(i) that we must switch our policy at this year’s Assembly if we want the mission to have ‘continuing benefit’; or
(ii) that we will have to switch our policy after this Assembly if we want ‘continuing benefit’.
Personally, I am inclined to the latter interpretation. However limited their knowledge of UN affairs, I think the Chinese are sufficiently well–informed and sufficiently realist to know we are now committed this year and will have to vote as we have undertaken to do. It would also make little sense from their point of view to let us send a trade mission to China without any expectation on their part that anything would be achieved.
6. But at very least I see here a clear warning that if the trade mission exchange is to get anywhere we shall have to change our policy after this Assembly; and indeed if we go ahead with our trade mission against the background of this Chinese warning, the Chinese will be entitled—even though no explicit Australian commitment has been given—to expect that our policy will be changed in 1972. If, on the other hand, we went ahead with the exchange but failed to change our policy, the Chinese would conclude that we had disregarded the understanding on which their proposal was put forward, that we had treated them contemptuously and that there was an insufficient basis of mutual confidence and respect for any long–term relationship between us.
7. Assuming, therefore, that the Government decides to proceed with the projected exchange of trade missions, I think it should be recognised that Ministers will have given a virtual undertaking to change our China policy after this year’s Assembly. Bareham need not say more to the Chinese than that their comments about the ‘continuing benefit’ of the trade mission exchange have been carefully noted—but the implications of this would be clear enough to the Chinese.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18/2/1]
1 In Cablegram 1279 (28 September) Bareham reported discussions with the China Resources Company (CRC) as relayed by Kibei. The main points made by the CRC representatives were that the Chinese were prepared to proceed with an Australian trade mission to the PRC, preferably arriving in November; that they would welcome a later visit by an Australian junior minister; that there should be a reciprocal visit by a PRC trade mission to Australia two or three months after the Australian visit; and that they held the view that the reciprocal visits would be a prelude to mutual recognition by the two Governments.