New York, 3 October 1971
758. Confidential
Chinese Representation
We do not think at this particular stage it is feasible to make a voting assessment on the IQ resolution that is accurate in any meaningful way. In this we agree with the United States Mission, who consider that our main objective must be to keep working for support or at least non–obstruction from the large number of member governments which have not yet made up their minds and from some of those which have.
2. The most optimistic estimate we can at present make suggests a very close vote, with a margin of one or two either way. At the other extreme, there could on present guesses be a majority of ten or twelve votes against us. If we are to win it looks as if we shall have to concentrate on increasing the number of abstentions.
3. Some attitudes will clarify and positions harden over the next few weeks. But there are bound to be uncertainties right up to the time of voting. Tactical flexibility will thus remain very important. The manoeuvre referred to in your paragraph 2 (which illustrates among other things the nervousness that Albanian co–sponsors are betraying, and which we are discussing with the Americans) is unlikely to be the only one of its kind. For example, the Tunisian Ambassador, who is evidently trying to be helpful, told me today, 30th September, that he has no instructions, that he hoped to bring back instructions from his forthcoming visit to Tunis, that if not he would use his own judgment, that his own present disposition was to propose an amendment to the American DR to make it more acceptable to him, and that he might in the end table his own separate resolution.
4. We note with satisfaction that our posts abroad are being asked to continue to lobby for support. So far as we here are concerned lobbying, in close consultation with our friends, is and will be a continuing process as circumstances dictate, and we shall keep you regularly informed of progress. The Minister is playing an active part in it.
Mcintyre.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/19, ii]
1 30 September. It referred to Cablegram UN746 (29 September) which questioned whether the Department of Foreign Affairs was being too optimistic in its assessment of voting for the Important Question resolution and asked the Australian Mission to the United Nations for its assessment of the vote.
2 Document 262.