Canberra, 15 October 1971
Secret
Chinese Representation in the United Nations
On present indications, the prospects of success of our two resolutions are not encouraging. Although we are certainly not prepared to acknowledge defeat at this point, the indications are that we could be faced with a straight vote on the Albanian Resolution (AR). This situation would arise if the Important Question resolution (which we are now calling the Non–expulsion resolution (NE)) is not accorded priority in voting over the AR, or if the NE fails, or if a motion to have a two–thirds majority requirement applied to the AR is defeated. As for our other resolution—the dual representation (DR) resolution—our judgment is that it has no prospect whatever of taking precedence over the AR. (The texts of the three resolutions are attached.)
2. We have recently discussed with the Americans, Japanese and New Zealanders the need for a fall–back plan which could be brought into operation at short notice. (The debate on Chinese representation is expected to cover the period 18th–26th October, 1971.) I outlined such a plan in my submission to Ministers of 7th September, 1971.1 This comprised (a) a call for separate votes on the two parts of the AR, and (b) amendments to the AR. The separate votes on the AR would enable us to vote in favour of the first part of the AR (calling for the seating of the PRC in the UN and Security Council) and oppose the second part (calling for the expulsion of the ROC). We would also argue that the vote on the second part would require for its adoption a two–thirds majority. The other alternative plan would be to move an amendment to the AR removing its damaging language (the call for the ROC’s expulsion).
3. At this stage, no final decision on the form of a contingency plan has been reached but we understand that the Americans tend to believe that, if necessary, it might be preferable to have separate votes on the AR.
4. At the same time we have made it clear to the Americans, and to the others that, while we are convinced that tactical fall–back plans are essential, our intention is to continue to work hard for the success of our two resolutions and that there has been no change whatever in our current priorities which are:
(i) to gain priority in voting for the NE;
(ii) to have the NE adopted by a simple majority;
(iii) to vote on the AR, (and Australia would vote against it) and argue that it requires for its adoption a two–thirds majority (that is, we would apply the NE to it);
(iv) This having been accomplished, move to a vote on the DR.
Vote on the Albanian Resolution
5. It is in our best interest to plan for all eventualities, because we cannot of course be certain that our tactical fall–back plans will succeed in any case. In my submission of 7th September I recommended inter alia that if we were confronted with a vote on the AR alone (all other alternatives including the NE and fall–back tactics having failed), Australia should abstain on the AR, and in an accompanying explanatory statement emphasise that (a) we had done everything possible to protect the interests of the ROC, and (b) our position all along had been to support the seating of the PRC in the United Nations and Security Council. We could not therefore support the AR because of its call for the ROC’s expulsion, but we would not vote against it because our stated policy was to support the entry of the PRC. (This situation is quite different to one in which the NE had been adopted (or if a prior move to have a two–thirds majority requirement applied to the second part of the AR had been successful); in that event we would of course vote against the AR.) Ministers however expressed the view (Decision No. 421)2 that, while the Government wished to keep its options and tactics open and consider matters further as necessary in the light of developments, Australia might in the event vote against the AR.
6. An abstention by Australia under the circumstances outlined would serve our interests better than a vote against, especially since it would be accompanied by an explanatory statement. In a situation in which the NE is defeated or does not obtain priority over the AR, (or in which all efforts have been defeated to apply a two–thirds majority requirement to either the whole of the AR or even its second part), a vote by Australia against the AR could not help the ROC (since the AR would then require only a simple majority which it will easily achieve). Such a vote by Australia could have serious implications for any future efforts by Australia to normalise relations with the PRC. An abstention would in fact be entirely consistent with the two sides of our policy on this question in the United Nations—support for the ROC and for the PRC. A vote against would favour only one part of this policy; it would thus amount to the abandonment of the United Nations aspect of our policy towards the PRC which has been so carefully formulated—and presented publicly—since the first part of this year.
Recommendation
7. It is recommended that Australia should abstain on the Albanian Resolution if, all other alternatives including the Non–expulsion resolution and fall–back tactics having failed, we are confronted with a vote on this resolution alone.
Nigel Bowen
Minister for Foreign Affairs
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xxi]
1 Not published.
2 Not published.