Canberra, 19 October 1971
1207. Secret Priority
Chinese Representation
Your 870.1 Your representations of fall–back positions are appreciated.
2. Your paragraph 1, third sentence.2 Our position on this matter is that tactical fall–back plans are essential. We consider it extremely important for the four countries to reach early agreement on this. We would not want the other three to have the impression that our views on this subject are tentative and in an exploratory stage only.
3. If a decision is taken in favour of separate votes on the two parts of the AR we think it would be safer to vote on the second part first (your paragraph 1, fourth sentence).3
4. Your paragraph 2, second sentence.4 Washington reported earlier in its 5598 (269 to UN New York),5 paragraph 10 that the State Department and New York Mission seemed to be generally agreed that it would probably be necessary to seek to amend the AR.
For Washington
5. We are repeating to you New York’s 870. With reference to your 5687,6 you will have noted from New York’s 8467 that Newlin had undertaken to refer the subject of fall–back tactics to the State Department and from New York’s 870 that Newlin was now awaiting the State Department’s response. When an opportunity next arises you might emphasise to Feldman the importance we attach to this matter.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/19, ii]
1 18 October. It reported that the Australian Mission to the United Nations had spoken to the US and New Zealand Missions separately about possible ‘fall–back positions’ and that it had informed the former that, while no decisions had yet been taken by Ministers, it considered there might be advantages in separate votes for the two parts of the Albanian resolution. It also reported that the New Zealand Mission considered that the US Mission was tending towards submission of an amendment which would remove ‘the offensive wording of the Albanian resolution’.
2 The sentence reads: ‘We made it clear that our Ministers had not yet made any final decisions about fall–back positions and that discussions with New Zealanders (and Americans and Japanese) were exploratory to see whether we could reach common positions on tactics and voting:.
3 The Australian Mission to the United Nations had suggested voting on the two parts of the Albanian resolution ‘in the order in which they appeared’.
4 It reported the New Zealand Mission’s view that the United States was tending towards an amendment of the Albanian resolution.
5 11 October. It reported a conversation with Feldman and conveyed a detailed US analysis of possible voting patterns.
6 11 October. It referred to a statement by Feldman that all tactical matters were being handled in New York.
7 Document 274.