London, 5 January 1951
76. Top Secret Immediate
For Fadden and Spender from Menzies.
Korea
When discussion opened this afternoon on United Kingdom paper1 text of which has been telegraphed to you, I pressed for immediate steps to defer further action on Korea at Lake Success.2 I said the matters under consideration were too important to justify hasty decision by Prime Ministers’ Conference. Moreover, I myself desired to have opportunity of consulting some of my colleagues in Australia over the weekend.
2. Prime Ministers agreed to send separate telegrams to their representatives in New York and Washington directing them to do their best to secure postponement of positive steps at Lake Success. Meanwhile I suggest that appropriate members of Cabinet should be got together to consider these matters. As the debate will be resumed in London on Monday afternoon 8th January, it will be necessary to receive any comments at latest by Monday morning London time.
3. In discussing United Kingdom paper I made the following points:—
(a) No cease fire proposal can usefully be put forward unless in the meantime we are able to consolidate a holding line in Korea.
(b) If such a line is consolidated then we could put forward proposals for—
(i) Cease fire.
(ii) Korean settlement on the basis of a unified Korea.
(iii) Admission of China to United Nations on the footing that obligations of the Charter will be accepted by China.
(iv) Indication to Peking regime that we are ready to discuss Formosa on footing of the Cairo Agreement. At the same time a vigorous attempt should be made to secure its demilitarisation.
4. I said that I felt it was useless to offer China a seat on the Korean Commission as proposed in the United Kingdom paper if at the same time she were denied a seat on the Security Council. In my view the Chiang Kai Shek Government was an émigré Government with a vested interest in world war. I felt that we should as quickly as possible discard the role of being Chiang’s advocate.
5. I stressed the view that the validity of any opinions we might have on Korea and Formosa depended largely on accurate military appreciations. Attlee has now agreed to provide such a military appreciation by Monday next and I expect in fact to receive a military appreciation in writing before then. The United Kingdom until today has been very cagey about producing such an appreciation. I was puzzled by Harrison’s conversation with Shinwell3 which he reported to you recently by telegram.4 It is satisfactory, however, that the United Kingdom has now agreed to produce the appreciation we have been seeking for some time.
6. I pointed out to the Conference that the alternative to negotiation with Chinese Communists on a basis which Chinese would consider realistic was to go ahead with war against China. As we could not limit war–like activities on our side without crippling ourselves this would mean an all–out war with China which would tend swiftly to be a general world war.
7. Having regard to the very delicate position which may arise in negotiations with the United States when we have finished our discussion on the subject in London we are taking precautions to prevent the line of our discussions becoming known publicly.
[NAA: A1838, TS852/20/4/2, i]
1 The paper proposed that an agreed statement of Commonwealth policy, to be presented after the Prime Ministers’ Conference, should comprise three elements: that the Commonwealth intended to stand in Korea, and support the UN in its efforts to do so; that the Commonwealth objective was the establishment of a unified, free and independent Korea and the prevention of conflict beyond Korea; and that the Commonwealth was ready at all times to achieve these aims by negotiation. It was suggested in the paper that the bases for negotiation might include a ceasefire; elections in Korea and a withdrawal of foreign forces; a change in Chinese representation in the UN; and, on Formosa, an acceptance of the Cairo Declaration in principle with Commonwealth support for a resolution to establish a UN commission to study the problem.
2 That is, UN headquarters in New York. The cease–fire group had reported to the Political Committee on 3 January, laying down five conditions for the restoration of peace in Korea: a cease–fire; a political conference; the staggered withdrawal of foreign troops; the formation of administrative machinery for the whole of Korea; and a general conference that would include China, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, and that would discuss Taiwan and PRC representation in the United Nations. The Committee adjourned for two days to consider the report and, after Menzies’ intervention at the Prime Minister’s conference, further postponement of the question occurred. The delay was of concern to the US Administration because it was anxious to move beyond the cease–fire process.
3 Emanuel Shinwell, UK Minister of Defence.
4 3 January. Harrison reported Shinwell’s view that the UK Chiefs of Staff had previously not considered Formosa vital. However, the Chiefs had since come to the US view that, because Formosa served as protection for the Philippines, it was, in fact, vital. Commenting further, Shinwell pointed out that the changed attitude was not based on a formal strategic assessment; the Chiefs had not yet put detailed views to the Government.