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MEMORANDUM FROM SHANN TO ASIAN POSTS

Canberra, 4 January 1972

Secret Austeo


China Policy

Since the UN General Assembly’s decision on Chinese representation, a succession of events has caused governments in Southeast Asia to give closer consideration to China policy. Five more countries (though none in Asia) have established relations with Peking, and two others have broken relations with the ROC. ROC membership of international agencies has been affected, and its membership of ASPAC has come under scrutiny. In Thailand and Korea the assumption by essentially military governments of increased power has been linked with international pressures to come to terms with Peking. Prime Minister Sato in Japan has stayed in office, but it seems certain that he will retire in 1972 and be succeeded by someone chosen because, among other factors, he may be able to achieve an accommodation with Peking.

2. The most important China policy developments affecting Southeast Asia have been the conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in late November1 and the Malaysian proposal for neutralisation which was given some recognition on that occasion2. It is evident that ASEAN members are concerned to establish among themselves some co–operative strength as a basis for dealing with China. At the same time there is clearly no unanimity amongst them on how closely to approach China or on how fast. Reports from posts on this subject have been valuable.

3. These developments provide a changing perspective to our assessments of the expectations of Southeast Asian countries regarding Australia’s China policy, and the impact any decisions or actions on our part towards China may have on them and on our relations with them. This perspective will no doubt continue to change, not least in the run–up to, and especially the aftermath of, President Nixon’s visit to Peking.

4. There have been no recent decisions on Australian China policy other than those of which you are aware, and which have been publicly announced. Nor is it possible to indicate whether or when any further decisions may be taken. The Australian Government’s long–term objective remains the normalisation of bilateral relations with Peking; but the dialogue is in a state of suspense as there is no prospect of reconciling our points of view at present. We want, however, to keep our policy options under review; and for that purpose we need amongst other things to have some idea of the likely reaction of Southeast Asian countries to possible changes in our policy. We should therefore be glad if you would let us have as soon as possible your thoughts on how the government to which you are accredited would feel itself affected, and its relations with Australia affected, if:

— the Australian Government’s policy were to remain as it is indefinitely, or

— the Government decided to reduce our relations with the ROC (e.g. by removing the Ambassador but not the Embassy) but not to break relations with the ROC or to establish relations with the PRC, or

— the Government decided to resume the dialogue on the basis that it was prepared in principle to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC and, as a necessary consequence, to break relations with the ROC.

You might supplement an initial report as circumstances warrant.

5. You may presume that if any decision to change policy were taken we would do whatever we could to keep our neighbours informed of our intentions and motives as early as possible, but we would not necessarily consult them before taking our decisions or seek to concert our actions with them.

[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xxii]

1 The Foreign Ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines and the former Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman (Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand), met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 26 and 27 November.

2 The Foreign Ministers and Special Envoy issued a declaration which, inter alia, stated that ‘Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand were determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of and respect for, South–East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers’.