Canberra, 8 February 1972
Secret Austeo
Subject: The Likely Outcome of President Nixon’s Visit to Peking
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AIM
To discuss what topics are likely to be discussed during President Nixon’s visit to Peking from February 21–28 (on which we have no reliable official intelligence) and to assess what scope there might be for agreement and resolution of existing problems in Sino–US relations.
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(a) TAIWAN2
9. China’s public position continues to be that the US must withdraw all her forces from Taiwan and recognize that the future of Taiwan is China’s internal affair. There is no possibility of a final solution on Taiwan emerging in the Sino–US talks, but it seems certain that a general framework of agreement—or tolerable disagreement—has been reached concerning Taiwan in the Kissinger–Chou talks.
10. The US Administration has emphasised that it is going to maintain diplomatic relations and the treaty relationship with Taiwan. On November 30 Kissinger told the press that ‘we are not going to the People’s Republic to change any existing commitments’. At the same briefing on November 30, however, Kissinger stated: ‘Our position is that the ultimate disposition, the ultimate relationship of Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China should be settled by direct negotiations between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China’. An officer on Kissinger’s National Security Council staff has confirmed privately that this means that, contrary to the position of previous US administrations, the US had now given up its role as a party principal in the dispute between the PRC and the ROC, believing that the solution should come about through negotiations between the two parties concerned. This is likely to have been regarded by Peking as a significant movement since it concedes the essential ‘Chineseness’ of the problem and leaves the way open for an eventual mutually agreed settlement between the PRC and ROC. It indicates that the US will not encourage the establishment of an independent Taiwanese state since the PRC would never agree to this and hence the solution would not come about by an agreement between the two parties. It cuts the ground from under any other countries pushing for self–determination for the Taiwanese, something which has almost certainly been of concern to Peking, especially since the Japanese were induced by the US to acknowledge the importance of Taiwan to their security in the Nixon–Sato communique in 1969.3However, following his recent talks with Nixon, Sato said that the 1969 joint communique is ‘now history’ and that statements made at that time are not binding on Japan in the changed international situation that now exists.
11. Our NSC informant expressed the view that in the light of the new US position on Taiwan the PRC might be prepared to acquiesce in an indefinite prolongation of the present situation, and to eschew the use or threat of force. Chinese statements also seem to indicate that they might be prepared to tolerate the continuance of the mutual defence treaty. In a list of demands last July concerning Taiwan, Chou stated: ‘The United States should withdraw all their present military strength and military installations from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. And the defence treaty which was concluded between the United States and Chiang Kai–shek in 1954 and the so–called defence of Taiwan and Penghu (Pescadores) is illegal, and null and void, and the Chinese people do not recognize that treaty’. This phrasing seems significant in that, while withdrawal of US troops is demanded, the abrogation of the treaty is not. It has generally been considered that there is a greater risk of China using force against the Offshore Islands, which are not covered by the US–ROC treaty, but the NSC official argued that China would prefer the ROC to remain on the Islands, because it maintained the ‘Chinese’ character of the Taiwan issue.
12. The US could follow up the Peking talks with some reduction of US forces in Taiwan (and possibly their total withdrawal within the next year or two.) Late last year the US Chiefs of Staff were asked by Secretary Laird to advise what facilities they would have to retain on Taiwan and in response produced a very modest requirement. In recent conversations, US officials have pointed out that the great bulk of the US forces on Taiwan are connected with the Vietnam war and could therefore be withdrawn without much difficulty. There seems a good prospect therefore that the Chinese will be able to regard the Taiwan problem with considerably less urgency.
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D. BILATERAL RELATIONS
28. Although there might be a mutual desire for the establishment of diplomatic relations, it does not seem feasible at this stage, even when one considers that in recent times President Nixon has shown himself capable of bold and adventurous policy changes. In fact on January 2 1972 Mr Nixon specifically ruled it out: ‘Recognition in the conventional sense will not be one of the results. They do not expect that. We do not expect that. The reasons it can not be one of the results is that as long as we continue to recognize Taiwan, which we do, as long as we continue to have our defence treaty with Taiwan, which we will, the People’s Republic will not have diplomatic relations in the conventional sense in that country. So we are not going to have that kind of normalization …4 we will have normalization in terms of setting up some kind of communication better than we currently have, because nations that do not have diplomatic relations in the conventional sense can have relations and that is one thing that we will be able to do’. There are a number of possible alternatives ranging from a US trade office in Peking to an agreement on regular consultations at, in effect, a Ministerial level. Chou has ruled out a visit to Washington while there is an ROC Ambassador there and it seems unlikely that the Chinese would want to use their UN delegation since this could complicate their anti–great power stance in New York.
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E. THE PR EFFECT
31. It seems likely that the visit in itself will be enough of a spectacle to guarantee a measure of success. Preparations are already in progress in Peking, repainting important buildings, repaving streets and trimming trees. The whole ‘production’ will be transmitted live to colour television viewers in America. The visit is also likely to be followed by more contacts at many levels between the US and China.
32. The cosmetic benefits of the new relationship are not confined to one side. It has already given China its seat in the UN Security Council and the visit will be another symbol of China’s acceptance back into the world community. For very little effort China has, in effect, been given great power status, while disclaiming any interest in having it. The fact that Nixon is corning to Peking at his own request is especially flattering to the Chinese—many have been quick to point out the comparison with earlier centuries when tributary nations came from great distances to pay homage to the emperor of the ‘middle kingdom’.
F. WIDER IMPLICATIONS
33. Even if the specific results of the Nixon visit to Peking are small, it will mark the most significant development in East–West relations since the Geneva Summit of 1955.5 It ushers in an era in which the interests and power of three and perhaps four great states in Asia will have to be counterbalanced. It is a setback to Soviet power aspirations and is likely to exacerbate Sino–Soviet hostility and distrust. The US will aim to have better relations with each of the two Communist powers than either of the latter will have with each other. The significance of ideology in East–West relations will be further eroded. A continuing role in Asia amongst the great powers will be less difficult for the US people to reject than one–sided obligations to smaller, unstable Asian countries. As a corollary US alliance policies will gradually receive less emphasis and there may be an acceleration of the process of ‘historical evolution’ of certain of her treaty commitments to which Kissinger looked forward in July 1970 (NIC 57 (71) P. 19).6
[NAA: A1838, 3107/40/16114, iv]
1 The National Assessments Staff was responsible to the Chairman of the National Intelligence Committee (who was also the Director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation) for preparing relatively long–range analytical assessments of international issues. The Staff did this at the direction of the Committee or its Chairman or, more controversially, on its own initiative.
2 Discussion of Taiwan occurred under the sub–title, ‘Possibility of Agreement on Main Problems in Sino–US Relations’.
3 See footnote 7, Document 135.
4 Ellipsis in the original.
5 In July 1955, the Heads of Government of the United States, USSR, United Kingdom and France met in Geneva to discuss major international problems.
6 Not published.