Canberra, 20 December 1949
Recognition of Chinese Communist Government
The following are the main arguments that have been advanced against early recognition of the People’s Government of China:—
(1) There is no advantage to be gained from it. The Chinese communists are communists in the fullest sense, and it can be expected that they will move into the Soviet orbit and become increasingly subject to Soviet domination. No thanks or any other form of reciprocal gesture can be expected from them.
(2) Recognition would amount to condoning the seizure of power by force, and the holding of it against the wishes of the majority.
(3) It would mean the throwing over of a former ally.
(4) It would result in the replacement in the Security Council and other United Nations meetings of a government which has been normally friendly to the western countries by a government which will vote solidly with the Soviet bloc (with the right of veto).
(5) Recognition would boost the morale of troublesome communist elements throughout South-East Asia
(6) It would needlessly antagonize the United States of America.
These arguments do not suggest that failure to accord recognition will have any effect whatever in halting the progress of communism in China or elsewhere. There is still the implication that the inevitable will have to be faced some day, and recognition given, however reluctantly. The Americans are even talking of withholding recognition for a number of years if necessary, but with the recollection of their long non-recognition of Soviet Russia in mind it is hard to see what they can hope to gain from this except a sense of moral rectitude.
All in all, advocacy of non-recognition would seem to amount to one of two things: either defeatism—a feeling that all is lost and the best that can be done is to hold out as long as possible; or an optimistic belief that, if we hold on long enough, some deus ex machina will appear and suddenly put everything right.
There are sound arguments that suggest that neither of these beliefs is justified by the facts, and that the only realistic course is to make the best of the situation and accord recognition as soon as possible. The main ones are:—
(1) It is indisputable that the communists are in fact in effective control of almost the entire mainland of China, and there is no likelihood whatever of their being thrown out in the foreseeable future. There is no evidence that the communists are actively disliked by the majority of the Chinese people. To ignore these facts is to be blind to reality. It is true that the communists have come to power by force; it is true that we dislike their methods and their philosophy. But the act of recognition does not condone the means by which they attained power, nor does it approve the communist doctrine. It merely acknowledges the factual situation, in the same way that the situation in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in Central Europe has had to be acknowledged.
(2) The Chinese communists are admittedly full-fledged communists, and they can be expected to co-operate with the Soviet Union within the United Nations framework. Admittedly no gratitude can be expected from them from the mere fact of recognising them. But it is far from certain—there is indeed evidence to the contrary—that they want to sever all their contacts with the West and identify their economy with that of the Soviet bloc. They may ultimately do so; but, if they do, it could be because the western countries for their part did nothing to preserve contacts. The only way, in the long run, to keep them out of the arms of Russia is to try to cultivate normal relations with them through existing channels of trade and through continued political contacts.
(3) Continued encouragement of trade and commercial contacts with communist China offers the best, and indeed the only, hope of preserving British commercial interests in Hongkong and up and down the China coast. If Hongkong is not allowed and encouraged to perform its normal function of a trade entrepot, it will become a liability, and an indefensible one at that. The rendition of Hongkong to China might ultimately have to be contemplated; but this need not be taken for granted so long as it can continue to perform a useful peace-time service to the communists.
(4) While the triumph of the Chinese communists will undoubtedly offer some encouragement to communists throughout South-East Asia, early recognition of the Communist Government will have corresponding advantages. The Governments of South-East Asia are anxious to recognize without delay. They all have substantial Chinese minorities within their borders and it is important from their point of view that they should have a recognized government to which to complain, if necessary, of the activities of these groups.
[NAA: A1838, 494/2/10, iv]
1 A handwritten note indicates that the submission was not given to the Minister.