Canberra, 17 February 1972
Secret
China Policy
It is necessary for the Government to give further consideration to its China policy in the light of recent developments. These include the entry of the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations and its agencies, the increase in the number of countries who recognise the PRC, the movement of the United States and Japan towards normalising their relations with the PRC, and the initiative of the ASEAN countries in deciding to seek recognition of their region as a zone of neutrality. Annex A1 refers to the movement towards recognition.
2. The Government’s policy as declared and acted upon last year may be summarised as one of moving towards normalisation of relations with the PRC with primary emphasis on expanding relations in trade, scientific and cultural relations, proceeding at all times with caution and with a careful assessment of Australia’s interests. However, the Government consistently adopted the attitude it was not prepared to abandon the Republic of China on Taiwan. Its actions in the UN General Assembly reflected these two strands in its policy.
3. The question arises whether this policy should be changed. There is a degree of importance and urgency attached to this question, not only by reason of the events in paragraph 1 but because our efforts to normalise relations with the PRC last year consistently met resistance. It was indicated there would be little or no advance unless we were prepared to acknowledge directly or indirectly the proposition that Taiwan is a province of China and to withdraw our ambassador from Taipei. A record of our contacts is set forth in Annex B.2
The Options
4. The options open to us are:—
(a) To continue our present policy of seeking to normalise relations with the PRC but to refuse to abandon the ROC.
(b) To modify our policy, by continuing to seek to normalise our relations with the PRC while decreasing our political links with the ROC (as e.g. by downgrading or removing our Embassy but keeping some official representation) but at the same time refusing to withdraw our recognition of the ROC.
(c) To reverse our policy by accepting the PRC’s conditions for recognition and withdrawing our recognition and all official representation from the ROC while maintaining a trade office in Taipei.
CONTINUATION OF PRESENT POLICY
The advantages of this course are:—
(i) It would be consistent with all our actions and statements up to the present time.
(ii) Although the announcement of this policy last year had an effect in leading Australian public opinion towards acceptance of attempts to get closer to the PRC and away from a rigid ‘cold’ war stance, opinion has not yet changed throughout the Australian community on this issue and, furthermore, a substantial body of Australian opinion is against the abandonment of Taiwan.
(iii) Our major political and trading interests still rest with the United States, the EEC including the United Kingdom, and Japan, while any interest with the PRC is marginal and our present policy is consistent with this fact.
(iv) Our regional neighbours, particularly Thailand and Indonesia, have special problems regarding the exchange of ambassadors with the PRC and it is in our interest to consult with them and not to act in a way which might bring pressure upon them to proceed to recognition earlier than they otherwise might do, with possible consequent accentuation of problems of subversion in their countries.
(v) It maintains some support for the ROC which is a nation of 14 1/2 million with whom we have maintained friendly relations over a long period, and avoids the abandonment of them.
(vi) It is not inconsistent with an expression publicly of our willingness to recognise the PRC without conditions, i.e. on the usual terms of recognition in international law under which recognition does not normally involve either approval or disapproval of policies or disputed territorial claims.
The disadvantages are:—
(i) It will result in our being unable to secure recognition and exchange of ambassadors with the PRC while we maintain the policy.
(ii) If during the year the ROC changed its position and became the Republic of Taiwan, it would be practically impossible for us to refuse to continue our diplomatic representation in Taipei at that stage, whereas continued recognition by us of Taipei in those circumstances could well defer our prospects of recognising the PRC indefinitely or, at least, until Taipei arranged some ‘deal’ with the PRC or we ourselves reversed our policy on Taipei.
(iii) If the PRC continue their ‘political’ line on trade it could mean our prospects of trade with the PRC would be adversely affected, particularly as regards the sale of wheat.
(iv) It would preclude us from exerting in Peking upon the largest nation in Asia such influence as we might have through our Australian ambassador there. It is difficult to judge the weight of this consideration. We would, of course, deal with the representatives of the PRC in the UN and in bodies such as ECAFE.
(v) If it led to a situation where we were one of the last significant countries in the world to recognise the PRC it could earn us a measure of hostility from the PRC which could be contrary to our long–term interests.
6. MODIFICATION OF PRESENT POLICY
The advantages of this course are:—
(i) It would place us in a position to move quickly towards recognition of the PRC on the PRC’s terms should future developments, e.g. developments flowing from changes in US, Japanese or UK policy or even changes in the policy of ASEAN countries towards the PRC, render this necessary or advisable in Australia’s interests.
(ii) It would furnish some insurance against having our capacity to manoeuvre limited by any action of the ROC to change its position and become e.g. the Republic of Taiwan.
(iii) It might as an earnest of a changing attitude on our part lead the PRC to adopt a less hard line on trade and scientific and cultural exchanges.
The disadvantages are:—
(i) Being a change from our actions and statements up to the present time, it would at present be unacceptable to the sections of Australian opinion referred to in paragraph 5 (ii) above.
(ii) It might have the effect of hardening the PRC line who, seeing us move so far, might see merit in continuing such political pressure through refusal to trade etc. as they have chosen to exert so far in the hope of compelling a complete reversal of Australian policy.
(iii) In sum, it may be suggested it incurs all the disadvantages of the first option without ensuring any of the advantages of the third option.
7. To RECOGNISE THE PRC ACCEPTING ITS CONDITIONS
The advantages are:—
(i) We would have diplomatic representation at the capital of the most populous nation on earth, which although industrially backward and not a super–power is emerging as one of the four major powers in the Asian region. This should enable us to have a better exchange of views and information and a better capacity to serve Australian travellers and businessmen in China.
(ii) In terms of trade, it should afford us a better opportunity of seizing any opportunities for increasing trade that may exist. It would remove what at present appears to be a bar or at least a restriction upon trade, particularly in wheat.
(iii) Sixty–eight countries have so far entered into diplomatic relations with the PRC and it may be suggested it will lessen our influence with other countries if we become isolated or identified as one of the last countries in the region to have diplomatic relations with Peking.
(iv) Because we are a country having some influence in the Asian and Pacific region and also with the United States, it may be argued we would have more leverage at present in negotiations with the PRC to secure terms favourable to us than we would have if and when our South–East Asian neighbours have exchanged diplomatic representatives with Peking and the US has arrived perhaps at some special accommodation. It is not suggested this leverage would be sufficient to secure waiver by the PRC of their condition that we acknowledge directly or indirectly that Taiwan is a province of China.
The disadvantages are:—
(i) By accepting the conditions laid down by Peking we would not only be reversing government policy and abandoning our support for a small and friendly country in face of the demands of a large country but we would be doing so at a time when a substantial section of the Australian public are either not prepared for it or are opposed to it.
(ii) Such action could weaken our credibility with other friendly Asian countries, to whom up to the present we have given support in their efforts to resist movements supported overtly or covertly by Peking to overthrow their constituted governments.
(iii) Such action could tend to undermine the security situation not only in Taiwan but also in other non–communist countries of Asia. The actions of the United States will, of course, have a greater influence than our own actions in this regard. But in advance of President Nixon’s visit to Peking there are already signs of suspicion and uneasiness in these countries. For example, the ASEAN countries, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia, are confronted with special problems in considering the establishment of PRC embassies in their respective countries. See Annex C for further details.3
(iv) The establishment of a PRC embassy in Australia would present some security problems. Presumably we would seek to control this by the same kind of restrictions upon movement of diplomatic representatives as are imposed by the PRC in Peking. Already funds are channelled from Peking (mainly through New China News Agency) to Australian citizens for use by them for what may be described as PRC propaganda purposes.
8. It is difficult to assign appropriate weight to each of the considerations mentioned and to arrive at a firm recommendation as to the best course to adopt. Each of the possible courses involves some presentational difficulties.
9. Quite apart from the considerations for and against the three options, there are considerations of timing any announcement of government policy. In favour of an .early announcement of government policy it may be said that in view of various international developments since the last foreign policy statement Parliament is entitled to an early foreign affairs statement in the coming session, that this must deal with our China policy and that the sooner the Australian people have a clear statement of that policy the better. Against an early announcement it may be argued that we should wait and see what emerges from President Nixon’s visit to Peking and from any Japanese moves, particularly what may emerge as to the probable future of Taiwan.
10. The considerations involved include assessments of community attitudes in Australia for which the Government must assume responsibility and my Department has not made a firm recommendation to me. It is fair to say that, excluding these factors, the advice of my Department would be in favour of recognising and entering into diplomatic relations with the PRC and, in consequence, accepting the PRC’s condition of breaking diplomatic relations with the ROC. However, giving the best consideration I can to the whole matter I am in favour of the first option, i.e. continuing our present policy.
11. I recommend:—
(i) That we decide to continue our present policy of seeking to normalise our relations with the PRC, moving at all times with caution and with a careful assessment of Australia’s interests.
(ii) That we announce that there is upon our part a willingness to recognise the PRC and exchange diplomatic representatives on the usual international law terms, that is, without either party approving or disapproving policy and without either party passing judgement upon disputed territorial claims, in particular the PRC claim that Taiwan is within their jurisdiction.
(iii) That I include this decision in an early statement to the Parliament on foreign policy.
(iv) That in my statement I express the hope that the question of the future relationship between the PRC and the ROC can be resolved between them in a peaceful manner to their mutual satisfaction.
Nigel Bowen
Minister for Foreign Affairs
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38/18, xxiii]
1 Not published.
2 Not published.
3 Annex C explained that for ASEAN nations the problems of recognition related to ‘their Chinese communities, their internal security situations, and their generally weak bases on which to develop relations with Peking’.