Canberra, 3 March 1972
Secret
Renewal of Contact with the PRC
As a follow–up to the Prime Minister’s press statement1 of 28 February on the Sino/American communique,2 we have prepared the attached draft telegram of instructions to Mr Renouf in Paris.3 The draft telegram is designed to test out the Chinese on their willingness to move ahead with us, as they have with the USA, in areas of our bilateral relations other than the Taiwan issue.
2. It may be, indeed it is probable, that China does in fact have one policy for the USA and another for countries, such as Australia, which are of lesser importance to China. It may be, too, that the PRC was also influenced in the American case by the indications (more apparent than real) in the communique of a shift in the United States position on Taiwan towards the PRC’s views. I refer particularly to the statements in the communique that:
‘The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position’. (This has been regarded by some sections of the press as amounting to United States endorsement of the ‘One China’ concept; but it is no such thing. At the most, it can be regarded as leaving open the question whether the United States endorses that concept. Moreover, what the United States does not challenge is that both Chinas take the position that there is only one China—not simply (as in Canada’s case) that the PRC regards Taiwan as part of China.)
‘(The United States) reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.’
‘With this prospect in mind, (the United States) affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all United States forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, (the United States) will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.’ (Dr Kissinger has since said that ‘in the area’ means ‘the general area’ and ‘is not a reference to any particular part of Asia’. )
3. For the reasons given at the beginning of the preceding paragraph, and in view of the unforthcoming attitude the PRC has so far taken towards us, I think it will be necessary to hang our renewed approach on some new elements in the situation. One of these, of course, to which the Prime Minister himself drew attention, is the fact that China has now agreed with the United States a line of approach virtually indistinguishable from the line we had proposed last May. But I think that that in itself is unlikely to be sufficient to move the PRC to a more positive attitude, and that we shall need to put forward further considerations.
4. One of these might be to state explicitly to the Chinese, as we have not done hitherto, that our ultimate objective is the establishment of full diplomatic relations on mutually acceptable terms. There is a basis for this:
(a) In the Prime Minister’s Melbourne speech on 28 July when he said: ‘I believe that, in due time, it will be possible to reach a point when we are able to recognize the People’s Republic with honour and without deserting old friends’; and
(b) In your own statement on International Affairs in the House on 18 August when you said: ‘We recognize that the establishment of full and normal relations with the People’s Republic on mutually acceptable terms will be a difficult and perhaps protracted exercise’.
5. Another might be to remind the Chinese that immediately after the UN vote you welcomed the seating of the PRC’s representatives in the United Nations and its assumption of the Security Council seat.
6. Another might be to remind them that we have not opposed their taking the China seat in the subsidiary bodies and Specialized Agencies of the United Nations in which the representation issue has arisen. Such a reminder might be taken as an implied assurance that we would continue to abstain in the voting on this issue in other Specialized Agencies and international bodies. It would thus be unfortunate were we subsequently to vote against the PRC in, for example, the IMF. But that possibility now seems most unlikely, given the overwhelming numbers against the ROC and the futility of backing the ROC in a hopeless cause, and given also that even the United States is seeking in the IMP and some other bodies a way to avoid a straight–out vote. Moreover, we could ensure that Mr Renouf did not give any explicit assurance about our future voting attitude.
7. A further point which could be made to the PRC (a point which in fact Mr Renouf made last May, on instructions) is that we hope that the two sides will resolve the Taiwan issue between themselves in a peaceful manner to their mutual satisfaction. This, of course, has a parallel in the Nixon–Chou communique.
8. Yet another point which could be made is that Australia ‘notes’ or ‘recognizes’ that both the PRC and ROC take the position that there is only one China, of which Taiwan is part. This too would have a parallel in the Nixon–Chou communique; it would not commit us (any more than President Nixon committed himself) to endorsing that position; and you have in effect already publicly made the point. (In your statement in the House on 26 October 1971, immediately after the General Assembly vote, you said, ‘We recognise, however, that the PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan, and the ROC claims sovereignty over Taiwan and the mainland’. )
9. Because you have in effect already made in public the point in paragraph 8, because you were in any case planning to include in your forthcoming statement to Parliament the point in paragraph 7, and because this might be a further element weighing with the Chinese, I think it would be useful if Mr Renouf could indicate that it was your intention to include those two points in your forthcoming statement.
10. It is likely, but not yet certain, that the PRC will be sending a delegation to the ECAFE meeting in Bangkok in the middle of this month, which you will be attending. It could be useful if you were to meet privately with the leader of the PRC delegation. Apart from constituting evidence (both here and to the PRC and elsewhere) of the Government’s seriousness of purpose in pursuing the objective of the progressive normalisation of relations, it may be that by that time the PRC would be ready with a response to Mr Renouf’s approach in Paris. To increase the chances of that, to provide another attraction to the Chinese, and to demonstrate that our inability to take up immediately the invitation to Mr Peacock did not mean that we had no desire for Ministerial contact with the PRC, it would be desirable to have Mr Renouf mention the possibility of a private meeting in Bangkok.
11. I recommend that you authorise the despatch of the attached telegram to Mr Renouf.
12. I attach another copy of this submission and the draft telegram in case you wish to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister.4
Keith Waller
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18/2]
1 See footnote 1, Document 305.
2 The text of the joint communique, issued at the end of Nixon’s visit to the PRC between 21 and 28 February, is given in Current Notes , vol. 43, 1972, pp. 50–2.
3 Final is Document 313.
4 Bowen endorsed the recommendation and indicated that he would advise the Prime Minister.