Canberra, 19 February 1951
Top Secret
Relationships Between Australia and China
On several occasions I have said, inside and outside Parliament, that the relationships between Australia and China will be reconsidered from time to time in the light of developments in the international situation. Although the Government of Mao Tse–tung controls the mainland of China and is unlikely to be replaced by any other Government in the foreseeable future, Australia has so far refused to recognise the Central People’s Government as the Government of China and has maintained its recognition of Chiang Kai–shek’s Government. This is primarily because:—
(a) Mao Tse–tung’s Government has shown no signs of readiness to pursue its international aims by peaceful means in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations; and
(b) Since the Korean incident began, it has been necessary to make it clear that the Central People’s Government should not be permitted to gain a positive advantage of this kind as a direct result of Communist Chinese aggression in Korea.
In my opinion, the worst possible time to agree to recognise Mao Tse–tung’s Government was when the United Nations forces in Korea were suffering a temporary military defeat. The military position is now fluid. It seems not unreasonable to expect that United Nations forces can hold a firm line in Korea. In these circumstances, I think it is permissible to reconsider whether it is desirable to take some action which, while not necessarily according full diplomatic recognition to Mao Tse–tung’s Government, would nevertheless make it clear that we do not propose to bolster up Chiang Kai–shek’s regime, that we have no expectation of Chiang Kai–shek ever controlling the mainland of China again and no desire that Chiang Kai–shek’s forces should become associated with the United Nations forces in military operations in Korea or on the mainland of China.
I therefore submit for Cabinet’s consideration the question whether it is not desirable for Australia, at a carefully chosen point of time, to take some action to indicate publicly that it does not regard Chiang Kai–shek as a future ruler of China as a whole, thus implying that Australia does not intend to be associated in military operations with Chiang Kai–shek’s forces. This could be done in any of several ways:—
(a) De–recognition of Chiang Kai–shek without recognition of Mao Tse–tung; or
(b) Public intimation that Chiang does not control the mainland of China but only Formosa; or
(c) Some public statement on behalf of the Government wherein it is acknowledged that the Peking regime is the de facto, as distinct from the de jure, government of the mainland of China.
The question of timing of any such announcement would be of the first importance and might, I suggest, be left to me in consultation with the Prime Minister. I have in mind chiefly the importance of avoiding any adverse reaction from any substantial element in American opinion at the very time when discussions on the question of a Japanese Peace Settlement and the possibility of security arrangements in the Pacific between the United States, Australia and New Zealand are unconcluded. Careful judgement would be required as to whether an announcement of this kind should be made at any particular point of time. I have taken the utmost care during the past few months to maintain a common front with the United States, while at the same time expressing through diplomatic channels, wherever I have thought it necessary or expedient, disagreement on particular proposals which the United States or certain United States representatives had in mind. While it is my firm conviction that the American point of view in international affairs must be given the fullest possible weight, at the same time, it is obviously necessary for countries like Australia to ensure that they are consulted before important steps are taken likely to commit them to political or military action. In addition it is necessary that we should bring a degree of public pressure to bear upon the United States in order to try to prevent their pursuing policies which, in our opinion, might be seriously disadvantageous both to them and to us.I feel that the continued recognition of the Chiang Kai–shek regime is a matter of sufficient importance for Australia to take an independent line, provided Australian action is taken at a point of time carefully chosen so as not to prejudice the fundamentally friendly relationships which exist between the United States and ourselves.
P. C. Spender
Minister for External Affairs
[NAA: A4940, C230]