313

CABLEGRAM TO PARIS

Canberra, 8 March 1972

1079. Secret Immediate

Personal for Renouf from Minister.


China Dialogue

Our 934.1

You will have seen the Prime Minister’s press statement of 28 February (tel. AP22)2 on the Nixon–Chou communique and the reference to testing out the Chinese on whether they are now prepared to move ahead with us, as they are with the USA, in areas of our bilateral relations other than the Taiwan issue.

2. Ministers wish you to raise this matter with the PRC Ambassador at earliest opportunity. You should therefore seek an early appointment with him and put to him the points in the next paragraph. We are sure you will appreciate the importance of your presentations being couched in correct but friendly terms, with no attempt to make what might be construed as mere debating points or to speak in a recriminatory way. Ministers are anxious that the PRC understand clearly that the Australian Government is genuinely concerned to effect a progressive normalisation of relations with the PRC, moving ahead in the first place in areas which present no real difficulties.

3. The points you should make to the Ambassador are these:

(a) In May and July last year you had on instructions informed him of the Australian Government’s objective of normalising relations with the PRC, and of its wish to work towards their progressive normalisation by beginning with discussion of some matters of mutual interest such as trade, cultural and sporting exchanges etc. The progressive extension of contacts in these fields will help lay the necessary basis of mutual confidence and understanding for the achievement of full diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, on mutually acceptable terms, which is our ultimate objective.

(b)It had not been possible to carry matters any distance in Paris, but in September 1971 we had been given to understand in Hong Kong, through officials of the China Resources Company, that a visit to China by the Minister for the Army would be welcome and that an Australian trade mission would also be welcome to visit China. We had responded by suggesting that a semi–official trade mission visit China for about two weeks after the middle of November, but that there were practical difficulties at that time in taking up the offer regarding the Minister for the Army. We had not, however, ruled out the possibility of a later visit by an Australian minister.

(c) Discussion on the possibility of a trade visit had continued in October, but on 1 November we had been informed, again through the China Resources Company, that ‘now was not the right time for a trade visit to be made’. We had of course accepted that, though naturally the Government had been disappointed.

(d) We had noted that no particular reason had been given for putting off the visit. It had occurred to us that it might have been connected with Australia’s voting against the Albanian resolution in the UNGA. But if that were indeed the reason, we assumed that the PRC would since have noted the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, immediately after the vote, expressing the Government’s pleasure that the PRC would henceforth be enabled to be represented in the United Nations and to take the seat on the Security Council. We also assumed that the PRC would since have noted that Australia had not opposed the PRC’s taking the China seat in those subsidiary bodies and specialized agencies of the United Nations in which the issue had arisen. (If asked directly whether Australia will continue to maintain this attitude in any future votes, and if you cannot avoid a direct answer, you should say that you are without instructions but that you assume so.)

(e) More recently, we had been encouraged by information received in January 1972 from Mr James Kibei, who had made a private business visit to Hong Kong, that he had spoken to officials of the China Resources Company, that they had not excluded the possibility of a renewed invitation to a trade mission from Australia, and that the PRC authorities’ position on such a visit might be expected after President Nixon had returned to the USA.

(f) We had also been encouraged by the terms of the joint communique issued by President Nixon and Premier Chou, from which it appeared that China and the USA had agreed to people–to–people contacts, the development of bilateral trade, and the maintenance of official contacts through various channels—notwithstanding the continuation of differing position on the Taiwan issue. This approach was very much in line with the one we had proposed in Paris last year: and the Australian Government earnestly hoped that the PRC would look again at our proposals, particularly the idea of making a beginning in the trade field—perhaps by an exchange of trade missions.

(g) The Australian Government fully appreciated that the PRC saw the Taiwan issue as the obstacle to the full normalisation of relations. In that connexion, the Australian Government noted that both the PRC and the ROC took the position that there was only one China, which included Taiwan. Furthermore, as you had indicated to him in May last, the Australian Government hoped that the question of the future relationship between the PRC and ROC would be resolved by the two sides in a peaceful manner to their mutual satisfaction.

(h) It was the intention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make these two points (i.e. those in the second and third sentences of (g) above) in a statement on international affairs which he was planning to make towards the end of this month.

(i) The Minister was also planning to attend the ECAFE meeting in Bangkok in the middle of this month. If the PRC were also sending a delegation to that meeting, the Minister hoped that it would be possible to have a private meeting with the leader of the Chinese delegation.

4. If it appears that the PRC Ambassador does not have a copy of the Prime Minister’s statement of 28 February, you should leave a copy with him.

5. You should tell the Ambassador that we do not propose to give any publicity to your contact at this stage, but that it may be necessary to say publicly that the dialogue is continuing ‘through diplomatic channels’.

6. We leave it to your discretion whether you inform the French authorities of the fact (but not the nature) of your renewed contact with the PRC Ambassador. You should not inform any of the embassies in Paris.

[NAA: Al838, 3107/38/18/2, ii]

1 Document 305.

2 See footnote I, Document 305.