Canberra, 14 March 1972
Top Secret
Mr Green first said he had been asked by the President to convey his warmest good wishes to myself and my wife. He had the most pleasant recollections, for many reasons, of our visit to Washington.
2. He informed me of the comment he had made when he arrived in Sydney and particularly of the very special position that Australia had with the President and the United States Administration.
3. He then went on to establish the basic considerations affecting Chinese foreign policy.
(a) The immense fear of the Soviet with 41 Divisions on the Chinese border and the fear that a pre–emptive attack would be made.
(b) The dangers of the growing economic strength of Japan, with the opportunity provided for establishing economic hegemony in South East Asia and possible growth in military power. The Chinese had bitter memories of the Japanese occupation.
For these reasons, the Chinese wanted a rapprochement with the United States which could be used as a balancing influence against the power of the Soviet.
4. These basic considerations have to be interpreted against the background that Chinese leadership had changed dramatically and substantially in recent years. There were now only three members of the Executive Committee and many others had been removed. The significance of these changes was not yet apparent.
5. It was obvious that China wanted to divide the United States and Japan, but he was sure they recognised the possibility that, in the case of such a split, Japan would adopt an independent military posture and become a great military power. This would be a restraining influence on the Chinese.
6. He pointed out that it was the Chinese who started the approach and not the United States, no matter how it might have been couched in the first communication.
7. Mr Green then went on to describe the visits he had made to the Asian countries—Korea, Japan, The Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. He would let us have a copy of the record of the discussions with these countries and would also let the officers see copies of his cables to Washington.
8. I raised the question of the attitude of the Asian countries before and subsequent to his visit to China and the Communique, and that many of the Asian countries thought that the visit had been dismal from their point of view and even disastrous. He said he found that, whilst there was apprehension in most of the countries he visited on his arrival, he was now able to say with emphasis that in every country the Mission was welcomed and the assurances that no obligations or treaty commitments had been watered down in any way were accepted. I asked that he emphasise this to the Foreign Minister when they met.
9. He went on to say that the question that was asked everywhere was whether or not China would sustain its aid programmes [to Revolutionary movements]1 and to subversive activities in the Asian countries. He could not answer this question but put the following thesis. The Chinese had had their fingers burnt in Ceylon and he felt that they would now exploit more internal difficulties than provide overt assistance to subversive operations.
[ matter omitted ]
14. Turning to the American position, he said that there was not much in it for them. There was little trade involved and, consequently, they would restrict themselves to personal visits by people like Senator Scott and Mike Mansfield2 and cultural exchanges. They had the means of conducting dialogues in various parts of the world, but had no intention of hurrying the process.
15. I asked whether he felt our position was different in the sense that we were not a great power and that China had no need to court our influence in balancing the influence of the Soviet. He thought we could show some leadership, but he doubted whether we could achieve our purposes without considerable and quite drastic action. But he also felt there was no need to change our policy of one of pragmatic approach through diplomatic channels, measuring the advantages that we would be able to get as each step was taken.
16. I said to Mr Green that the Government’s attitude was along very similar lines to their own, but, in particular, I wanted to emphasise—
(a) that we must do all in our power to ensure that Japan remained within the Liberal western bloc and was not thrown into the arms of either China as a satellite or the Soviet, and
(b) that we must not forget the interests of India and Bangla Desh. We had recently given increased aid and we must ensure that both of these countries remained western orientated, and particularly that Bangla Desh was not submerged by communist subversive operations.
I then asked in the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister with officials to speak to the Americans.
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38/18/5]
1 The words in square brackets were added by hand.
2 Senator William L. Scott of Virginia and Senator Michael J. Mansfield of Montana.