Paris, 23 March 1972
1343. Secret Priority
China
I saw the PRC Ambassador 23 March as arranged. I gave him the piece of paper prepared in accordance with your instructions (copies by bag) and went through it with him paragraph by paragraph.
2. Huang then asked me whether I had anything further to say in the light of developments since we had last met. I made the points about publicity (paragraph 5 of your telegram 1079)1 and about our low–level enquiry in New York (paragraph 3 of your telegram 1078).2 I then said that if the Ambassador was interested, I could say something about our agreement to look after British interests in Taiwan. Huang replied that he was interested so I made to him the points in your telegram 1342.3
3. Huang said that he would report all I had said to his Government. He had been instructed, he continued, to tell me the following which he asked me to write down.
Huang then read out from a telegram. Begins—
(a) The PRC is willing to establish and develop diplomatic relations with all countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co–existence. If Australia is willing to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, Australia must recognize the PRC as the sole legal government representing all the Chinese people, sever her so–called diplomatic relations with the Chiang–Kai–shek clique and promise neither to support nor to take part in the fallacies of the two Chinas, one China–one Taiwan, and independent Taiwan and the fallacy that the status of Taiwan remains to be determined. If Australia has difficulties at present in so doing, the PRC can wait.
(b) The PRC and Australia already have bilateral trade and this can go on. However, there are difficulties in developing trade rapidly before the normalization of relations, especially in circumstances where Australia is still a partner in the aggressive war in Vietnam. Ends.
Huang concluded by saying I would appreciate that what he had said was completely clear. What I had said was also completely clear so that he saw no point in prolonging the conversation. I thought it best therefore not to speak along the lines of your telegram 1090,4 resting myself with the observation that Australia’s policy was that stated in the piece of paper. Huang said that he understood this.
Comment
5. This was a pleasant if unproductive interview, with Huang being polite and friendly. But as you will appreciate, the message is that what is good for the United States is not (repeat not) good for Australia. Clearly, the Chinese regard time as on their side.
Renouf.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18/2, ii]
1 Document 313.
2 Document 312.
3 22 March. It gave instructions to Renouf in case he was questioned by Huang about the Australian Government’s agreement to look after UK interests in Taiwan. Renouf was to say that Australia had only agreed informally to look after UK interests and consular problems; that ‘informal’ roughly meant maintaining a ‘watching brief’ ; that Australia’s Embassy in Taiwan would not be issuing passports or visas to UK citizens but would be limited ‘to such things as registering UK citizens, supervising the winding-up of British property interests in Taiwan, and looking after emergency cases of distressed UK citizens’ ; that Australian and UK missions overseas had had reciprocal arrangements for many years in many parts of the world; and that the decision ‘was not related to, and should not be regarded as having implications for, our broader China policy’ .
4 Document 315.