Canberra, 30 March 1972
Secret
China Dialogue
We are inclined to think that the PRC’s conditions for diplomatic relations,1 which the PRC Ambassador to France (Huang Chen) read to Mr Renouf on 23 March, represent an advance rejection of our renewed proposal for the progressive normalisation of relations. It is true that Huang, whose attitude on this occasion was polite and correct, undertook to report Renouf’s remarks to Peking. On the other hand, the Chinese were almost certainly aware, from the Prime Minister’s statement on 28 February,2 of our intention to test out Chinese willingness to set the Taiwan issue aside as an obstacle to normalisation. (We have had ample evidence that they read and take careful note of Australian official statements on China policy.) Peking’s conditions for diplomatic relations were telegraphed to Huang well after the Prime Minister’s statement and presumably during the period between Renouf’s request for an appointment and the interview itself. Since our own proposals—past and present—look only to establishing diplomatic relations after the development of contacts at trade and other levels, and say nothing of course about giving up relations with the ROC, and since the Chinese have in effect said to Renouf that trade can go on as at present but is unlikely to expand pending diplomatic relations, we seem to have arrived at an impasse.
2. Renouf has suggested that it will still be open to us in due course to enquire about a Chinese response to our approach, but we should let some time pass before taking the matter up again. Assuming that the Government’s present policy remains unchanged, and unless some new element emerges, we would agree that there would be no advantage and some disadvantages (a probable rebuff) in making any further approach to the Chinese for at least some months.
3. Against this background, we have been considering the significance of the Chinese action in returning to Renouf, because it ‘wrongly names the Taiwan province of our country’ .3 the bout de papier which he left with Huang.4
4. The Chinese objection is almost certainly to the sentence: ‘Furthermore, as you had indicated to him in May last, the Australian Government hoped that the question of the future relationship between the PRC and ROC would be resolved by the two sides in a peaceful manner to their mutual satisfaction.’ From Peking’s viewpoint, the PRC is justified in rejecting a reference of this kind, even though the bout de papier is not a document having any diplomatic status.
5. We do no believe that the return of the document means that Huang has failed to pass it on to Peking. The delay of four days in fact suggests that it was returned on Peking’s instructions, since Huang himself did not take up the point when Renouf took him through the document paragraph by paragraph.
6. The return of the document, although not otherwise important, could enable Peking later, if it so wished, to claim that there was nothing for them to respond to, that the ball was in our court, not theirs, and that the dialogue could not be said to be continuing. The Chinese would probably take this attitude if they had already decided on substantive grounds to reject our approach; but in the unlikely event of their deciding to make a positive response, they would not need to treat the bout de papier as an obstacle, Huang having heard Renouf out and undertaken to report what he said.
7. We have considered whether there would be any advantage in returning the document to Huang, but with the offending sentence redrafted. It is not completely clear, however, what it is in the sentence which offends Peking. Certainly they must dislike ‘ROC’ ; but perhaps they also dislike ‘future relationship’ . on the grounds that the relationship is already settled. To be safe, therefore, we would probably need in any redraft to draw on the language of the Nixon–Chou communique5 and to say ‘ … the Australian Government hoped that the Taiwan question would be resolved by the Chinese themselves in a peaceful manner to their mutual satisfaction.’ .
8. A difficulty in returning a (redrafted) document to Huang is that he (or Peking) might still find some pretext for rejecting it, which would be humiliating as well as making the exercise futile. Another difficulty is that, even if he were to accept it, the Chinese would be in a position, should they so decide, to make public capital of our change in wording. Given Peking’s past silence in public on our dealings with them, we think it unlikely that they would choose to do so, but the possibility cannot be excluded.
9. All in all, and particularly because we do not think a redrafted document, even if accepted, would materially increase the chances of Peking’s giving a positive response to our suggestions of trade or Ministerial visits, we think it would probably be best not to proffer a redrafted document.
10. It is therefore recommended that no further action be taken for the present either by way of enquiring about a Chinese response to our approach, or to correct the bout de papier. If it should later be decided to have Renouf seek a further appointment with Huang, it would be possible for him at that time to show or give to Huang a document redrafted to take due account of Chinese sensibilities.
H.D. Anderson
First Assistant Secretary
Asia Division
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38/18/2, ii]
1 See Document 322.
2 See footnote 1, Document 305.
3 See Document 327.
4 Document 323.
5 See Document 320.