Canberra, 7 April 1972
Secret
China Policy: Information Paper
Two developments since 21 February; when Cabinet considered my submission (No. 5542 attached) on our China Policy, lead me to resubmit this matter.
2. The first development was President Nixon’s visit to China. The second was a renewed attempt by us to engage the PRC in a dialogue aimed at improving our relations.
President Nixon’s Visit
3. The general significance of President Nixon’s visit lay in its demonstration that both the PRC and USA wish to improve their relations, even at the cost of lessening their allies’ trust, and to free themselves to pursue more flexibly their own interest in the new balance of power now emerging in North Asia, and in their bilateral relations with the USSR. To achieve this new relationship, the USA found it necessary to make statements which make it clear that the USA no longer regards itself as a party principal to the dispute between the two Chinese governments; is perfectly willing to see the ROC absorbed into the PRC provided only that it is done peacefully; and is not interested in setting up an independent state of Taiwan. It is important to note, however, that the new relationship entered into with the PRC was not at the expense of the USA’s diplomatic relations with the ROC or, of greater moment, its security commitment to the ROC.
4. The particular significance for us of the visit, and the communique3 released at the end of it, lay in its demonstration that the USA had achieved almost precisely what we have been trying to do for almost a year now—that is, to get the PRC to put aside the Taiwan issue, while each maintaining its position on that issue, and to move towards the progressive normalisation of bilateral relations by making a beginning in such areas as trade and cultural relations.
The Dialogue
5. The Prime Minister noted in his statement4 of 28 February that the PRC was prepared not to make Taiwan the stumbling–block in the way normalising relations with USA. He added: ‘It may be that Peking will not be prepared to do the same in our case; we shall certainly test out the Chinese on this.’ Instructions were sent to our Ambassador in Paris, Mr Renouf, to seek an early appointment with the PRC Ambassador. After some delay a meeting was arranged for 23 March. Our Ambassador spoke to instructions. The two principal telegrams are available on request to Ministers who wish to see them.
6. In summary, the PRC Ambassador (Mr Huang Chen) laid down Peking’s conditions precedent to the establishment of diplomatic relations; said that, if Australia had difficulties at present in meeting these conditions, ‘the PRC can wait’ ; noted that we already have bilateral trade, ‘and this can go on’ ; but said that ‘there are difficulties in developing trade rapidly before the normalisation of relations, especially in circumstances where Australia is still a partner in the aggressive war in VietNam’ .
7. The PRC’s conditions precedent to establishing diplomatic relations are not surprising, but it is useful to have their formal terms on the record. It is useful, too, to have the assurance that trade can go on, though what this will mean in practice remains to be seen. Certainly it is unlikely to mean any marked increase in trade, given the PRC’s citing of two difficulties (the absence of normalised relations, and Australia’s participation in the Viet Nam war) in developing trade ‘rapidly’ .
8. I cannot, of course, entirely exclude the possibility that Peking, after digesting what Mr Renouf had to say to Mr Huang, will respond favourably to our suggestion of exchanging visits by trade missions or even of exchanging Ministerial visits. But the weight of probability, given what Mr Huang said on 23 March and all that has gone before, is heavily against it.
9. I am of the opinion that the Chinese are not prepared to accord Australia the same treatment as they have accorded the USA.
10. The prospects of making a beginning with trade, scientific and cultural relations, and leaving until the very last the question of recognition and diplomatic relations, are remote. Peking’s present attitude is that normalisation involves first and foremost Australian recognition of Peking as the only lawful government of China, and the severance of our diplomatic relations with the ROC; and that other aspects of normalisation can be developed beyond present levels only when that is done.
11. I set out in Cabinet Submission No. 554, particularly in its paragraph 7, what to my mind were the principal advantages and disadvantages of recognising the PRC and establishing diplomatic relations with it. I wish to add to that only two thoughts.
12. Mr Marshall Green, in his discussions with us, suggested that the best course for Australia was perhaps to wait on events and allow the USA to be ‘the spearhead’ . I do not accept that for a moment.
13. On the other hand, if we were the first or one of the first regional countries to move, we could create problems for our Asian friends and consequently for our relations with them—and our membership of such bodies as AS PAC. But we must not forget that our friends face their own pressures and that they do not have a good record of consulting with us before effecting major departures in their policies (for example, neutralisation, and the visit of Governor Romualdez5 to Peking). We should take due account of the views and interests of the ASEAN countries and Japan, but in the last analysis the nature and timing of our China policy should be a matter for Australian decision.
14. In general, the position has become no clearer. I see no reason to alter the recommendations in my submission No. 554.
Nigel Bowen
Minister for Foreign Affairs
[NAA: A5882, C01138, ii]
1 A teletype message dated 7 April from Bowen’s Sydney office instructed Waller to make several changes to an earlier undated draft of the Cabinet submission. Among the most significant deletions were the following words which would have appeared in paragraph 9 of the cited copy: ‘I therefore reluctantly conclude … that our present policy of seeking a progressive normalisation of our bilateral relations with the PRC is no longer practicable’ . Also omitted, on Bowen’s instructions, was a long paragraph indicating that Australia’s withdrawing its Embassy from Taipei would have no practical difference to the course on which the ROC was set and that breaking diplomatic ties with the ROC would not mean the end of Australia’s ties with it.
2 Document 300.
3 See Document 320.
4 See footnote I, Document 305.
5 Eduardo Z. Romualdez, Philippines Ambassador to the United States.