Canberra, 11 July 1951
790. Secret Immediate
For Spender from Casey.1
My telegram Washington 789 London 4077.2
It is, of course, fundamental, and I mention it specifically because it was raised in Cabinet this morning, that there should be no, repeat no, discussion of Formosa or of Chinese representation in the United Nations during present armistice talks3 or during any ensuing discussions designed to achieve political settlement in Korea.4
It would, we think, be a calamity if the Communists were able to convert the Korean aggression issue into an argument about matters which clearly did not give rise to hostilities in Korea.5
[NAA: A1838, TS852/20/4/3, i]
THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS
In September 1950, a resolution of the General Assembly established a Special Committee to look at the problem of Chinese representation in the World Organization. Meeting on 16 October 1951, the Committee rejected a Polish proposal to exclude the ROC and admit the PRC, but it informed the Assembly that it was unable to make a recommendation. The Assembly subsequently accepted a proposal that it simply take note of the Committee’s decision, while a Soviet suggestion to refer the matter to the next Session was rejected.
In November 1951, on the first day of the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly, the USSR proposed that the representation question be placed on the agenda. It argued that the ‘Kuomintang group’ did not have the right to represent China, and that the Organization could not function properly without the PRC. A counter– proposal was introduced during General Committee1 discussion on 10 November. Thailand proffered a draft resolution which stated that the ‘sense’ of the Assembly’s decision of the Fifth Session was that ‘consideration of the question was not opportune or appropriate’; it recommended that the Soviet proposal be rejected and that the Assembly not consider the problem further in the current Session. The General Committee voted in favour of the Thai proposal, as did the General Assembly (by 37 votes (including Australia) to 11, with 4 abstentions).
These events created a pattern that continued for a number of years. Communist bloc and Afro–Asian initiatives were geared to the admission of the PRC and the expulsion of the ROC, and those of the United States and its supporters sought to delay consideration of Chinese representation. The latter, characterised by the ‘moratorium’ resolution, held sway until 1961, by which time its authors had decided that consistent reductions in their majority necessitated a change in tactics.
1 R.G. Casey had succeeded Spender as Minister for External Affairs on 27 April.
2 10 July. Casey had argued that it was essential for countries on the UN side in Korea to agree upon political objectives and the means to achieve them.
3 According to the recorded Decision (10 July), Cabinet had spoken of recognition of China in the same terms.
4 By June 1951, after driving communist forces north of the 38th parallel, the United States had begun to seek an armistice. This was followed by Soviet calls for a truce and, by early July, agreement had been reached with the Chinese and North Koreans on the need for negotiations. For information on the remaining course of the war, see editorial note—Toward an Armistice in Korea.
5 This paragraph was not in the original cablegram but was requested as an addition in a subsequent cablegram (Cablegram 795, 11 July).
1 The General Committee was established to deal with procedural questions, including those associated with the Assembly’s agenda.