Canberra, 17 April 1972
Secret
Notes on Cabinet Submission No. 6081
This note does not challenge the Minister’s recommendations on China policy. There are two courses of action for the Australian Government and these basically arise from the political philosophy of the Government.
2. They are:
(i) Acceptance of Peking demands on the legality of its claim to Taiwan. OR
(ii) Resistance to that claim in the context of a Pacific–oriented policy which takes into account special problems of the United States, Japan and Asean.
3. Hanson Baldwin in an article published in the National Times, April, 3–8 describes China’s policy, and is attached.2
4. The Minister’s statement on the implications for Taiwan of recognition on China’s terms is well–balanced.
5. The whole question is one where consequences have to be evaluated. It is clear that China’s diplomacy whatever its motivation is basically a policy subversive of Western influence. The consequences for South East Asia in our view is such that any increase in China’s influence will bring the Chinese communities in South East Asia under more direct pressure, and instability in the region will increase. Communist China can work most efficiently where there are embassies established protecting her activities. One of the important reasons why the non–recognition policy was embarked upon in the first place was that it was foreseen that stability could only be introduced into South East Asia by more direct Western influence and that this would be made difficult if Peking influence in the region was given full diplomatic scope. The Indonesian Government paid a very high price for close conduct with China and for this reason the present Indonesian Administration is reluctant to embark on a revival of diplomatic contacts with China. The Indonesians have been active in dampening down a tendency on the part of Malaysia to move towards China and they seem to have had some result. Singapore has kept alive through its own media critical insights into President Nixon’s visit and there seems to be no doubt that if there is movement towards China into the region Singapore will elect to move towards Russia:
6. Singapore is keeping Russia in the wings. Lee Kuan Yew knows that the Chinese mind is conditioned to fall in line with the winning trend. He will endeavour to offset any apparent growth in Chinese status by Russia simply to keep his electoral position intact. Thus, if America and Australia were to acknowledge a new relationship with China, Lee Kuan Yew seems bound to shift his loyalty to Russia.
7. To sum up there are considerable consequences for Asean policy if Australia recognises China on her terms and in our view Appendix C3 of the Submission understates the consequences.
8. A decision which places Australian policy within the context of a consultative relationship with Asean, United States and Japan is publicly supportable and logically tenable in terms of the Government’s stated objective of ensuring the stability of South East Asia as a contribution to the security of Australia.
[NAA: A5882, C01138, ii]
1 Document 329.
2 Not published.
3 Annex C of the Submission provided information about the attitude of the ASEAN countries to the PRC. Indonesia recognised but had no diplomatic relations with the PRC; the Philippines and Thailand exchanged Embassies with the ROC; and Malaysia and Singapore recognised neither Government. The paper noted that for Australia, Taiwan was the principal obstacle in the way of recognition of the PRC whereas for the ASEAN countries, their problems were ‘rather their Chinese communities, their internal security relations, and their generally weak bases on which to develop relations with Peking’ . It concluded that relations with ASEAN ‘could not remain unaffected’ by an Australian decision to recognise the PRC.