Taipei, 16 June 1972
Secret Personal
[ matter omitted ]
I shall continue by making some observations on what I have sought to do here, in the belief that this was in accordance with our overall policy objectives. You might wish to comment on this section also.
I have worked to maintain a reasonably normal but low–key relationship with the ROC, discouraging it, when necessary, from trying too hard to expand or deepen that relationship lest our prospects with the PRC be affected. At the same time, I have sought to keep our relationship fairly cordial, so that there is a suitable atmosphere in which our major interest here—trade—can be advanced. In addition, by keeping the ROC informed, as instructed, of our dealings with the PRC, I have sought to condition thinking to accept that our relations with both the PRC and Taiwan could continue to evolve along lines determined by our own national interests.
This has been an interesting exercise and one not without its challenge. Changes in the international situation, and the ROC’s reactions to them, have led us to the point where many people here accept that relations with some other countries, including Australia, could continue to evolve steadily. I believe that, after a period of adjustment, the ROC now in practice attaches much less importance than it did to the maintenance of formal ties—although it will of course use every method available to it to retain such ties. In essence, I believe that the ROC has now come to the point where it can accept—if it has to—that its own immediate interests can be adequately served and its future development assured on the lines it now plans by continuation of trading relations (including provision for easy movement of its citizens) and other ad hoc relations with most other countries. The main exception is of course the United States, on which it is almost completely dependent in the last resort, both in defence and economic terms. Japan is also very important, of course, but I believe that even in that case, the ROC is uneasily and unhappily adjusting to the prospect of change.
There has been considerable satisfaction for me in participating in a process of policy adjustment towards what I have long believed should be Australia’s position in regard to China—acceptance of present realities. By that I mean a fully effective relationship with Peking, without which many of our national interests are, or will be, at very serious risk. At the same time, I have also believed that the definition and protection of our interests in Taiwan is important and need not, with sufficient clarity of thought and resolution, stand in the way of the other relationship.
The last couple of years have been very useful in that we have by now defined our interests here more closely than ever before. We have reached a point where those interests could, in my view, be adequately protected through a change of political relations with Taiwan, and where the ROC is largely conditioned to accept such a change (though not with too good a grace!). In more concrete terms I believe that our major interests here could for the most part be well served by having essentially a trade relationship, using either official or unofficial channels, together with efficient arrangements for visa issuing for businessmen and travellers.
Having reached that point, it would seem unfortunate if we did not continue to make progress towards our eventual goal. You know from some of my other letters how I think things could usefully be played from now on.
Perhaps one further comment could be made. While normalization of relations with the PRC is our stated goal, another aim may well be—as in the UN question—to work so that our overall China policy is as obviously fair and defensible as possible. Some other countries with similar problems to ours, and with which we might wish to keep in line, could well appreciate a lead from us in reaching such a position (the ‘regional formula’ I have hankered for in the past). It would seem to me that, among the elements of such a formula would be
(a) an expressed willingness to recognise the PRC provided we do not have explicitly to endorse its claim to Taiwan;
(b) a change in the form of our relations with the ROC as an indication that we accept the new situation and an earnest of a serious desire to come to terms with the PRC—but not a severing of all relations;
(c) an expressed determination to continue such practical dealings with Taiwan as are obviously beneficial and non–provocative.
We are part of the way there; can we go further? I would lose some heart for the job here if, instead of having some slight role to play in the advancement of our policies, I became merely a symbol of a static lukewarm friendship. If there is no further evolution in our policies, the job of advancing our real interests here could be done as well, or better, by a Trade Commissioner.
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38, xi]