Canberra, 12 July 1972
Secret Personal
I was glad to have your letter of 30 June on China policy,1 and interested in your analysis and suggestions.
Your most radical suggestion is that your Embassy be converted into some form of Trade Office (your paras. 6–9): You argue persuasively; but I think the suggestion runs up against two insuperable difficulties. The first is that the PRC would be quite unmoved by it: the PRC is interested only in our severing diplomatic relations with Taipei, and downgrading the status of the mission would not, I am afraid, persuade the PRC to accept our gradualist approach to the normalisation of relations. As David Anderson wrote in his letter of 3 July to you,2 the ‘progressive normalisation of bilateral relations’ approach is out because Peking in effect insists that diplomatic relations cannot be the final step in progressive normalisation but must be the first.
The second difficulty is that to downgrade the mission at this time would be seen by the Australian Government, and by the public, as a deliberate and unfriendly gesture to the ROC. To some commentators and others, this would no doubt be welcome. But it would be quite unacceptable in terms of majority opinion within the government parties.
I find myself in general agreement with most of the points you make in your paragraphs 2 and 3. But I must point out that your 2(a) is clearly no longer a feasible objective: the PRC has no interest in proceeding ’steadily’ towards normalisation of regulations. This of course puts us in some difficulty, including in relation to the point in the third sentence of your para. 3(d). But you will have noted that in its public statements the Government has said that the dialogue is continuing, with the ball being in Peking’s court. This is also relevant to your 5(a).
The suggestion in your paragraph 5(b) is an interesting one, and we shall bear it in mind when composing future public statements.
Your paragraph 5(c) is useful and will be put to further study. This will be helped materially by the thought you have put into the ‘Contingency Planning’ paper3 you sent to Michael Cook on 30 June.
I hope you will not feel discouraged by our inability to accept all your suggestions. We value your efforts to think ahead, and look forward to receiving any further views you may develop in the corning months.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38, xi]
1 Document 334.
2 Anderson’s communication had been written in response to Dunn’s letter of 16 June (Document 333). For the context of Anderson’s comments related below, see footnote 2, Document 337.
3 Presumably a reference to a letter of the same date addressed to Waller, in which Dunn gave reasons for his ’strong conviction that the maintenance of adequate trade channels between Australia and Taiwan should be regarded as the essential point in our future relationship with the ROC, and that there are adequate grounds to argue that maintenance of such channels means that we are not abandoning Taiwan’ . The Ambassador also suggested courses that might be pursued if his opinion was accepted. These included the early establishment in Taipei of a non–official Australian office that would handle trade promotion work and, if the Embassy were withdrawn, deal with visa applications.