Canberra, 8 August 1972
Confidential
The China Dialogue
We have suggested points you could make in reply to a possible Parliamentary question on this matter (copy attached).1 But we are uneasy about the whole thing.
2. The fact is that the PRC has not responded to our stated desire for the progressive normalisation of bilateral relations by making a beginning in such fields as trade etc. The closest the Chinese have got is to say (in the March 1972 meeting) that ‘the PRC and Australia already have bilateral trade and this can go on’ . But that is hardly helpful publicly—especially as it was coupled with the statement ‘However, there are difficulties in developing trade rapidly before the normalisation of relations, especially in circumstances where Australia is still a partner in the aggressive war in VietNam’ .
3. Indeed it is clear that, as you said in your Cabinet information paper of 7 April,2 ‘The prospects of making a beginning with trade, scientific and cultural relations, and leaving until the very last the question of recognition and diplomatic relations, are remote. Peking’s present attitude is that normalisation involves first and foremost Australian recognition of Peking as the only lawful government of China and the severance of our diplomatic relations with the ROC; and that other aspects of normalisation can be developed beyond present levels only when that is done’ .
4. As we have noted in the ‘Background’ section of the attached PPQ, something might be made of what Peking has actually done, as distinct from what it has—or rather has not—said. But, as explained in the attached, we think it would not be right to interpret these developments (the Spring Canton Fair; the sugar sale; and the table tennis visit)3 as responses to our approach in the dialogue. Moreover it would be difficult to sustain such an interpretation publicly.
5. It could of course be said that Australia does have much of the substance of normal bilateral relations with China saving only for diplomatic relations. Trade goes on, ‘people to people’ exchanges can and do take place, there are some scientific cultural contacts, the two Governments (notably in Paris) and their officials (notably in UN meetings) can and do talk to each other. But there are three difficulties in taking the line that this proves the success of the dialogue. First, there is no real depth to any of these relations, and little prospect of any until diplomatic relations are established. The relationship certainly does not, and very probably will not, approach the level of US/PRC relations, with a Presidential visit, repeated visits by Kissinger, established contacts in Warsaw and Paris, Congressional visits, visits by journalists, scientists and others, and some newsworthy trade deals (eg the satellite communications station and the likely purchase of Boeing and Lockheed aircraft). Secondly, very little of what substance there is in Australia/PRC relations is of recent origin: we have been trading for a long time, and Australians have for years been visiting China. The only really new developments have been the contacts between the two Governments and their officials, from which little has resulted, and China’s decisions to send the table tennis team, which was more of a propaganda ploy and pressure play than anything else and unlikely to be followed up in other areas (eg swimming) with any more serious purpose. Thirdly, in the trade field it could even be said that, on the important question of wheat sales, we have slipped back rather than moved forward. While a case can be made out for suggesting that, in case of real need, China would not hesitate to buy wheat again from Australia, it is difficult to prove the assertion with any public conviction.
6. Another consideration is that Australian editors and commentators are becoming increasingly sceptical, as Mr Woolcott has found, about the value of the dialogue and that it is still alive.
7. In the light of the foregoing, it seems to us that there is a need to choose one of three main alternatives.
(a) Seek another meeting in Paris, either to put another proposition or to ask for a specific response to our last approach. But we are unable at the moment to think of another worthwhile proposition which might be accepted by the PRC; and if we asked for a specific response to our last approach we would probably either be rebuffed or given an answer which would leave us even worse off.
(b) Continue to take the line, as in the attached PPQ, that the dialogue is not at an end. But we wonder how much conviction this carries, and whether and for how long the line can be sustained publicly.
(c) Acknowledge publicly that the PRC is clearly not prepared in Australia’s case to put Taiwan on one side, as it has done in the case of the USA; that nevertheless limited but quite useful contacts, both governmental and non–governmental, are taking place in various areas of our bilateral relations; but that in view of China’s attitude it is not at present possible to bring about the deeper, though still hard–headed and cautious, governmental relationship which Australia would like to establish: this would require the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC but at the cost of abandoning the ROC, a course the Government is not at present prepared to take.
8. We make no recommendation as to which of these three alternatives should be decided upon, as it seems to us that the choice will depend in significant part on other than foreign policy considerations.
H.D. Anderson
First Assistant Secretary
[NAA: A1838, 3107138, xi]
1 The possible parliamentary question dated 7 August recited the background to the dialogue with the PRC on normalising relations between Australia and the PRC.
2 Document 329.
3 See footnote I, Document 340.