Washington, 2 February 1953
96. Secret Immediate
For Casey from Spender.
Your 72.1
I saw Allison2 this afternoon and questioned him as to the likely effects of Eisenhower’s instructions to the 7th Fleet3 and future policies. In more detail I asked:
(1) Whether the United States Government would exercise positive or negative influence on activities by the Chinese Nationalist Government or whether they would leave it up to this Government to take what action they saw fit,
(2) whether the United States would subsequently increase their military assistance and general support for the Chinese Nationalist Government, and
(3) whether Governments would be kept informed of and consulted on policy developments.
2. Allison said effects were that the Chinese could not engage in any substantial activities against the Mainland of China without a great deal of assistance from the United States and that before getting such assistance they would have to consult with the United States and in effect to that extent obtain the agreement of the United States. The United States, therefore, still exercised a real degree of control over military action from Formosa. Allison repeated that the Chinese Nationalist Government would accordingly in practice have to get United States’ consent for any large scale attack on the Mainland but implied that such consent would not necessarily cover small raids presumably of the commando type he has referred to before. Allison told me in strict confidence that the United States Chargé d’Affaires in Formosa when informing the Chinese Nationalist Government of the President’s statement had on instructions made it clear that this action should not be interpreted as an invitation to the Chinese Nationalist Government to ask for further military or other assistance. With regard to consultation with friendly Governments Allison said he thought that this would continue and that he assumed there would be some give and take of views about future steps in this area
3. He went on to say that, apart from the two steps announced by Eisenhower today, i.e. new instructions to the 7th Fleet and the building up of R.O.K. Forces, one of the first acts of the Administration would be to study what further U.S.F. action might be taken in the area. He gave me the impression that this study had not yet proceeded too far. Allison also ‘drew the inference’ from the absence in Eisenhower’s speech to any reference to the use of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea that, despite certain military and political pressures for this action, it had been disregarded certainly for the time being.
4. I asked Allison what the United States attitude could be if the Chinese Nationalist Government were to take the bit in their teeth and attempt bombing raids or a limited blockade of the China coast. He replied that his personal view was that the United States Government would keep the Nationalists from doing anything ‘exciting’ and that Chiang Kai-Shek would not embark on any major adventure without consulting the United States. I also put to Allison specific question ‘does the United States Government propose to exercise influence over what the Chinese Nationalists are able to do at the present moment’. He stalled upon this but in conclusion Allison repeated that the primary p[ur]pose of Eisenhower’s new instructions to the 7th Fleet was to remove the anomaly of having United States Forces protecting Communist territory and not to open the way for major aggressive action against China.
5. The following are some of my own observations on this and related matters:
(a) although it is true that we were not formally consulted about change in orders to the 7th Fleet, we have over the past year been able to gather and report information which showed a definite trend in policy in this direction.
[ matter omitted ]4
Whilst, therefore, it is true we were not formally consulted we have nonetheless been in a position to express a view on this subject on the assumption that such a decision was a likely or probable one.
(b) It seems to me that there is an urgent and primary need for the development of an agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom and Old Dominions on a common policy in relation to the various issues which present themselves in the ‘Far East’ generally or at the least of agreed common lines of approach to these issues so that we could put forward our views long before any given policy or change of policy has reached the stage of decision in the United States administration. It should I think be possible with the large volume of information available to the United Kingdom and the Old Dominions to consult together and decide, in the light of our joint assessment of the way policies are developing, to attempt to arrest, divert or alter these policy trends.
(c) Although we should with reason expect to be consulted before decisions are actually reached, I think we have to recognise that by the very nature of things in this country matters do not always turn out this way. In this particular case all available evidence points to the fact that the actual policy decision, although a long time in its development, was not reached until the middle of last week, i.e. only a few days before the public announcement. Regardless of the leakage of the information from Congress which I am inclined to think was prearranged it was then too late to influence policy. These facts emphasise the need to evaluate trends and take the initiative in expressing a view even in the absence of formal consultation.
(d) I have felt for a long time, and have so stated, the need for discussions between the United States on the one hand and the United Kingdom and Old Dominions on the other with a view to the formulation of a common approach to Far Eastern policy, e.g. the defence of South East Asia, the future of Japan and of Formosa and related questions. If this common approach is not sought we shall constantly and inescapably be placed in the position of dealing on an ad hoc basis with separate parts of separate aspects of a whole range of problems which should be considered as an entity.
(e) It is my firm opinion that the new administration will not be content with the maintenance of the status quo in Asia (or indeed in Europe) and that they are likely to adopt a tougher policy and increase military pressure in the areas where fighting is now in progress (see my 69).5 If this assessment is correct and if we hold contrary views as to the desirability of tougher policy whether in the military, economic or political spheres we should I believe state that as soon as possible. I should also add that it is my impression that the new administration will show less readiness to have their policies conditioned or negatived6 by any particular power or powers e.g. the European countries or the United Nations. These hard facts will I think have to be borne in mind. My impression is that Eisenhower and Dulles will seek in different ways to break what they regard as the ‘paralysis’ in Korea and indeed elsewhere and that they will be less ready than the proceeding7 administration to have their views affected by what I think they regard as the negative approach of the older powers.
(f) In the case under reference we had been presented with a fait accompli and I suggest that more harm than good would be done if we were to take up too critical a position on the merits of the decision or the procedure whereby it was reached i.e. without consultation. The American public and certainly the administration regard the decision as properly one for the United States alone to make and I would think it had very clearly the majority support of Congress. What, however, we can and should do is to attempt to condition other policies which may in time flow from this decision. Chiang Kai-Shek will doubtless welcome Eisenhower’s announcement and seek to increase the pressures in the United States for greater support and greater United States involvement in China. In order to counteract this pressure I think we should give serious consideration to an approach to the new administration suggesting at least that on the positive side we who continue to recognise Chiang as the leader of the Government of China should aim at withdrawing recognition from the Nationalist Government in that capacity and recognise it as that of the Government of Formosa with all the resultant consequences including those in the United Nations.at the same time making it perfectly clear that Formosa, which has a right to determine its own destiny, would not be forfeited to Communist aggression. My views on this are I think well known to you. This would be a step in the right direction but unless we can agree upon a common policy and suggest it to the United States at an early stage we might well find that the United States had stiffened in a contrary direction. There are clear dangers that the United States whatever its purpose to the contrary may be ‘sucked into’ further involvement with China, either as a direct result of policy decisions or the result of events which such policy decisions make possible. It is my strong conviction that this is the time when we must, in collaboration particularly with the United Kingdom, work towards the acceptance by the United States of agreed lines of policy acceptable to us. Unless we do we may well find ourselves incapable of exercising much influence (certainly in the immediate future) with this administration of8 policy matters at the critical stage of their development.
[NAA: A1838, TS852/20/4/2, iv]
1 2 February. Casey informed Spender that he was being ‘bombarded’ by enquiries and requests from the press about comments that Eisenhower proposed to make on Formosa. Casey remarked that he had so far made no comment but would find it difficult to avoid doing so after the President made a statement. He also indicated that an earlier cablegram from Spender constituted informal notification of Eisenhower’s thinking but ‘could not be described as consultation’. In regard to the issue itself (see footnote 3 below), Casey confided that the decision was causing anxiety in Canberra ‘because of possible consequential action into which [the] United States might be drawn’. He asked Spender to seek further information without making critical comment.
2 J.M. Allison, US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
3 In his first State of the Union address to Congress, 2 February 1953, President Eisenhower explained that the US Seventh Fleet, which in June 1950 was ordered to prevent attacks by the PRC on Formosa and vice versa (see editorial note— War on the Korean Peninsula) , was being instructed to cease acting as a shield for communist China. He said that the change did not imply aggressive intent, but that the United States had no obligation to protect a country with which it was at war in Korea. Foreign Relations of the United States , 1951, vol. XIV, part 1, Washington, 1985, p. 140.
4 Matter omitted includes examples of this information.
5 22 January. Spender recorded a conversation with Allison in which the latter said that John Foster Dulles, the new US Secretary of State, regarded the questions of Korea, Indo-China and China as related, and that Dulles had been considering the advisability of increased military pressure in the area in order to force a modus vivendi with the USSR.
6 The word ‘negatived’ may have been intended to read ‘negated’.
7 The word ‘proceeding’ should presumably read ‘preceding’.
8 The word ‘of’ should presumably read ‘on’.