Tokyo, 5 December 1972
3399. Confidential
Japan/PRC/Taiwan
Our 3384.1
2. We saw Ogura2 (Deputy Head, China Division, Foreign Ministry) on December 4 in order to discuss developments in Japan’s relations with China and Taiwan.
3. Ogura (who was a member of the recent Foreign Ministry administrative mission to China) said that the PRC had agreed to the establishment of a Japanese Embassy in Peking by the beginning of January, subject to two conditions:
(a) recall of the Japanese and Taiwanese Ambassadors from Taipei and Tokyo as a first step,
(b) withdrawal of the remainder of the Japanese and Taiwanese Embassy staff as quickly as possible thereafter.
Ogura said that arrangements to implement the second step were now in hand and, in answer to our query, that the Japanese staff in Taiwan might be able to effect their ‘resignations’ from the Foreign Ministry there in order to begin work immediately for the new ‘private’ organisation which would handle Japan/Taiwan relations. Ogura seemed reasonably confident that the Japanese Embassy in Peking would be operating by January, although there were a number of administrative problems on their own side (provision of personnel, allowances etc.) still to be settled.
4. In regard to the Japanese Mission led by Deputy Vice–Foreign Minister Togo which is currently in Peking, Ogura emphasised that it was only an exploratory mission. He said that the Mission had been rather hastily put together because of the Government’s anxiety to show some progress on the follow–up to normalisation. Its purpose was to obtain the necessary background to enable serious negotiations on trade, fisheries, shipping etc. to begin, and to enable Japanese officials from the various ministries concerned to familiarise themselves with the governmental structure and officials with whom they would be dealing in the future. Ogura said that he would be surprised if any clear–cut ideas emerged from the Mission’s visit: reports from the Mission in Peking indicated the Chinese had been ‘distant’ in their replies to many of the Japanese questions and more information might well have to be obtained before serious negotiations could begin.
5. Ogura said that the question of a civil aviation agreement was specifically excluded from the Togo Mission’s terms of reference. He confirmed that Japanese proposals on this had been conveyed to the PRC—they were on the lines that had generally been reported but were less specific—but no response had come from Peking. It was difficult to speculate what the final outcome might be. Ogura thought that, given the PRC’s reasonably flexible attitude to continued Japan/Taiwan relations, Japan would not have to sever its air links with Taiwan as part of the price for a civil aviation agreement with China, but the PRC might not allow the same Japanese airline to serve both the PRC and Taiwan.
An essential quid pro quo for Japanese landing rights in China, Ogura said, was reciprocal concessions in Japan, but whether the PRC’s airline would be permitted to fly beyond Japan would depend on what was offered by China.
6. In response to our query, Ogura said emphatically that despite the wording of the Sino–Japanese communique,3 Japan still did not regard Taiwan as legally part of the PRC and considered that Taiwan’s international status remained ‘undetermined’ . The ‘fully understands and respects’ formula had been proposed by Japan for two reasons:
(a) the PRC could not have been expected to accept anything less from Japan,
(b) pro–China elements in Japan had to be satisfied.
(We will pursue this question further with the Treaties Bureau of the Foreign Ministry later this week.)
7. On the private association to handle future Japan/Taiwan relations, Ogura said this would be registered as a ’special association’ . The expenses of the headquarters in Tokyo would be met partly by Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organisations) and partly by the Government. The offices in Taiwan would be entirely Government–subsidised. Ogura said that Itagaki, as Director–General, would run the association. Horikoshi’s4 role would be primarily as a channel between the association and the business world and, by implication, as a source of funds. Ogura said Ito, the Minister in the former Japanese Embassy, would run the Taipei office.
8. Ogura confirmed that the spheres the association would cover were as reported in our 3384. He said that the establishment of the association was still causing many problems and he was uncertain whether the 15 December target date for the beginning of operations would be met. He specifically mentioned telecommunications and customs questions as causing the greatest difficulties. Ogura was very sceptical about how the whole procedure for maintaining non–political links with Taiwan would work and said it could be many months yet before the Japanese association could begin to operate effectively—if it ever could.
9. Ogura said that, as far as he knew, the Japanese Government was not contemplating any action to terminate or impede the operations of the Bank of China (now the International Commercial Bank of China) in Japan. However, next year, the Government might be obliged to take measures against semi–governmental Taiwan bodies still operating in Japan.
10. Overall, Ogura said that progress in Japan/China relations since the 29 September communique had been as fast as could have been expected, given the problems of the winding–down operation in Taiwan and Japan’s pre–occupation with getting its Embassy established in Peking. He was not prepared to speculate how long it would take to negotiate trade and other agreements with the PRC, but he did not think progress would be necessarily rapid.
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38/18/6, i]
1 4 December. It gave details of the ‘private’ association which had been inaugurated on 1 December to handle the Japan–Taiwan relationship. The functions of the association reportedly included: protection of Japanese nationals and assets in Taiwan; provision of entry facilities; maintenance of economic relations; conclusion of private business arrangements; maintenance of technical cooperation; protection of Japanese fishing operations; maintenance of transport and communications; and promotion of scientific, cultural and sporting exchanges. The cablegram noted that Japanese business had apparently contributed financially to the organisation, but it was to be dependent on government subsidies.
2 Ogura Kazuo.
3 29 September, whereby Japan and the PRC declared mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. On Taiwan, China reiterated that the territory was an ‘inalienable’ part of the PRC—a claim that the Japanese Government said it ‘fully understands and respects’ .
4 Horikoshi Teizo, Executive Director and Secretary–General, Japan Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren).