Washington, 12 February 1953
SAV28. Secret
For Casey from Spender
Thanks for your 90.1 There are obviously some parts of my telegram No. 962 which have been quite misunderstood, in particular my observations on advisability of aiming as a matter of policy at limited recognition of the Chinese Nationalist Government. It is implied in paragraph 4 of your 90 that it was thought that in my paragraph 5(f) I was suggesting the recognition of Communist China and its admission to the United Nations. I had thought that my views on this were already quite clear. I have opposed and continue to be opposed to the recognition of Communist China until at least—
(a) She discontinues her aggression in Korea and satisfies us that she will not be likely to engage in aggression elsewhere in the Far East, e.g. Indo–China, and
(b) She satisfies us that she is ready and willing to carry out her international obligations.
I have not deviated from this view and paragraph 5(f) of my telegram 96 in no way suggests the recognition of Communist China in any capacity at this time. (Incidentally I have never suggested that it would be feasible at present to persuade the United States to agree to the changing in [sic] their policy of recognising the Nationalist Government as the Government of China). What I was seeking to suggest was that some such approach as set out in my cable might be our ‘aim’, in other words a policy objective designed in time to find a middle ground between United Kingdom and United States which might ultimately aid the achievement of a modus vivendi with the Communist regime. So long as the Chinese Nationalist Government is supported by the United States as the government of all China it poses a real threat to the Peking Regime because of the apprehension on the latter’s part that the United States might be drawn in to a conflict in China by the Chinese Nationalist Government. This apprehension may of course have its value in the short run as a psychological factor. But so long as this threat exists I find it hard to see that there is another3 hope of weaning Peking from Moscow; indeed it may also bear on the chances of reaching a final solution of the Korean war. Any lessening of tensions in the Far East may come about only if some new approach is attempted. The according of a limited recognition to the Chinese Nationalist Government is one such possible new approach.
Obviously such an approach presents a number of problems and the chances of its being successful are admittedly not bright for the present. Nevertheless in the absence of any other fresh approach it seems to me worth examining and discussing with United States at an appropriate time as a long–term objective. You will have seen from paragraph 6 of my telegram No. 694 that a suggestion along these lines would not necessarily fall on completely barren ground. Incidentally there is a precedent for the recognition of the Chinese Nationalist Government as something less than the government of the whole of China in the Peace Treaty between Japan and the Nationalist Government5
What I am suggesting is that new ideas should be conveyed to the United States Administration not necessarily with a view to achieving a major change in policy in a short time but in the hope that Administration will recognise the desirability of working towards an improvement, whenever and wherever that is feasible, in the atmosphere between the United States and Communist China. If some improvement in the atmosphere is not reached there is an appreciable risk of the United States becoming quite deeply involved in hostilities with China, with all the resultant consequences. This is the problem with which we are faced and my whole objective is to make whatever contribution I can to aid you in finding a solution.
TOWARD AN ARMISTICE IN KOREA
From June 1951, the front in Korea changed little. Action by both sides, though costly in lives, was largely ineffective in a situation where positions had become well established. Meanwhile, progress in armistice negotiations was slow. It was not until October 1952 that an understanding was reached on three of the four aspects of a proposed armistice agreement: a military demarcation line was to be established along the line of contact at the time of armistice; implementation of detailed armistice arrangements would be overseen by a Military Armistice Commission and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; and the protagonists would recommend to interested governments the convening of a ‘political conference’ within three months of the armistice to ‘settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc’. The final aspect, involving repatriation of prisoners of war, proved a sticking point. In December 1952, the Chinese rejected a resolution of the UN General Assembly which affirmed that prisoners would not be prevented from returning or coerced to return to their homelands. But by the end of March 1953, Chou En–lai had indicated a more flexible attitude to the question. Hopes for an end to the war were high.
1 Document 36.
2 Document 35.
3 The word ‘another’ may have been intended to read ‘any’.
4 In his conversation with Spender on 22 January (see footnote 5, Document 35), Allison had expressed his personal view that ‘the facts of the situation would have to be admitted’ through the Nationalists being recognised as the government of Formosa alone and by allowing the Communists to join the UN.
5 A Peace Treaty between Japan and Nationalist China came into force on 5 August 1952. Under an exchange of Notes, the terms of the treaty were restricted to ‘all the territories which are now, or may hereafter be’ under the control of the Nationalist Chinese Government.