Taipei, 14 December 1972
811. Secret Immediate
Relations with ROC
Your telegram 8341 reached me while I was with, among others, Economic Affairs Minister Sun and Minister without portfolio Chow Shu–kai. As the Foreign Minister and Vice Minister could not be reached immediately, and as both had been involved in earlier discussions, I made suitable opportunities to give them the information on behalf of their Government. Chow said he would find Foreign Minister Shen, to whom he was a ’special adviser’ . and relay it to him.
2. Sun’s first reaction was that the ideas in paragraph 2 of your telegram were at variance with what we had earlier said about unofficial offices. (On a personal basis I made points similar to those later put to Vice Foreign Minister Tsai, see paragraph 6 below. He said ‘this could seriously affect our trade with you’ . ‘these ideas are more severe than anything the Canadians put to us’ and ‘it sounds as if there must have been some Communist pressures on you’ . He became more relaxed later in the evening and again spoke of the mutual benefits of trade.)
3. Chow’s reaction was more phlegmatic. He said that this development was not entirely unexpected. When a strong wind was blowing many things blew away. He listened amiably but cynically to the points I made. He said Shen had already been instructed when to lower the flag etc.
4. I met Tsai late that evening. His first comment was that he was uncertain whether any response was called for (he obviously doubted whether he could give a considered reply before I leave). I said that while I had only been asked to pass on this information, you would obviously be interested to know the ROC’s reactions.
5. Tsai then said that there seemed to be differences between what we now said and the ideas about unofficial offices advanced earlier. Our Prime Minister had also publicly spoken of unofficial commercial relations ‘analogous to’ those the ROC would have with Japan. Various reports from Shen in Canberra had strongly suggested that that was how our thinking was running.
6. I repeated that our thinking was not sufficiently developed to warrant discussion. I would point out personally, however, that we earlier had said that we ‘had an idea in mind’ . That was tentative while we asked whether the ROC was interested. The term ‘an unofficial office’ could obviously embrace a private firm. Officials, including Tsai himself, who had been closely following the Japanese case might tend to have their thinking conditioned by that example. The Prime Minister has spoken of unofficial commercial contacts being a reasonable matter but his succeeding clause has simply said that there were such contacts between Japan and Taiwan. It did not necessarily mean that the way of handling such contacts would be closely analogous.
7. Tsai, while seeing something in this, said that if all we had in mind was operations by private firms, why need there be any discussion between Government representatives on the question? We could simply permit ‘Mr. Liu’ .sup>2 or someone to set up an office in Australia. Even then of course there could be problems with the PRC, which could if it wished ‘represent’ any organisation as having governmental connections. (Sun had made much the same point, adding that some connection could be proved in almost all cases. Any firm that needed bank financing had to go to a government–owned bank.)
8. After this exchange (which was not heated), Tsai paused for thought and suggested that I note his next words. He thought his Government’s concern would be ‘to ascertain Australian keenness in maintaining trade relations as well as setting up unofficial agencies in our two countries. If there were keenness on the Australian side, there would still be a basis for consultations (he imagined we would not like the word “negotiations”) before the Embassies in Taipei and Canberra closed’ .
Tsai then referred to the difficulties of and delays in communicating after a break in relations. He went on ‘we understand fairly well that these agencies would not in their legal nature represent governments—that they would be there merely to promote trade. But it was difficult to have them absolutely (underline one) free from government connection’ . He later said ‘we can avoid anything which Peking could interpret as being an organ of the Government here’ .
9. Tsai said ‘the card is in your hand’ to show whether you are really keen or not.
10. I asked what the answer would be if the question were turned. Was the ROC keen? Tsai said that my experience here should have given the answer. It was. Apart from purely economic and developmental considerations, it needed to give its citizens the feeling that they were not isolated—that they could travel for business reasons to many countries (Britain and so on) with which it had no diplomatic relations. It was most desirable to sustain freedom of movement. Tsai that day had counted that the ROC still had official representation in some form in 50 countries (including Consulates, such as that in Malaysia, Consulate–Generals, the Trade Office in Singapore and the ‘Chamber of Commerce’ office in Djakarta of the twenty–two countries which had broken or suspended relations, almost all had been courteous and many even ‘apologetic’ about the process. Most had been extremely keen on continuing and developing trade and had assisted or closed their eyes to the way in which unofficial ROC trading offices were established, provided that such offices complied with local laws. Virtually all had sought to ensure that overseas Chinese in their territory were not harassed by the PRC after it had representatives there).
11. Comment. It seems to be the ROC tactic, as it was with the Japanese, to bat the ball back to us as quickly as possible to make suggestions (paragraph 9 above).
Dunn
[NAA: A1838/38/18/6, ii]
1 Document 367.
2 Possibly a reference to Liu Chieh, ROC Ambassador to the United Nations.