Paris, 19 December 1972
5870. Secret Immediate
China
The P.R.C. Ambassador came to see me 1600 hours 19 December (having earlier changed the time from 1130 hours). The meeting lasted for two hours but everything was cleaned up subject to approval by both Governments.
2. Huang began by asking whether I had anything new to say. I replied that it had been our practice for me to speak first when the discussion took place at the Chinese Embassy, and vice versa. Hence, Huang should speak first on this occasion.
3. Huang riposted that as it was I who had been anxious for another meeting, it was up to me to make the running. I replied that as a compromise I would do so on the first paragraph of the draft communique if Huang would agree to do so on the third paragraph. Huang agreed.
4. I said that as regards the first paragraph, you preferred the formulation ‘having as from to–day accepted’ . Huang replied that Peking preferred its draft— ‘as from … ‘ Drawing upon para 2 of your telegram 6089,1 I said that Australia, to be helpful, could accept this.
5. Turning to the Taiwan paragraph, Huang said that after very careful consideration over several days, Peking had decided to insist upon its own formulation and did not understand why Australia could not accept this. As all the arguments I could muster made no impression upon Huang, I finally floated the wording contained in para 5 of your 6062.2 I had to argue long and hard over the change of ‘on’ at the end to ‘by’ but eventually Huang said that he was satisfied. It was then agreed that the date at the end of paragraph 3 should be five weeks from the date of the communique.
6. For reasons unknown to me, Huang then proposed to change ‘their’ in the second paragraph to ‘the’ . I remarked that the paragraph would then not be very elegant English and said that it would be better to say neither ‘their’ nor ‘the’ if any change had to be made. It was agreed to say neither ‘their’ nor ‘the’ .
7. Agreement ad referendum (underline two) was thus reached on the text of the draft communique. The full text is being telegraphed separately.
8. Huang then said that Peking agreed to the release of the messages between Chou En–lai and the Prime Minister upon publication of the communique.
9. Huang went on to say that so far so good but the two questions of substance remained to be settled. The first was the private trade arrangements between Taiwan and Australia. Peking wanted to know what was meant by ‘arrangements’ .
10.I repeated what I had said earlier, namely, business deals between private individuals or companies without any involvement of the Australian Government. When Huang grumpily said that this was not precise enough, I took the liberty of reading out to him the first two sentences of para 2 of your telegram 6095 (your 834 to Taipeh)3 adding that this had been conveyed to the Taiwanese authorities. Beyond this, I said with some force the Australian Government was not (repeat not) prepared to go. Just what did the P.R.C. want, I asked? To go any further would call for [un]4usually strong action by the Australian Government against Taiwan, such as a trade boycott, and you were not (repeat not) prepared to consider any such an extreme step.
11. Huang then said that he was satisfied and thought that Peking would also be satisfied. The second question, he continued, was that of the disposal of Taiwanese property in Australia. Peking had noted press reports that the Taiwanese representative in Canberra had put his house up for sale. In the circumstances, he had to remind me of the warning he had given at our last meeting.
12. I said that I too had noticed the press reports which Huang had mentioned. I had, however, been reassured by them for they meant that the house had not yet been sold and this being the case, given legal practice in Australia, it was very unlikely that the property could be sold before the joint communique had been signed. I then was asked to explain how real estate was sold in Australia which I did.
13. I went on to speak as instructed in para 4 of your telegram 6089 and said that as an Australian lawyer myself, I would never run the risk of advising a client to buy in the face of such a warning.
14. Huang expressed his personal appreciation of the offer to issue a warning which he accepted on behalf of the P.R.C. He added that he himself was now satisfied and considered that Peking would also be satisfied. He asked just the same that in the unlikely event that any of the property involved could be sold between now and the signing of the communique, the Australian Government should use its influence to hold up the sale. I replied that the answer lay in signing the communique very quickly and in the smart despatch to Australia of P.R.C. representatives. Huang responded that Australia need have no worries on the latter point.
15. We then got down to discussing the modalities of signing and announcing the communique. It was agreed ad referendum (underline two) that:
(a) The English and Chinese texts should be exchanged 20 December.
(b) We should meet on 21 December to ensure that the texts were identical.
(c) The communique should be signed at my residence at 2100 hours Paris time 21 December, with one photographer from each side present, publication of photographs to be embargoed until the release of the communique.
(d) The communique and the messages (see para 8 above) should be released at a time to be agreed on 22 December (Peking time is 7 hours ahead of Paris time). If this proved impossible, the documents should be released no later than 23 December, again at a time to be agreed.
16. The meeting ended in high good humour with mutual expressions of friendliness etc.
17. Please let [me]5 have your reactions to all of the above as quickly as possible.
[NAA: A6364, PA1972/12–01]
Renouf.
1 Document 369.
2 Document 364.
3 Document 367.
4 Editorial insertion.
5 Editorial insertion.