Canberra, undated
Top Secret
Recognition of Communist China and Representation in the United Nations
Since the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War in 1950, the problem of whether or not the Peking Government should be recognised and seated in the United Nations as the proper representative of China has not been a pressing one. Even the United Kingdom and other Western European Governments recognising Peking readily agreed that the question of admission to the United Nations should be deferred until after the Korean hostilities ceased.
2. Hostilities in Korea have now ceased, but the problem may well, except in exceptional circumstances, not become acute for a time. It will, in part, depend on the kind of attitude adopted by the Chinese at the political conference, the progress of that conference, and any developing possibilities of a general easing of tensions in the Far East. If the Chinese adopt a reasonable and conciliatory attitude at the political conference and show no signs of engaging in expansionist or subversive adventures in other areas, then serious consideration will need to be given to this matter. It cannot be argued, as some have sought to, that agreement on Far Eastern matters is impossible without recognition. China’s presence at the political conference, in itself a sort of recognition, enables contact to be maintained.
3. From a purely legal viewpoint there seems little reason why we should not recognise the Peking Government as soon as possible. To the lawyer’s mind, recognition of a Government, and, for that matter, its right to represent the country in the United Nations if that country is a member, does not imply either approval or disapproval of the regime concerned. Admittedly, Article IV of the Charter2 does use the word ‘peace-loving’ and lays down certain obligations, but the lawyer would argue that this article relates solely to the question of the admission of a country to the organisation and is not relevant to the present case
4. It is submitted, however, that there are grave practical and political difficulties in early recognition of the Peking Government and, indeed, in giving any kind of binding indications at this point that one is considering such a step. Our relationship with the United States is of enormous importance in the formulation of a practical foreign policy whose objective must always be the safe-guarding of Australian security. Public opinion in the United States is not ready either to recognise Peking or to see it seated in the United Nations. ManyAmerican soldiers have been killed by the aggressive intervention of Peking in the Korean war. It would be rash to take action at this stage which might jeopardise the whole attitude of the United States Government and people towards the United Nations and towards Far Eastern policy generally. Furthermore, there is the question of Formosa. It is hardly .conceivable, in view of what we understand to be the United States assessment of the strategic importance of Formosa, that this could be handed over to Peking as part of China and used as a base by the Communists. The most that can be expected from the Americans on this matter is the neutralisation of Formosa in some way and possibly, so far as the United Nations is concerned, the eventual seating of China and a Government of Formosa.
5. In view of these circumstances, it would seem that the wise course for Australia to follow would be to take these questions fairly quietly, making no commitments one way or the other at this time, but indicating fairly clearly that we are in no particular hurry until we can see the way more clearly, to take what is probably, in the long run, the inevitable action of recognition. We should, it is thought, rather let India, or Canada (if it so wishes) take the lead in pressing this question.
6. The effect of trying to work this question out ‘sooner rather than later’, as the New Zealand Minister for External Affairs3 has put it in a letter to theAmerican Ambassador in Wellington,4 may well have the effect of delaying rather than accelerating the eventual solution of the problem. It is well known to us here what the effect in the United States is of trying to hurry them on something which, while the Administration may privately be sympathetic, the public is not prepared for. The effect is likely to be that the Administration, against its better judgement and because of poor timing on the part of someone trying to get a quick decision, is forced into public statements which fix United States policy for some time in the future.
7. The possible eventual outcome of this problem may well be that the United States will privately accept the inevitable as regards the recognition of Peking by the great majority of the free nations and will accept the seating of the Peking Government in the United Nations. Publicly, they will oppose both moves and will vote against them in the United Nations, but will accept ‘unwillingly’ the decision of the Democratic majority.
8. Attempts to hurry this issue will alarm Washington. They may result in increased pressure on us not to recognise or to let the Chinese into the United Nations. Such views expressed by a number of the countries like New Zealand might well have the effect of making United States policy more rather than less rigid. It is suggested, therefore, that Australia should not follow the New Zealand lead in this matter, but that her actions should be governed by the considerations outlined above.
9. It follows from the above that discussion at the ANZUS Council meeting should, in no circumstances, be directed to an attempt to persuade the United States at this point that she should consider the early recognition of the Peking Government or the seating of Peking as a representative of China in the United Nations. We might, however, direct our suggestions to the idea that recognition is probably sooner or later inevitable. It might be possible and useful to have the Secretary of State on record as recognising this fact. It would also assist us to have the American assessment of the length of time it might be necessary to devote to the preparation of American public opinion to this step. Furthermore, an evolution of the real significance of recent Senate action implying American withdrawal from the United Nations, if the United Nations did seat the Chinese Communists, would be useful. If there were any real chance of the view of the Senate actually becoming a policy of the United States Government in this regard, then our own position would be thereby materially affected. The seating of Peking in the United Nations would be a very hollow victory indeed for those who advocate this course if it drove the United States out of the organization thereby rendering it completely hopeless.
10. It is submitted therefore, that, given the analysis above and the overriding importance of our relationship with the United States, that the ANZUS Council is not the time for discussion as to whether or when to recognise the Peking Government. It is rather an opportunity to establish accurately those facts upon which we must, in due course, base our own policy.
11. It is quite possible that the U. S. Administration is relieved that it is not at present obliged to decide its attitude on recognition since its long term attitude towards Communist China is involved in the decision. The view has [been?]5 attributed to Admiral Radford6 that the U.S. will never be secure so long as the Communists retain power in China. James Reston7 wrote from Tokyo last month that some U.S. diplomatic and military officials in the Far East deplore the lack of any clear objective from Washington in favour of a long-range policy of trying to overthrow Mao Tse-tung. Thus there might well be powerful elements within theAdministration which are opposed to recognition at any time in the foreseeable future.
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Formosa
1. The most delicate of the problems likely to arise at the meeting of the ANZUS Council is the question of Formosa. In estimating the position of the Nationalist regime is8 its potential, the effects of the American policy (the amount of aid and encouragement the Americans are prepared to give to the regime) must have a most important bearing on our judgement. Without American aid the Nationalists can achieve nothing and would be unlikely to be able even to defend Formosa if it were attacked. With American aid continuing at the present rate, they would be capable, according to reliable observers, of putting up a spirited defence of the island. With increased aid and encouragement from the Americans they may attempt to make a re-conquest of the mainland. Such an attempt could be made without a renewed outbreak of war in the Far East, and it is a matter for consideration how far we should attempt to discover the intentions of the United States in this respect and/or attempt to influence them. Intelligence at present available to us suggests that the Nationalists could not hope to achieve anything in such an attempt without aid on a large scale. Nevertheless, the Nationalists do seem to have interpreted the deneutralisation of Formosa announced by President Eisenhower in February, as something of an ‘all clear’ for stepped up activity, not only along the mainland coasts, but in raids against islands off the mainland. The terms of any understanding between the United States and the Nationalists requiring consultation prior to any stepping up of Nationalist military activities against the mainland are unknown to us, however, a recent raid upon the island of Tung Shan was reported to have been n a larger scale than previously. Though the Americans were consulted on the preparations for the raid, we understand they were not informed of the actual operational target. Unconfirmed press reports of a secret agreement between the Americans and the Chinese Nationalists, that the latter will do nothing without consulting the former, suggest the Americans are concerned lest the Nationalists ‘beat the gun’ and get involved in large scale operations from which it might become necessary later on to extricate them. The ANZUS meeting would be a suitable occasion for endeavouring to ascertain the nature of this agreement.
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3. It is probable that American policy aims at nothing more than maintaining the pressure against Communist China by keeping the Nationalists as a threat against the mainland. (This was the explanation of United States policy suggested by Allison in February of this year). The possibility of the Nationalists attempting some action without United States cognisance should not be ruled out. The United Kingdom Consul-General at Tamsui9 recently observed that Nationalist forces might be expected to improve in efficiency for a year or two, but that after that, their potential would decrease, due to the ageing of their forces etc. This factor is likely to weigh heavily with them when considering their chances of maintaining an attack on the mainland. It may be possible to ascertain at the ANZUS Council meeting whether the United States policy on Formosa still has the limited objective suggested by Allison in February.10
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A10576, vi]
1 Held in Washington, September 1953.
2 Article 4(1) of the UN Charter reads: ‘Membership in the United Nations is open to … all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations’.
3 T.C. Webb, New Zealand Minister for External Affairs and Island Territories.
4 Robert M. Scotten.
5 A word appears to be missing here.
6 Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.
7 US author and journalist.
8 The word ‘is’ may have been intended to read ‘for’.
9 Presumably a reference to E.H. Jacobs-Larkcom, the UK Consul in Tamsui.
10 Much of the discussion of China at the Council Meeting centred on Formosa. Secretary of State Dulles argued that the de-neutralisation of the island had possibly helped to convince the Chinese that an armistice in Korea was desirable. Prompted by Spender, he also remarked that the future role of Nationalist forces depended on what might happen in Indo-China—but he said the current priority was to make these forces capable of defending Formosa. Chinese representation in the United Nations was raised by WalterS. Robertson, US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who said that the seating of the PRC would be a ‘serious blow to United States prestige in Asia’. On recognition, Spender repeated an earlier statement by Menzies that discussion of recognition could not occur while Australia was at war with China. In the final communique, it was agreed that the view of the three ANZUS governments was that ‘under present circumstances, no question of the recognition of Communist China or the admission of its representatives to the United Nations would be entertained’.