Canberra, 12 February 1954
38. Top Secret Priority
Your telegrams 10 to 14.1
1. We are grateful for the information you have been able to secure. Please thank Eden and others for keeping us in touch and for their assurances that Australian interests will not be overlooked.
2. We agree with stand of Western Powers that there should be no Five Power Conference with unrestricted agenda and opening possibilities for ranging over world at large. This would merely expose us to attacks by Communists on matters of their own choosing (e.g. American bases in other countries) without affording any prospect that they would discuss reasonably other matters on which an agreement might be hoped for. It would also give Communist China in effect the status of one of the great powers despite the fact we have not recognized that government or supported its admission to United Nations.
3. We also agree it would be desirable to talk with Communist Chinese on limited range of subjects such as Korea. Question, however, still arises of whether other countries should also be present, and we still believe, and are pleased that Eden and Dulles have pressed this view, that other nations providing forces should be present also. If communists want a Korean conference strongly enough, Dulles proposal can serve as basis, but if their principal desire is to move closer to world recognition of Communist China a solution is unlikely to be found at present.
[ matter omitted ]
5. It would appear to us that, provided reservations about recognition were made, the status of the Chinese People’s Republic as a co–sponsor or main participant in a political conference on Korea should not be a stumbling block. The question whether a conference on Korea be convened by a Big Four or a Big Five might be resolved if there is a will to do so by recording the decision in the name of the Big Four now meeting but listing as participants these four, then the Chinese People’s Republic, the Republic of Korea, the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, and such other countries which provided armed forces to serve under the United Nations Command in Korea as may desire to participate.
[ matter omitted ]
8. Finally, the Berlin Conference might conclude its declaration on Asian affairs by a statement that after progress had been made on the questions of Korea and Indo–China, the Big Four might consider the desirability of convening further meetings among the countries principally concerned to discuss other questions concerning East Asia.
9. Declaration on the above lines might have the effect of meeting the desire of the U.S.S.R. that the Chinese People’s Republic be given adequate status at conferences on Korea and Indo–China and possibly ultimately other Asian matters, while avoiding the formal inclusion of the Chinese People’s Republic in any Big Power grouping and precluding the Peking Regime from exercising any right to bring up any general topic for discussion at a given meeting. While it is realistic to recognise the interest of the Chinese People’s Republic in certain Asian questions and to be able to test their willingness to honour agreements relating thereto, it would be undesirable to hasten the time at which they could by right intervene in international affairs.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1838, TS852/20/4/27]
1 Cablegrams under reference related to information from the Australian Mission in Berlin on discussions between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France. In late January and February, the Ministers had been debating a number of world issues, including the basis on which a political conference on Korea would take place. Dulles and Anthony Eden, the UK Foreign Secretary, resisted calls by the USSR for a conference between the ‘big five’ (that is, one including the PRC) that would discuss broadly a means of reducing international tension. Dulles, for his part, proposed that the ‘big four’ invite the parties involved in the Korean war, including the PRC, to a conference on Korea specifically—which, given certain conditions, could be followed by a conference on Indo–China. Dulles’ proposal stated in conclusion that ‘neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above–mentioned political conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded’( Foreign Relations of the United States , 1952–54, vol. VII, p. 983).