Canberra, 9 July 1954
Top Secret
Recognition of Communist China and Seating in the United Nations
Attached is a paper I prepared last August for the ANZUS Council meeting in September,3 which you attended. The wheel has turned full circle in that it was prepared at a time when the New Zealanders had expressed ‘sooner rather than later’ views on the matter, and just after a round of resolutions in the United States Senate demanding withdrawal from the United Nations in the event of the admission of Peking.
2. Also attached is a paper showing the present position as regards recognition and Chinese representation abroad.4 This paper is a revised version of a document we received last October from the United States Government.
3. Public opinion in the United States has not changed, and the importance of the United States to us is exactly as it was twelve months ago. Moreover, if the move to recognise (and then to seat in the United Nations) secured general acceptance, and the United States was driven from the organisation, the United Nations would cease to have much significance (if any), and international tension would be aggravated.
4. These factors must weigh heavily in our consideration of the matter, but there are others which we must now take into account:—
5. In brief therefore I feel that the problem has to an extent simplified itself. It would not, it is submitted, be impossible to say that the aggression had been defeated and was not something that will go on forever. It can be argued that the Chinese position at the Korean Conference both on Korea, and Far Eastern problems (in this case only Indo–China), was not unreasonable. If one puts aside certain thorny problems such as Formosa (and it is not suggested for a moment that recognition or admission to the United Nations should mean that Formosa should be handed over) it boils down to the proposition that our decision on China should be based simply on our evaluation of its effect on our relations with the United States of America.
6. Whether one thinks that the policy of the United States on this matter is wrong—and I do—we have to admit that we cannot afford so to upset them that they will be driven away from close relationships with us, and driven from the United Nations. An assessment of this is more a matter of hunches than logical argument. In my view neither will happen. If a number of countries like ourselves, highly respected in the United States as ‘reliable’, take action to recognise the clear facts of the situation, then some re–assessment of policy may take place in the United States. So far as the United Nations is concerned, United States abandonment of the organisation would seem to be an extreme and perhaps unlikely step. Anyway, the organisation as at present constituted is practically useless as an instrument in affairs in the area of the world vital to us. Chinese participation in settlements is essential and they will have nothing to do with the United Nations. Chinese entry into the organisation would probably have a good effect on relationships in the area, and on strengthening the organisation as a whole.
7. Recognition of China, and her entry into the United Nations, by the establishment of contact, and the possible reduction of points of misunderstanding, may reduce the possibility of war with China in the area.
8. It looks very much as though, in the British Commonwealth, we are very soon to be faced with the situation where the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon will have taken the step of recognition, and only Australia and South Africa will be standing out.
9. Consideration of this question in September in New York, so far as representation in the United Nations is concerned, will be lively and bitter. If we maintain our present position we may well find ourselves not only isolated from the rest of the Commonwealth, but also all of our traditional friends in Europe and Asia, and in the company only of the United States and an assorted crew of Latin Americans, and not all of the Latin Americans either.
10. This would not matter if we thought either that the Americans were right, or that even if wrong their reaction would be such as to affect our security substantially. In all the circumstances, it is submitted that it would matter.
(a) The Korean war has been over for thirteen months, and there is no sign that it will be renewed. How long does the process of ‘purging an aggression’ take? Until the signing of a peace treaty? In which case, should the West Germans be regarded as aggressors? Would the United States oppose their admission to the United Nations or walk out if they were admitted? The United States certainly suffered great losses in Korea. They also did in Germany. American reaction to the Chinese is emotional rather than rational. It is another case of the distinction between Communist aggression, aggression, and just plain Communism. But what about Russia?
(b) Twelve months ago we were saying that we would have to wait and see what attitude the Chinese adopted at the Political Conference on Korea, and towards Far Eastern problems generally before we would make up our minds on this matter. Presumably, the Korean part of the Geneva Conference can be taken as the ‘political conference’ envisaged in the Armistice Agreement. If this is so, Chinese participation was not unusually unco–operative. The real stumbling block at Geneva was the ROK and it is likely that, without them, and without understandable anxiety on the part of the US and some of the rest of the ‘sixteen’ including ourselves not to let them down, some progress at least might have been made in reaching a ‘modus vivendi’ settlement.
(c) So far as the Chinese attitude towards Far Eastern problems generally is concerned it is difficult to make clear judgments. It might not be wrong to suggest that the Chinese showed some restraint in Geneva, some desire to reach a settlement, and some anxiety to avoid general hostilities in the area. Many delegates not on the Communist side were impressed by Chou En–lai.
[NAA: A1838, 494/2/12]
1 K.C.O. Shann, Assistant Secretary, UN Branch, Department of External Affairs.
2 A.H. Tange, Secretary, Department of External Affairs.
3 Document 42, paragraphs 1—11.
4 That is, countries that recognised China and PRC representatives abroad. Not published.