Melbourne, 10 December 1954
Confidential Personal
As I mentioned to you I had intended to make some veiled reference in this past week to the recognition of Communist China. However, it might have alienated two or three votes at the end of the debate on Dutch New Guinea1 (Nationalist China and one or two others)—so I thought it best to postpone it for a little.
I enclose the approximate text of what I had proposed to say. It is rather indirect as you will see—and has a little both ways—but I think would reasonably have been interpreted as a fairly distinct lead to public opinion. Actually, the majority of the Australian press seems to me, on net balance, to be for recognition—so that the Government would not have got a black mark in the press.
When I was last in Washington I got the distinct impression at the top end of the State Department that some lead like this would not be ill–taken. Now that the American election is behind them,2 the minds of a number of them seem to me to be hoping that some more realistic attitude towards Peking can be brought about—but it is very hard for them to take the lead themselves, as they are prisoners of their past statements and attitude.
If and when I say something on the attached lines, I will prepare the way by telegraphing or airmailing in advance the gist of it to Washington, Ottawa and London in particular, so that they will not have to rely on some garbled press telegram.
I have been on the verge of doing this sort of thing once or twice before, but the moment has never seemed to be opportune. One has to guard against the probability that the time will never be really opportune, by reason of one thing or another. I think one has to try to seize the moment that is least inopportune.
I would be grateful if you would let me have your reaction to the attached—with any alterations or additions that you think would be wise.3
Attachment
Last week, the United States of America and Nationalist China entered into a security pact.4 The pact is defensive in nature. It specifically covers Formosa and the Pescadores. It does not make firm commitments about any other territories such as the islands off the coast of China.
This is an important agreement, the implications of which deserve attention and discussion. This pact could open up possibilities of avoiding war if the Chinese Communists can be brought to see the futility and irresponsibility of pursuing their aims by force of arms. It may well tum out to be a factor making for stability in the Far East. Quite clearly, this pact has no militarily offensive purpose against the mainland of China. Equally, it makes clear the intention of the parties that any attack upon Formosa or the Pescadores will be resisted.
It is the position of the Australian Government—and I believe of the United Kingdom Government—that Formosa should remain, as at present, in non–Communist hands and that the people living in that island should not be handed over to a Communist regime to which they are opposed and which would wreak vengeance upon them.
This brings us, however, to the question of the Communist Government of the mainland of China and the way in which it should be regarded by other countries.
Let me say in the first place that the present Peking regime is in fact in control of the mainland of China. We do not like the way in which the Communists gained power. We deplore many basic features in their regime—the mass regimentation, the totalitarian control by a small party of zealots, limitation of fundamental human liberties, the execution of thousands of non–Communists, the distortion of truth.
But I believe it is a fact to say that some matters in the Far East cannot be effectively dealt with unless negotiations take place with the Peking Government. In some questions affecting the Far East, for example, discussions in the United Nations have been ineffective because in fact there is no one who can speak for, or enter into commitments on behalf of, the mainland of China.
The control exercised over the mainland of China and over the conduct of her international relations has led to dealings by the western world with the Communist Government in Peking. Discussions have taken place outside the United Nations and agreements have been entered into by the Chinese Communist Government. The Geneva Conference is the most obvious example. The attempt at Geneva to deal effectively with Korea and Indo–China could only have been made with any chance of reality by discussions which included the Peking authorities, representing the power and resources of the mainland of China.
The logic of this appears to me to lead us irresistibly to the need for discussion and negotiation with the Peking regime on such international questions. We must therefore, ask ourselves whether the relations of most of the democratic world with this Peking regime are on a satisfactory basis at present—whether we have the means of discussion and negotiation when they are needed. I believe that it is not in our long–term interests that Peking should be cut off from intercourse with the democratic world. Equally I do not believe that it is in our democratic interests to encourage the rulers of Peking to live isolated in their own propaganda and their own dogmas. It is not to the general advantage that they acquire their picture of the world from these misleading sources and from their Soviet Communist elder partners.
At the same time, non–Communist countries are not encouraged to regularize their diplomatic or other relations with Peking when that Government continues to act in defiance of international agreements and contrary to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter. The latest example is the continued detention and even punishment of American prisoners of war taken during the Korean hostilities. Nor have we any real reason to believe that the Chinese Communists are necessarily ready to regularize relations with the other countries. For example they have for long treated with considerable indifference the offers of some countries to formal recognition and to exchange diplomatic representatives.
Moreover, as I have said, a fundamental feature of our approach to China must clearly be the denial of Communist claims upon Formosa.
Finally, the method of conducting relations with Peking has nothing to do with our view of its foreign policy or its international intentions. We have no evidence which leads us to believe that Chinese Communist policy is anything but expansionist. On the other hand, we have every reason to believe that international Communism in Asia—the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Viet Minh and their agents in each country—will continue to work with zeal and cunning to absorb the whole of South–East Asia. It follows that we must press on with the work that has already begun.
We must build upon the Manila Treaty Organization and related military understandings among the countries of the non–Communist world. We in Australia must be prepared to perform whatever tasks fall to us in this collective effort, for it involves, at one short remove, the defence of Australia itself.
But over and beyond military preparations, we must join with all those who genuinely want freedom, independence and security in South–East Asia: and we must enter the ideological struggle with the Communists with all the nonmilitary weapons at our command. These weapons are powerful if they are directed and co–ordinated. We can help people to acquire better living standards and personal security: spread knowledge of facts and combat the poison of Communist propaganda: open opportunities for Asians to western technology: offer governments friendly co–operation when they want genuine assistance.
[NAA: A4940, C230]
1 At the Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly beginning in New York on 21 September 1954, the General Assembly had voted to inscribe the item of West New Guinea on its agenda. Casey had spoken against inscription of the item and had fully supported the Netherlands position of opposition to the extension of Indonesian sovereignty to West New Guinea. A resolution whose operative paragraphs expressed the hope that Indonesia and the Netherlands would try to find a solution to their dispute in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter was defeated in the plenary General Assembly on 10 December with Australia supporting the majority position.
2 In the United States, congressional and gubernatorial elections had been held on 2 November 1954 for over one–third of the membership of the Senate, all of the House of Representatives and Governors of 34 States.
3 Menzies wrote on the document: ‘This has been fully discussed in Cabinet, which does not favour a change’.
4 See editorial note entitled The United States–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty.