Washington, 17 November 1956
Top Secret Guard
[ matter omitted ]
7. Later in the discussion Robertson returned to the subject of Communist China. In a lengthy intervention, he declared that U.S. non–recognition was the main obstacle to Chinese Communist influence in Asia; that recognition would result in Asian countries rapidly entering the Communist orbit; and that the Communist regime could not be regarded as truly representing the Chinese people. Stump1 warmly supported these remarks and Hoover2 assented to them …
Formosa and the Offshore Islands
8. Robertson said that the situation in Formosa was good. Economic aid was usefully employed and the Army was effective. Nationalist leaders ‘at long last’ recognised that they could not attack the mainland successfully themselves, and ‘knew that the United States would not go to war to put them back on the mainland’. U.S. had been trying to persuade Nationalists not to go on repeatedly proclaiming their intention of liberating the mainland. ‘A settlement of the China question would have to come from within rather than from without’, along the lines indicated by the present revolts in Eastern Europe. There were written agreements preventing any Nationalist attack without U.S. consent. The U.S. did not believe there was much danger of a Chinese Communist attack on Formosa because Communists were on notice that this would mean war with U.S. Robertson stressed that the Formosa regime was the only alternative to the Communists. ‘Liquidate Formosa, and you convert them into Chicoms’.3
9. Subsequently Mr Casey asked Gordon Gray (U.S. Assistant Secretary, Defence) whether the danger of a Soviet miscalculation (our ANZUS 3)4 should also be related to Communist China. Gray (supported by Robertson) replied that he believed that if Russians started serious trouble the Chinese would follow suit.
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China
27. Replying to Robertson, Mr Casey said that we understood that the U.S. Government and Congress had very strong views about Communist China. Our own attitude was very largely influenced by the U.S. views. No change of policy on our part in regard to recognition was in mind or in prospect. At present we conducted a certain amount of trade with China but this was solely in nonstrategic materials. He hoped that the U.S. would not misunderstand some slight increase in future in commodities such as wool and agricultural machinery. Macdonald (New Zealand)5 explained the New Zealand experience with the Peking Opera, for which the local Communists had tried unsuccessfully by every means to get some Governmental recognition. The Leader of the New Zealand Opposition was advocating recognition, and the Government was under considerable pressure to liberalize trade restrictions but it would give no encouragement to increased trade.
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[NAA: Al0576, ix]
1 Admiral Felix B. Stump, Commander–in–Chief of the US Navy’s Pacific Command and Pacific Fleet.
2 Herbert J. Hoover, US Under Secretary of State.
3 That is, Chinese Communists.
4 17 November. Hoover informed the Australian Embassy that the US Government believed that ‘the greatest present danger’ was a miscalculation by Soviet leaders resulting from strong pressures they were experiencing in the Eastern European satellites and conflict among the leadership in Moscow. He thought that the Allies should ‘in no way minimize the dangers’ that the USSR ‘might move’. Moreover, in the present situation, ‘anything might happen’ if the USSR made a ‘major miscalculation’, such as trying to overrun Western Europe. The United States, Hoover noted, had placed its armed forces in a state of ‘world wide alert’.
5 T.L. Macdonald, New Zealand Minister of External Affairs.