Canberra, 27 February 1958
Secret
Communist China
(a) Recognition
(b) Admission to United Nations.
Notes for Talks with Mr Nash.1
We have heard that the Americans were very concerned at the possibility of recognition of Communist China by the New Zealand Socialist Government; so much so that Dulles asked Mr Macmillan2 to speak personally to Nash. This was done, and Mr Nash stated that he was in no hurry to move toward recognition.
The matter may be raised during your talks with Mr Nash,3 and this note is to suggest that you might reinforce Mr Macmillan’s line that it would be unwise, at this stage, to recognise Communist China. You will know that following the Bermuda talks the United Kingdom Permanent Delegate4 to the United Nations told Commonwealth delegates that in the United Kingdom view the admission of Communist China to the United Nations carried with it major disadvantages at a time when the Afro–Asian bloc was assuming such importance in the functioning of the Assembly.
Recognition by New Zealand—or by ourselves for that matter—would do little to assist the Chinese, and may not have any startling results, except that it would mean that additional pressure would be brought on the United States to do likewise, and if this happened, recognition would have a ‘snowballing’ effect right throughout Asia.
The balance between the forces of Communism in Asia and the force of democracy is at present precarious, but any substantial movement towards recognition would tip the scale irrevocably in favour of Communist China. The British representative on Formosa5 has recently summed up the practical consequences to the position of the Western Powers in Asia as well as the anti–Communist countries on our side if recognition were to be granted, particularly by the United States. He saw these disadvantages as:
(i) the greatest Communist prestige victory in Asia since the take–over of the mainland;
(ii) a much stronger Communist claim to Formosa—the pivotal point in American security defence chain;
(iii) an even less workable United Nations Organization;
(iv) a split in American public opinion and a major crisis in Anglo–American relations;
(v) as a result of all the above the need for practically all countries in South–East Asia and the Far East, which have not already done so, to abandon National China and come to terms with Communist China; to recognise it and establish relations, and, in the process, to review their whole foreign policy alignment.
There are one or two other aspects that should be mentioned. The first is that it is sometimes forgotten that the number of countries in the world which continue to recognise the Chiang Kai–shek Government formally as the legal Government of China is still much greater than the number of those which do not. Secondly, arising out of general recognition of Communist China we would expose Malaya and Singapore—countries vital to our own defence and to the defence of New Zealand in the present context of international relations—to the damaging influences of Communist Chinese diplomatic representatives in the area.
M.C. Timbs
[NAA: A1209, 57/4832, ii]
1 Walter Nash, New Zealand Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs.
2 Harold Macmillan, UK Prime Minister, had left London on 7 January for a six–week goodwill tour of Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Macmillan had arrived in New Zealand on 20 January and in Australia on 28 January.
3 Menzies and Casey had talks with Nash in Sydney on 28 February.
4 Sir Pierson Dixon.
5Presumably, the UK Consul in Tamsui, A. Veitch.